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Abstract 
In this thesis I apply Merleau-Ponty's brand of existential phenomenology to 
the developmental language disorder 'dyslexia'. Developmental dyslexia is 
marked by an unexpected failure to acquire written language skills, in 
particularly reading, spelling and aspects of writing, and has primarily been 
studied by experimental cognitive psychology, physiology, and more recently, 
the neurosciences. The current explanatory paradigm holds the view that 
symptoms of dyslexia are caused by deficits M phonological skills, M 
particularly verbal memory and phoneme awareness. As a means of facilitating 
previous research, I take a phenomenological approach to the pre-reflective, 
lived experience of dyslexia by studying the peculiar style of intentional 
relationships that are developed by dyslexics in linguistic situations. This 
approach adopts a non-causal, descriptive methodology which attends to the 
manner in which dyslexics not only have a disrupted experience of the written 
word, but also a meaningful relationship with language. Using the notion of the 
'lived body', I propose that dyslexics are marked by a loosening of body 
intentionality in linguistic situations, and this is further interpreted as an 
incohesive sedimentation of skills. I apply these general findings to the topics 
of spatiality, expression and temporality, and conclude that dyslexics exhibit a 
different style of being-in-the-world. This difference in style is characterised as 
an interaction between the propensity to foreclose the transitional and 
differential structures of perceptual experience, and moreover, the possibility 
of sustaining a provisional relationship with language through the development 
of compensatory strategies, the latter of these observations prompting a new 
line of future qualitative research, 
Chapter One 
The Possibility of a Phenomenology of Dyslexia 
The aim of this thesis is to illustrate how a descriptive phenomenology can begin to 
elucidate the experiential level of what is commonly referred to as 'dyslexia', a 
developmental disorder that is marked by an unexpected failure to acquire written 
language skills, in particularly reading, spelling and the quality and speed of written 
work. The notion of an experiential level is one which lies in advance of any 
scientific or objectively-based approaches taken to dyslexia, and yet a 
phenomenological account should not be simply understood as an autobiographical, 
first-person perspective report. As such, a phenomenological investigation of 
dyslexia offers something quite new to the current field of research. A wide variety 
of disciplines have contributed to dyslexia research, the most important of which will 
be referenced and described in detail later m this chapter. These approaches include: 
the neurosciences, including Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI); physiology and perceptual studies, which focus on both 
the visual and auditory systems; first-hand autobiographical accounts of dyslexia 
from dyslexics and their families; education, including the remediation and screening 
of dyslexic children; and to a smaller extent sociology. However, by far the largest 
area of research has come in the form of experimental cognitive psychology, and 
through individual and group testing, an array of clinical and experimental 
approaches have made valuable contributions to the grouping and understanding of 
manifold symptoms displayed in different forms of dyslexia. Furthermore, of the 
disciplines mentioned thus far, it is this approach that Will feature most heaVily 
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during this thesis, for not only does cognitive psychology provide the current 
paradigm for explanations of dyslexia, but it may stand to gain the most from a 
phenomenological account of dyslexia. Although these approaches have proved 
essential M opening up our understanding of dyslexia, the role of a philosophically 
driven phenomenology of dyslexia, focusing on the pre-reflective, lived experience 
of the dyslexic subject has not been explored. This thesis thus serves as an 
introduction to this line of research. 
From the brief overview just given it is evident that, due to the nature of disciphnes 
involved in dyslexia research, the prevailing methodology has been scientific 
(whether these disciplines are understood as a natural or social science), and 
therefore such research is generally underpinned by notions of causality, 
detenninism, and objectivity. Although highly useful autobiographical accounts have 
provided a discursive means of gaining a better understanding of the symptoms and 
general experience of dyslexia, what the above disciplines do not consider is the 
worth of a rigorous, descriptive-based account of dyslexia which aims to interpret the 
manner in which those affected by dyslexia expenence language, i. e. the manner in 
which language is meaning(ul to them. As such, the account I am attemptmg to 
provide is less interested in explaining why certain symptoms of dyslexia occur, i. e. a 
causal account, and more interested in describing how dyslexics experience 
difficulties during reading and writing, difficulties which can be grouped together 
and accounted for by scientific disciplines, but which can also be interpreted on a 
broader 'existential' level. It is important to note that such an exposition would not 
be opposecl to, or invalidate the findings of, a scientific Mquiry, for although they 
inay be concerned with a similar topic, a phenomenological investigation has quite 
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different objectives at stake and takes a quite different methodological approach to a 
scientific account. Although a phenomenological approach may be critical of some of 
the presuppositions used in the methodology of the sciences, most notably 
psychology, I am in no way trying to provide a 'truer' or 'more complete' account of 
dyslexia, rather, one which would work with, and be complementary to established 
research. 
Merleau-Ponty's brand of phenomenology, set out most explicitly in Phenomenology 
of Perception and originally published in 19451, is particularly apposite in this 
respect. Demonstrating the value of some of his philosophical themes and 
conclusions through the re-interpretation of case studies of individuals with a range 
of psychological disorders, Merleau-Ponty attempts to access the pre-objective, pre- 
reflective, existential level of our 'bemg', Through a detailed critique of both 
empiricist and intellectualist approaches to perception, Merleau-Ponty prescribes a 
return to the 'life world', and such a return sees the examination of the perpetual 
unfolding of the intimate relationship between a world and ourselves. This unfolding 
is understood as the self-effacing, intentional level of existence which is built up 
through the reciprocity between the subject (understood as a bodily subjectivity), and 
that which it is umersed in - the world (understood as both physical and cultural). 
Because this level of existence is precisely pre-reflective it escapes a detenninate 
conceptualisation, and thus we nomially have only an everyday, indirect awareness 
of its structure. Merleau-Ponty attempts to describe this pnMordial trope of our 
existence by elucidating the meaningful style in which reflective 'consciousness' is 
grounded by a corporeal subjectivity which is amersed in a practical, concrete 
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situation - our 'being-in-the-world'. Thus, what a phenomenological investigation of 
dyslexia anns to bring to the literature is a descriptive account of the style in which 
the dyslexic relates to written language, a style which may not be coherent to others, 
but which has an existential, lived-meaning for the dyslexic. 
An introduction to developmental dyslexia, and my own case study 
What is dyslexia? 
This thesis is primarily an exercise in phenomenological description, and therefore 
has a philosophical impetus and grounding. However, it is hoped that the 
methodology used and the conclusions reached can be interpreted by other 
disciplines involved with dyslexia research in furthering their own accounts. As such, 
the thesis is intended for a philosophical readership, although it is hoped that the key 
notions and conclusions reached are accessible to a wider audience. Whilst the thesis 
will take for granted a certain knowledge of phenomenological literature, I do not 
expect that the reader will have had a great deal of exposure (if any) to the 
phenomenon of dyslexia. Thus, in order for the reader to gain a better purchase on 
the suitability of this thesis, in this section of the chapter I hope to introduce the 
reader to the topic of dyslexia through a brief definition as offered by previous 
research, and a biographical account of the problems faced by dyslexics through my 
Mcricau-Ponty, M. 1962. Because this text will be the primary philosophical resource used in the 
thesis and Nvill be referenced on a regular basis, any references to Chapters, Parts or direct quotes 
from the book will simply appear in brackets, e. g. - (Preface, p. xiii). 
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own case history and experience of dyslexia. Let us start with a recent, concrete 
defmition of 'dyslexia' as understood by the British Dyslexia Association: 
"We define dyslexia as a specific difficulty in learning, constitutional in Origin, in 
one or more of reading, spelling and written language which may be accompanied by 
difficulty in number work. It is particularly related to mastering and using written 
language (alphabetic, numerical and musical notation) although often affecting oral 
langmge to some degree ->, 
2 
As acknowledged in the popular understanding of dyslexia, and stated definitively in 
the above quote, dyslexia is primarily a disability which is associated with chi-ldren 
who show an unexpected failure to acquire written language skills, in particularly 
reading, spelling and the quality and speed of written work 3. Although many dyslexic 
children are able to compensate for such difficulties, it is often the case that problems 
of literacy often stretch into adulthood. Dyslexia is a developmental disorder, as 
opposed to acquired, which cannot be attributed to a lack of educational or 
sociocultural opportunity, low intelligence, sensory or neurological damage, or 
psychiatric and emotional problems, and the occurrence of such disabilities often 
leads to difficulties in education and activities that are dependant upon a proficient 
level of literacy, e. g. reading music. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that 
problems of literacy associated with dyslexia may also have wider consequences 
which can involve emotional problems, and in certain extreme cases, antisocial 
and/or crIminal behaviour 4. Dyslexia tends to run m families, and the relatives of 
2 Bntish Dyslexia Association, 1989, quoted iný Purnfrev, P& Reason, R. 1991 ý p. 14, 1 Snowling, M. 1987, Chapter I. and, Miles, T. 1993. 
4 It should be noted that under the topic of emotional problems, the problems faced by the teachers 
and families of dyslexic children are also taken into account. See- Biggar, S& Barr, J. 1996, and, 
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those affected by dyslexia often have other language problems, whilst dyslexia is 
more common in boys than girls5. 
As mentioned, the main area of performance that is problematic for dyslexics is that 
of Wntten language skills. The most common features of dyslexic reading and 
spelling are: the inabihty to read and pronounce unfamiliar words with a tendency to 
4Z gruess haphazardly at their phonetic structure, and a failure to realise differences ; I- I 
between words which are similar in spelling and sound (e. g. right/write); difficulty in 
keeping track of the correct place when reading such that a page of text may seem to 
be unstable; problems in switching from one line to the next, or moving to a new 
place in the text (e. g. locating and trying to skip to the next paragraph); the rotation 
and the reversal of symbols In a word (e. g. writing or reading aV for a V), or the 
mixing up of words within a sentence, often referred to as 'strephosymbolia'; the 
omission of certain letters within words, or words within sentences in reading and 
writing; eccentric ways of spelling regular and irregular words which follow an 
inconsistent pattern such that the same word may be spelled incorrectly and quite 
differently on different occasions; and finally, a very poor standard of handwriting6. 
Apart from the failure to acquire a proficient level of written language skills, dyslexia 
is also associated with a number of other categories of difficulty. These include: slow 
speech development, delays in motor development, visual perceptual deficits, 
sequencing problems (e. g. the learning of lists), problems with the use of abstract 
symbols and numbers, and finally, impairments in temporal and spatial awareness 7. 
Although dyslexia is most commonly defmed'by such problems of literacy, it should 
Reid. G& Hinton, J. 1996, Pumfrev, P& Reason, R. 199 1, Chapter 4; and, Alm, J& Andersson, 
J. 1995. 
Olson. R, et al. 1989. 
See: Cntchlcy. M. 1970, and, Miles, T& Miles, E. 1990. 
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be noted that dyslexia can also be understood in a more positive manner, that is by 
paying attention to the non-phonological skills that dyslexics seem to flourish at. 
Such skills are usually of a more creative, visual-based quality, and examples of this 
are illustrated by the higb proportion of dyslexics wbo succeed in areas of 
8 
engineering, architectue and the visual arts 
Assessment and sub-! ypes of dvslexia 
Although some dyslexic traits are common to us all on an occasional basis (i. e. 
everybody misreads/misspells words occasionafly), as mentioned above, there are a 
number of key distinguishing features that differentiate dyslexia from an everyday 
susceptibility to reading and writing errors. These features have been interpreted on a 
diagnostic basis by a host of educational psychologists in an attempt to develop a 
standardised test that can be used to assess children who exhibit traits of dyslexia. A 
number of normative tests have been developed and used in the field of assessment, 
not only in the task of identifying 'dyslexia', but also in the differentiation between 
developmental dyslexics and other pupils with prolonged reading difficulties9. 
Although these tests are by no means definitive, two main forms of assessment are 
used m the UK: The Aston Index1o, developed at The University of Aston, and which 
acts as more of a screening test that can be used by teachers in the early identification 
of children who may be at educational risk from dyslexia; and, The Bangor Dyslexia 
7 See, . Critchley, M& Cntchley, E. 1978. 
" See: Aaron, ý. & Gwileniard, J. 1993. 'Artists as Dyslexics', in Willows, D. et al. 1993; and, 
DaN is, R. 1994. 
9 Such tests inclu& 'The Bangor Dyslexia Test', 'The Aston Index', 'The Boder Test of Reading- 
Spelling Patterns' and the 'British Ability Scales' test. A good surnman, of these and derivative 
tests is included in: Pumfrev, P. & Reason, R- 1991. Chapter 6. 
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Test", developed at Bangor University, which is generally used by an educational 
psychologist in their assessment of children who have shown traits of dyslexia at 
school. A brief description of this influential test is included below. 
The Bangor Dyslexia Test, pioneered by Tim Miles, is based upon a series of 
diagnostic indicators that have been derived from many years work with children 
who had shown unexpected difficulties with various aspects of literacy and 
numeracy. This indication test is used in conjunction with the results of a test of 
general ability, the family incidence of reading and spelling problems, and a report of 
the individual's reading, 4riting and spelhng problems at school. The main 
diagnostic indicators are as follows: awareness of left/right spatial direction, hand 
and eye dominance, repeating polysyllabic and rhyming words, mathematical 
calculations involving subtraction, the recitation of arithmetic tables, the recitation of 
months and digits in normal sequence and in reverse, and finally, the confusion and 
reversal of letters (b for d). Performance on the individual components of the test are 
score dyslexia positive, negative or ambiguous, according to criteria which are based 
on normative data and which take account of the examinee's age and general ability. 
The total number of dyslexia positive symptorns can then be determined and, 
depending on the age of the child, a critical number of positive symptoms will 
differentiate the dyslexic from the 'slow' or 'poor' reader. To legitimate this 
approach, Miles has carried out studies that have used the test in conjunction with 
three age groups of children which included both control subjects and children who 
exhibited traits of dyslexia, and found that in all age groups children who suffered 
Newton, M. & Thompson, M. 1982. 
Miles, T. 1983. 
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from reading, writing and spelling difficulties at school exhibited far more dyslexia- 
positive symptoms than control subjects 12 
One of the continuing problems of dyslexia research, from both a clinical and 
educational point of view, is that the symptoms exhibited by dyslexic children vary 
greatly, and thus the substantiation of dyslexia as a specific developmental disability 
which is distinct from other learning and reading difficulties is not without its 
problems 13 . As Tun Miles asserts: "there are poor readers who are not 
dyslexic, and 
there are many who satisfy some of the other criteria for dyslexia implied by the 
proposed taxonomy who nevertheless can read adequately. " 14 Concerning the topic 
of taxonomy, one of the main decisions to be taken is whether to 'lump together' a 
wide range of symptoms under the broad title of dyslexia, or whether to pioneer a 
range of sub-types of dyslexia, a 'splitting' of dyslexia into a number of different 
manifestations. Thus, apart from the fundamental split between acquired dyslexia 15 
and developmental dyslexia, one finds in the clinical literature that dyslexia Is 
presented as either a general disorder or a specific forin of dyslexia which has its 
own distinguishing features. 
12 Secý Miles, T. 1993. and, Singleton, C. 1988. 
11 The controveM! over 'specific learning difficulties' versus 'dyslexia' is a major debate within 
the clinical, educational and legislative fields of dvslexia, and for a background to this debate I 
advise the reader to look at. Nunfrey. P. & Reason, R_ 199 1, Chapter I .. 
Snowling, M. 1987, 
Chapter 1. and, Stanovich, K. 1994. For a helpful, concise article on the label of 'dysl "xia' m 
relation to other specific learning difficulties, see: Watson, P. 1997. 
NIiles, 'F. 1994. p. 205. 
For a good sununary of 'acquired dNslexia' and its sub-groups that result from an injur-y to the 
brain, scc: Ellis, A. 1993, Chapter 4. 
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These 'sub-groups' of dyslexia 16 exhibit aspects of both the core symptoms of 
dyslexia detailed above and specific characteristics, and are widely presented as: 
phonological dyslexia -a very low reading age compared to chronological age, a low 
capacity to read non-words (e. g. reading GOK as Joke'), poor word and non-word 
repetition, and, a poor short-term memory for sequences of words and digits 17; 
surface dyslexia' - again, a very low reading age, a poor ability to recogruse 
irregular wordv, but a far greater ability to read real words such that irregular words 
were regularised (e. g. BIND read as 'binned'), and a greater ability than 
phonological dyslexics at repeating words and non-words 18 ; and to a lesser extent 
'deep dyslexia' - marked by a problem in reading abstract words (e. g. infinite) which 
cannot be visualised, a range of semantic errors when reading (e. g. reading CHAIR 
as 'table' and SEVEN as 'eight'), and a low capacity for reading non-words'9. 
Although these sub-groups are useful in distinguishing the different characteristics 
exhibited by dyslexic children, and to an extent the different levels of severity, it is 
rare that diagnosed dyslexics fall neatly into the categories illustrated above. As Ellis 
suggests, it may be beneficial to treat dyslexia as a continuum between these groups 
(in particularly between phonological and surface dyslexia) than sticking to rigid 
categories'O. Indeed, the debate between the exact distinctions that are made between 
these sub-groups is outside the scope of this thesis, and therefore I wifl work with a 
general definItion of dyslexia which understands the disorder in the variety of its 
features mentioned above. In order to give the reader a first hand insight into the 
array of problems faced by dyslexic children, and to explain in part some of the 
16 On the topic of sub-groups of dyslexia, see: Stanovich, K. et al. 1997. 
17 Socý Ellis, A. 1993, Chapter 8, - and, Hulme, C. & Snowling, M. 1992. 
"See: Hanley, J. et al. 199 1. 
19 See: Johnston. R. 1983. However, the notions of developmental deep dyslexia and its similanty 
with acquired deep dyslexia has come under a certain amount of criticism, and is therefore 
disregarded in sonic of the literature, for example: Snowling, M. 1987, p. 82-86. 
II 
motivation for this thesis, I now turn to a case study of my own experience of 
dyslexia as a child. 
case AM2dl 
Although I have now largely overcome the majority of my childhood dyslexic 
problems, I feel as though I have always been, and to an extent stdl am, chaflenged 
by the written word. During my earliest years at infant school I can remember having 
particular trouble with both copying words and creative writing, i. e. actually 
converting my thoughts into letter and words on the page. Once I entered the higher 
part of infant school at the age of seven, it was clear from my teacher's reactions and 
reports that my work was extremely slow, even when copying directly firom a printed 
text, and my spelling, handwriting and sentence construction was very poor. The 
reaction to my problems from teachers was predominantly unsympathetic, attributing 
my slowness to being lazy and inattentive, and I was sometimes kept In class after 
school had finished in order to complete the piece of work that had been set. 
Understandably, I quickly grew to resent some of the people who taught me, and 
started to build up a distinct fear of going to school in the morning. The fear I had of 
specific teachers, of school as an institution, as well as the alienation I felt in relation 
to other pupils, all compounded the uncertainty and lack of confidence I had in 
relation to my work, and my parents decided I should be tested for dyslexia at 
Bangor University, Nordi Wales, using the Bangor Dyslexia Test as mentioned 
above. 
20 Ellis, A. 1993, p. 102-3. 
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At the age of eight I was diagnosed as exhibiting symptoms of developmental 
dyslexia, and I moved to a new school that had a special unit dealing with reading 
and writing difficulties. My problems were greatly reduced by the specialised 
learning unit and understanding atmosphere of my second school, and although I 
have learned to cope with written language through a combination of remediation 
and various self-monitoring strategies, my structuring of a piece of writing, the time 
it takes to complete and elementary writing/spelling and reading mistakes can still be 
quite problematic, especially if I am under the pressure of completing a task in a 
specific period of time. Indeed, to this date, I have never come close to finishing a 
written exam, and have often had to resort to notation in order to come near to 
completing a final exam question. 
There is no doubt that the symptoms I suffer from are only a mild form of dyslexia, 
however, I believe that I am in a good position to appreciate the problems faced by 
those with more severe forms of dyslexia, not only in terms of the troubles dyslexics 
face with language and communication, but the prejudice and lack of consideration 
they often experience. Moreover, to the extent that some mild dyslexic symptoms are 
still with me, this means that I can still access the vivacity of those problems which, 
as a child, were far more severe. I will now illustrate my experience of these 
problenis dirough a number of key examples. 
The first, and most obvious facet of dyslexia I can relate to, is the basic problem of 
maintaining a good standard of reading and vmting. This can be broken down into a 
2' A similar version of the above case histor)- also appears in: Philpotý M. 1998. 
13 
number of areas. Firstly, a simple miss-recognition or even lack of recognition of a 
word during reading or writing, such that I would either completely nuss out a word 
P-- - trom the current sentence, or would use a word that TrUght have a rough 
approximation to the intended word e. g. I might read 'slit' for 'slight'. A similar 
problem would be the well documented phenomenon of 'strephosymbolia', the act of 
twisting symbols. This would, and still can, occur for me in both single words (e. g. 
using d for b), and whole sentences, where I have a tendency to want to use words at 
the start of a sentence, when grammatically, they should occur at the end of a 
sentence. 
A second phenomenon involves problems related with maintaining the flow or 
sequencing of language, and these are problems which still remain with me. This 
phenomenon is associated with the slowness of my linguistic tasks, for although I am 
not necessarily distracted from my task, it is as though the momentum of my work 
starts to slow right down, or even stop altogether. I generally experience these 
disruptions in two ways. Firstly, although I can be composing/reading a sentence 
quite easily and lucidly, and therefore maintaining a certain momentum to my 
composition/reading task, quite unknown to myself, and through no force of what 
could be crudely termed 'inattention', I will suddenly realise that the 
composition/reading process has lost its vivacity, and the momentum that carried me 
before has completely broken down. A second related problem which I still 
experience involves a rushing through words, at times jumping well ahead of myself 
in the seqtience of words which make up a sentence. This jumping ahead is not 
simply tIYIng to anticipate the general direction of where the sentence is taking me, 
rather I am almost 'over-anticipating' what the sentence actually means, and qwte 
14 
often end up losing my place in a text. Because of this tendency, the rhyffim of the 
reading process is again affected; the jumping ahead of myself clearly frustrates the 
clarity and coherency of meaning experienced when I am reading smoothly. The 
slowness of my work clearly has its roots In the constant stopping, re-sequencing, 
and starting agam of my tasks. Furthermore, I should note that when at school my 
self-awareness of the label 'dyslexia' could often exacerbate some of the problems 
described above by amplifying the uncertainty and indecision when using language, 
ace problems when reading or i. e. being overly aware that I was highly likely to f 
wnting. 
Although these linguistic difficulties may become a significant problem for the 
dyslexic, and in my childhood experience became very much a part of my everyday 
life, the problems I have described above did not prevent me from using written 
language, and participating in communal linguistic actiVities. Rather, the difficulties I 
encountered were substantial and frequent enough to dehneate the different manner 
in which I associated with language. Moreover, this hopefully illustrates that, 
although on a specific linguistic level I could be viewed as 'abnormal', this class of 
abnormality does not fit into the standard medical model of disfunction that can be 
put under the heading of 'gross pathology', a point that I will come back to during 
later chapters in the thesis. 
li 
Previous clinical research 
The different methods of research 
Dyslexia has been recognised for over 100 years as an unexpected failure to gain 
literacy skills, and in this time has been explained in a host of different ways. The 
vast majority of such explanations have taken the form of a deficit account where 
dyslexia is defined negatively against the skills (e. g. phonological awareness) which 
are usually deemed necessaiy for tasks such as fluent reading, correct spelling, and 
legible reproduction of text. Initially, dyslexia was understood as a type of 
developmental visual-processing difficulty by figures such as Hinshelwood 22 , who 
understood dyslexia as a type of word blindness, and Orton, who paid specific 
attention to the phenomenon of symbol twisting (strephosymbolia) and the dire effect 
this had on some children's reading capabilItY23 . This paradigm of dyslexia research 
was superseded in the late 1970's when the problems associated with dyslexia were 
re-interpreted, most notably by Vellutino, 24 , not only 
in terms of visual-processing 
deficits, but primarily in terms of the verbal processing of language. 
Within the contemporary literature the most widely accepted explanation is still 
concerned within linguistic-cognitive deficits, and I will discuss and reference these 
in detail below. More specificafly, the current research paradigm is dominated by 
deficit accounts which focus on phonological (speech) deficits which disrupt the 
ability for dyslexics to reflect upon the sound-structure of spoken words, and thus 
leads to difficulties in learning how the letters and sounds of printed words are 
'2 Hinsbckvood, J. 1904. 
'Orton, S. 1937. 
'4 
Vcllutino, F. 1979. 
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related. This theory has also been given a neuro-physiological grounding through 
evidence from PET scanning which suggests that phonological difficulties may result 
from a weak connection between the anterior and posterior language areas of the left 
25 hemisphere of the brain . 
Although I will concentrate predominantly on the current paradigm of dyslexia 
research outlined above in both this section and in later chapters, areas of 
psychology, and especially physiology, have recently begun to pay attention to 
possible differences and deficits in dyslexics of the sensory perceptual system, most 
notably low level impairments of the visual system 26 . Although this type of research 
into dyslexia is generally seen as subordinate to the cognitive-phonological accounts 
I will detail below, a growing number of wide ranging studies are now beginning to 
make some impact on dyslexia research in the form of explaining deficits in tasks 
which have no linguistic or phonological component. Such research has presented the 
possibility that the wide ranging features of dyslexia cannot simply be explained by 
fundamental differences in phonological processing, although it should be added that 
the phonological deficits of dyslexia are by no means dismissed. Thus, a number of 
new lines of research have been pioneered such that problems faced by dyslexics can 
also be associated with: visual abnormalities, such as the bluffing and moving around 
of letter/words on a page, which can be attributed to a deficits in the magnoceflular 
component of the visual system which is specialised for processing fast temporal 
information 27 (see below); motor co-ordination problems, which are classified as 
'clumsiness' and have been related to aspects of dyspraxia, such as static and 
dynamic balance, manual dexterity, gross and fine motor control and the production 
25 Paulesa, E et al. 1996. 
26 For a comprehensive rcN-icNN- of this topic, see: Willows, D. et al. 1993. 
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of simultaneous movemene'; and lastly, problems With complex skill learning such 
as organisation and planning, for example, the structuring a piece of work'9. To 
elaborate on the idea of dyslexia being marked by a visual deficit I will briefly 
illustrate the argument offered by John Stein and colleges, as this seems to be one of 
most well developed non-phonological theories, and will be returned to later in the 
thesis. 
The theory offered by Stein and colleagues is one which is grounded in a 
neurophysiological approach, but which puts a greater emphasis back onto the way m 
which dyslexics actually experience their problems. Stein's theory is based upon a 
neurophysiological deficit in dyslexia, specifically, that the brain's magnocellular 
pathway which controls eye movements needed for reading and writing skills fails to 
send adequate 'stabilising information' to the visual cortex in dyslexics. Because 
there is a marked reduction of stabilising information - information which allows the 
flow and smoothness of reading/writing to persist, this results In unsteady eye 
movements which may lie behind dyslexic features such as, words blUrrMg and 
moving around the page, a loss of position on a page, and as specified by other 
accounts of dyslexics with poor motor skills, poor balance and co-ordination. Thus, 
the emphasis here is on how the dyslexic fmds it much harder to develop the ability 
to sense the most rapid changes M motion around him/her, especially in what is seen 
and heard. The stark conclusion drawn by a Stein and others is that the poorer the 
ability to detect a change in motion, the worse the reading, writing and spelling'O 
The evidence provided by Stein is an attempt to provide a more integrated account of 
27 See: Lovegrove, W. 1994; and, Stem, J& Walsh, V. 1997. 
2' Sec: Fawcett, A. & Nicolson, R. 1994(b) 
' 
Denk-la, M. 198-5 
.- and 
for the possible relationship 
between dyslcua and symptoms of dN-spr&Xla, see: Stephenson, L. & Fairgrieve, E. 1996. 
29 See: McLoughlin, D. el al. 1994. 
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dyslexia that does not make phonological, visual or motor deficits a fundamental 
explanation of dyslexia, and rather, he speculates whether temporal processing in all 
31 three of these systems may well be impaired in cases of dyslexia 
The Thonological Deficit Hypothesis" 
Since the late 1970's much research has concentrated on the cognitive deficits that 
underpin the problems faced by dyslexics, more specifically, the language-based, 
phonological skills which are required to use the written word proficiently and which 
are either absent or diminished for dyslexicS32 .A number of key verbal processing 
deficits that underpin dyslexia have been attended to by the literature, and these 
include: short-term and long-term memory deficits, verbal repetition, sequencing, 
naming difficulties, and of the specifically phonological skills that are diminished, 
the detection of rhyme and a child's overall phonological awareness. The basic 
premise of the phonological deficit hypothesis is that dyslexic children have 
difficulty in reflecting on the sound structure of spoken words, often referred to as 
phonological representations or codes, and such phonological problems make it 
difficult to learn how the letters and sounds of printed words are related. Because of 
this difficulty dyslexic children are either marked by a delay in the acquisition of 
See: Stein, J. & Walsh, V. 1997; Stein, J. 1994; and, Stein, J. 1993. 
Stein, J. & Walsh, V. 1997. 
32 There is a huge amount of hter-at= on the subject of cogmtivc and connected phonological 
deficits that underpin dyslexia, and a good review of the literature is provided in: Rack, P. 1994. A 
number of influential accounts include: Snowling, M. 1987. - Snowling, M. 1995; Brady, S. 1986, 
and, Vellutino, F. & Scanlon, D. 1987. For a good review of the wider cogruti,,, e aspects of word 
recognition that are found to be inadequate in dyslexia, see: Pumfi-ey, P. & Reason, R. 199 1. 
Chapter 5. And finally, for a more entical account of this hNpothesis, see: Johnston, R- 1996. 
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reading skillS33, or more often, an atypical development of phonological reading and 
spelling strategies34. 
As with the majority of explanatory accounts used m developmental 
psychopathology which are based upon the recognition of underlying, core deficits, 
the phonological deficit account can be chal-lenged on a nwnber of Eronts. A 
phonological deficit account of dyslexia must be able to recognise a particular rather 
than general deficit if it is to be relevant to dyslexia as a specific disability; it must 
determine whether the problems faced by dyslexics are a cause or consequence of the 
recognised deficit; and finally, whether the recognition of a particular underlying 
deficit can be reconciled with the individual variations of dyslexics and the sub- 
groups of dyslexia 35 . Because of the 
large number of accounts and the differences 
that exist between them, both subtle and sometimes significant I Will restrict myself 
to an account of the phonological deficit hypothesis which has been pioneered by 
Margaret Snowling and colleagues, which has, certainly Within the UK, held a 
prominent position in dyslexia research since the mid-1980's. Furthermore, this 
account is consequential in that it wiH be the template for much of the interaction 
between the traditional approaches taken to dyslexia research and my own 
phenomenological account in the following chapters of the thesis. 
SnowlMg places a great deal of emphasis on the role of phonological deficits in her 
explanation of dyslexic problems, and although she is not as reductive as some 
33 Stanovich, K. 1997. 
'4 Rack, J. et al. 1992. 
'5 Whethcr certain phonological deficit accounts actuafly meet these challenges is well outside the 
scope and aim of this thesis, but for a good review of the literature concenung challenges facing 
., 
pothesis, see: Rack, J. 1994, and, die phonological deficit h- - Frith, U. 1997. 
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authors", it is clear that the delay and/or deficit of phonological skills isfundamental 
to the phenomenon of dyslexia. Furthermore, this stance will have consequences for 
the way in which dyslexia is conceptualised (i. e. as a umtary or sub-grouped 
disability), and the relevance of other, non-phonological approaches that have been 
taken to dyslexia research. Through an extensive amount of experimental research, 
Snowling and colleagues have come to the conclusion that dyslexic children are poor 
at forniing reliable phonological representafions that are needed when learning to 
read. More specifically, because reliable phonological representations are not 
formed, this disrupts the intricate links which usually form between phonological and 
orthographic representations and which allow the child to read new words without 
access to conscious rules 37 . Thus, Snowling points out that dyslexics not only have 
problems in their conscious awareness of Phonological information, but more 
importantly, in their automatic recall of phonological representafions, and this claim 
is founded upon evidence that the language difficulties of dyslexics extend to speech 
perception, speech production, verbal short-term memory and object naming skillS38. 
Snowling and colleagues recently tested 71 children from families with a genetic risk 
of dyslexia, compared with 37 children ftom control families in which there was no 
history of unexpected reading problemS39. AN children were tested around the time of 
their fow-th birthday, and assessed on an arTay of language tasks which tested: 
expressive language, vocabulary development, phonological processing and pre- 
literacy skills which included letter knowledge. The findings in this experiment were 
that the children at risk of dyslexia differed from control children in vocabulary 
16 In particularly: Stanovich. K. 1988. 
" Hulmc, C& Snowling, M. 1992, 
Snowling, M. 1995. 
Reported in: Snowling, M. & Nation, K. 1997. 
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development, phonological awareness and letter knowledge. Perhaps most 
importantly it was found that the at-risk children had specific difficulty in repeating 
both non-words and novel phonological fonns with unusual patterns of stress, a 
finding which strongly suggests that these children were delayed in their 
phonological development. 
The argument Snowling makes on this evidence is explicitly developmental - because 
children at risk of dyslexia appear to have difficulties with the creation of 
phonological representations before they begin to read, there is a high chance that 
they will start to learn to read with poorly specified phonological representations, and 
this in turn will mean that these children will attempt to read with the disadvantage of 
being unable to establish concrete relations between orthographic and phonological 
representationS40 . This relationship between phonological and orthographic 
representations is vital in leammg how to 'decode' the sound structure of a wntten 
word, a skill that is needed in order to both read and spell a word, and which can be 
explained ftu-ther by problems of verbal encoding and phonemic awareness (see 
below). 
In another study carried out by Snowling involving the cognitive skil-Is of university 
students with self-reported dyslexic difficulties, when compared with control 
students of a similar age and educational standard, the dyslexic readers not only had 
persisting difficulties with basic reading and spelling processes, but more specifically 
had deficits on a range of tests of phonological processing skills and phonological 
awareness. Thus, even at an age where such difficulties should have become masked, 
' Snowling, M. & Nation, K. 1997, p. 156. 
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Snowling and colleagues argue tentatively that such problems could well result from 
poorly specified phonological representations at an early age 41 
The specific difficulties exhibited by dyslexics through a delay in their phonological 
development are elaborated upon further in both the above and other studies earned 
out by Snowling, Perhaps the main difficulty faced by dyslexic children is their poor 
standard of 'verbal encoding', i. e. the representation and storage of words, and this 
problem is usually one of delay rather than pure deficit. Because, it is claimed, 
information is normally held in short-term memory in the form of a phonological 
code, dyslexics are compromised in both their short-term and long-term memory 
recall of words due to their poor level of verbal encoding. Moreover, their 
performance will be affected most markedly in situations where the use of 
phonological codes is obligatory, such as the tasks of learning to read and spell. This 
has lead both Snowling and other advocates of the phonological deficit hypothesis to 
speculate that dyslexics rely more (although not exclusively) on a visual, 
orthographic style of encoding as a compensatory strategy for the delay in 
phonological developmen t42 .A related area of difficulty exhibited by dyslexics 
concerns their reduced phonemic awareness, a skill which greatly facilitates reading 
and spelling tasks. Phonemic awareness, also referred to as phoneme segmentation, is 
the awareness of words as sequences of discrete phonemes for example, splitting 
PEN into its individual phonemes p-e-n, and dyslexic children show difficulties not 
only in the segmentation of phonemes, but in counting, substituting and deleting 
individual phonemes. The consequences of this difficulty are primarily M the 
acquisition of new vocabulary, and Snowling attributes this difficulty to both a 
" Snowling, M. et al. 1997. 
-42 See: Snowling, M. 1987, p, 18-26; Olson, R- et al. 1984. - and, Rack, J. 1985. 
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problem of speech perception (i. e. the identification and discrimination of auditory 
cues) and phonological memory coding 43 . Snowling concludes that although 
dyslexics are able to acquire reading skills despite poor phonological awareness 
skills, a deficiency or delay in these skills makes reading acquisition more difficult 
for thern" 
On a final note, Snowling's position regarding the phonological deficit hypothesis is 
consequential in two ways. Firstly, Snowling maintains that the phonological 
difficulties displayed by dyslexic children are fundamental to the wide variety of 
reading and writing problems, whether dyslexia is conceptualised as a unitary 
disability or under the headings of different sub-groups. Thus, if we go back to the 
distinction made earlier in this Chapter between phonological dyslexia (poor non- 
word reading) and surface dyslexia (poor irregular word reading), Snowling's 
position is significant In that the differences between the two sub-groups are 
conceived of as differences in degree and not in type. Snowling concludes that 
phonological and surface dyslexia are caused by the swne difficulties, but are 
representative of different levels of severity, 'phonological dyslexics' having more 
difficulty in creating and accessing phonological representations of speech than 
surface dyslexics. Thus, in Snowling's own words: "there need be no paradox 
between unitary theories of dyslexia and theories that posit sub-types of dyslexia. v) 45 
Fw-thermore, although other non-phonological accounts, such as those that pay 
attention to possible visual deficits associated with surface dyslexia, are 
acknowledged, it is clear that in Snowling's opinion they are of secondary or 
" Although problems of speech perception and production are usuafly associated With the 
phonolo ical deficit hypothesis, it is also argued that such problems could equally derive from an 91 
underlying motor problem. See: Everatt, J. et al. 1999. 
' See: Snovding. M 1987. Chapter 2, and, Rack. I et al. 1992. 
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negligible importance when compared to the phonological deficits that are the 
primary cause of dyslexia46 
How can phenomenology contribute to dyslexia research? 
The contribution of philosophy towards research into developmental dyslexia has so 
far been negligible, although certain approaches to symptoms associated with 
acquired dyslexia, such as 'bfindsight', have been explored by more language-based 
'analytic' philosophy 47 . To my knowledge, there have been no prior studies into 
developmental dyslexia that have been conducted along the lines of a 
phenomenological investigation, that is, a series of phenomenological descriptions 
that are grounded in philosophy. I stress this last point because of a tendency Within 
disciplines involved with research into psychopathology, such as psychology and 
neurophysiology, to refer to first-hand experiential accounts as phenomenological 
accounts. Although first-person accounts are invaluable to the understanding of 
developmental and acquired disorders, indeed many highly revealing 
autobiographical reports concerning the experience of dyslexia have made 
contribufions to more experimentaJ researcW8, such accounts cannot be said to be 
6 phenomenological' in the philosophical sense of the word. From a philosophical 
perspective, autobiographical accounts cannot be understood as 'phenomenological' 
45 SnowlMig. M. & Nation, K. 1997, p. 160; and also see: Snowlmig, M. et al. 1994. 
' Although Snowfing is clearly an advocate of phonological deficits being an underlying cause of 
dysIcxic s), mptoms. she can sometimes be more forgiving towards visual deficit accounts (see: 
Snowling, M. 1997), whilst in some studies they, are almost dismissed out of hand as they are seen 
to be derived from studies into acquired dyslexia (see: Snowlmig, M. & Nation, K. 1997. ). 
" Tve, M. 1993. 
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as they are grounded in the 'realist' presuppositions that are representative of the 
cnatural attitude', i. e. personal knowledge and beliefs, scientific and other 
epistemological theories, assumptions concerning cause and objectivity, and 
assumptions about the priority of certain aspects of experience over others 49 . 
Although a first-person autobiographical account and a phenomenological account 
are both concerned with how one experiences a certain event or phenomenon, the 
difference between the two concerns the use of a phenomenological epochi or 
I reduction'. This is a type of philosophical methodology pioneered by Husserl which 
suspends judgement or 'brackets off the presuppositions characterised by the natural 
attitude 50 , most notably 'realist' judgements concerning the existence of the 
phenomenon under Investigation, and the existence of an external world. Husserl's 
use of the epocN is a means to return to 'the things themselves', i. e. the pure, 
indubitable and universal phenomena given in consciousness, and is part of a 
philosophical project which privileges the role of a transcendental subject. Merleau- 
Ponty's brand of phenomenology is also interested in the rich description of 
phenomena, i. e. how phenomena reveal themselves. However, instead of trying 
describing the essential structures of phenomena, Merleau-Ponty is more interested 
in the manner in which phenomena are meaning(ul for us, a form of invesfigation 
which asks questions of a situated, corporeal form of subjectivity, that is, the way in 
which our experience of phenomena results from our bodily engagement with the 
world. This said, Merleau-Ponty still maintains an interest in the idea of an epoch6, 
for although he has no intention of performing a phenomenological reduction in 
order to reveal the fimdarnental structures of transcendental consciousness, he is still 
4' See: Hanipshirc, S. 198 1, and, Faludy, T. & Faludy A, 1996. 
49Ashworth, P. 1996. 
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very much interested in stripping his phenomenological descriptions of any 
presuppositions, most notable those charactensed by 'objective thought'. Merleau- 
Ponty is quite explicit about his debt to Husserl. m the 'Preface' to Phenomenology of 
Perception, where he endorses the idea of a suitable form of reduction that avoids the 
presuppositions of 'objective thougbt': 
"Sensationalism 'reduces' the world by noting that after all we never expenence 
anything but states of ourselves. Transcendental idealism too 'reduces' the world 
since, in so far as it guarantees the world, it does so by regarding it as thought or 
consciousness of the world, and as the mere correlative of our knowledge, with the 
result that it becomes immanent in consciousness and the aseity of things is thereby 
done away with. The eidetic reduction is, on the other hand, the determination to 
bring the world to light as it is before any falling back on ourselves has occurred, it is 
the ambition to make reflection emulate the unreflective life of consciousness. I aim 
at and perceive a world. " (p. xv-xVI) 
From the above quote it is clear that through his version of a reduction Merleau- 
Ponty Wishes to set aside the presuppositions that anse from disciplines concerned 
with describing an objective reality, i. e. those disciphnes which conduct 
themselves as a type of science, whether they be a natural or social science (e. g. 
somatic medicine, neurophysiology, cognitive psychology, or even sociology). 
PhenomenoloKv of* Perception therefore serves as both a criticism of, and 
departure from, objective and scientific methodology in its study of phenomena. 
The central problem Merleau-Ponty has with the above disciplines is that they 
50 See. - Husserl, E. 1977. First Mcditation, Section 7-9. 
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purport to the existence of a detemunate, objective world, an assertion which is 
grounded in pnnciples of cause and effect, and justified by normative data. The 
point here is not that disciplines such as cognitive psychology or neurophysiology 
are necessarily wrong in their explanations of behaviour, for even if investigative 
disciplines are underpinned by an objective methodology, they have clearly made 
huge contributions to the diagnosis, screening and treatment/remediation of 
illnesses, disabilities and psychological disorders. However, if one is to scrutinise 
disciplines grounded upon objective thought on a conceptual, philosophical level 
as opposed to their pragmatic worth, what these disciplines do fail to account for 
is "the unreflective life of consciousness" (see above quote), what Merleau-Ponty 
refers to as lived experience. Thus, the type of reduction that Merleau-Ponty aims 
to achieve is one which strips away the presuppositions and prejudices held by 
6 schools' of objective thought, most notably empiricist and intellectualist schools, 
as a means to begin to describe the pre-scientific, pre-objective, bodily-situated 
structures of the Wfe-world'- the world of 'existential! or 'lived'meanings. 
As opposed to empiricist disciplines that try to study the structures of the natural 
world, and opposed to cognitive, intellectualist disciplines that try to study the 
structures of the conscious world, Merleau-Ponty develops a 'middle path' 
between the more worthy attributes of these approaches. This middle path respects 
both the contfibution of a subjectý albeit understood as a situated, engaged bodily 
subjectivity, and the contribution of a world, a notion which should not be 
understood as simply a 'natural' or 'cultural' domain, but excludes neither of 
these characteristics. I will discuss both Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of empiricism 
and intellectualism and his ideas concemmg the 'body-subject' and the 'world' in 
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greater detail in Chapters Two and Three respectively. However, the main point to 
grasp here is that, in order to start describing the manner in which existential 
meanings reveal themselves, one cannot think of the body-subject without it being 
engaged with a world, or having a worldly perspective without being anchored by 
a body, i. e. they are mutually inclusive, reciprocal structures. As Merleau-Ponty 
puts it: 
"The sensor and the sensible do not stand in relation to each other as two mutually 
external terms, and sensation is not an invasion of the sensor by the sensible ... The 
sensible gives back to me what I lent to it but this is only what I took from it in 
the fiTst place. " (p. 214) 
This reciprocal relationship between the world and the body is ftmdaniental to 
Merleau-Ponty's description of phenomena, for the perception of a piece of music 
does not exist in a physical, external world, nor does it exist as a state of 
consciousness - the piece of music exists as something which is meaningiul, and 
as such, is part of the experiential 'life-world'. Hence, in his description of 
phenomena Merleau-Ponty is inquiring into the intimate, lived relationship 
between the body and world, what he refers to as our 'being-in-the-world' (etre- 
au-mode, also referred to as 'being-towards-the-world'), and this relationship 
should be understood as an inlentional relationship, that is, the manner in which a 
certam phenomenon or group of phenomena unfold and reveal themselves as 
meaningful experiences in my perpetual interrogation of the life-world. What 
Merleau-Ponty presents in Phenomenoloýý of Perception is a philosophical 
method of describing our lived experience of worldly phenomena afiresh, and thus 
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what would be of interest to myself in conducting a phenomenological 
investigation into dyslexia would be to focus on the manner in which dyslexics 
have a different, but still intentional, relationship with the lived world during tasks 
which involve the use of the written word. The question that now remains to be 
answered concerns choice, that is, why use specifically Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology to describe the intentional experience of dyslexia afresh? 
The main reasons for turning to the work of Merleau-Ponty are, firstly, his interest 
in the applicafion and presuppositions represented by schools of objective 
thought but more importantly, his philosophical interest in cases of 
psychopathology. Throughout Phenomenologl of Perception Merleau-Ponty uses 
real case studies ftom. both clinical psychiatry and developmental psychology, and 
applies his brand of phenomenology to the way in which the patient experiences a 
loss of action, and in some cases a loss of expression. Most notably for this thesis, 
one of Merleau. -Ponty's key interpretations Includes a study of the acquired 
language disorder 'aphasia'. By attending to these disruptions of action or 
expression with his brand of existential phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty attempts 
to elucidate the different intentional relationships, as opposed to causal 
relationvhips, that constitute the way in which patients experience the lived world. 
For example, III cases of aphasia Merleau-Ponty is neither enquiring into the 
status of the brain lesion nor the status of relevant cognitive states as a way of 
explaining how the disorder has ansen 5 1. Although the focus of such studies may 
be of great importance in charting the cause and possible remediation of the 
patient, it is Merleau-Ponty's aim to try and describe how the aphasic's use of 
5' See. Phenomenology- 'The Body as Expression, and Speech'. 
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language presents itself in a way which has profoundly different lived meanings 
from non-aphasics, i. e. as problematic, difficult uncertam etc.. Although these 
phenomenological interpretations can be understood as specific examples of 
applied phenomenology, for Merleau-Ponty, the main purpose of such 
interpretations is to illustrate (albeit Ma negative way) just how the body's 
multitude of intentional relationships with the world become habituated through 
successive layers of experience. Although such intentional relationships may 
become 'covered over', they are by no means lost or forgotten, rather, they 
become part of the general style in which we comport ourselves towards the lived 
world - our particular style of being-in-the-world. 
Aside from Merleau-Ponty's own application of phenomenology, when looking 
for examples of how phenomenology can be applied to cases of pathology, a 
similar type of phenomenology has been applied by Eugýne Minkowski in his 
investigations into the spatio-temporal structures of psychopathological 
behaviour 52 
, whilst more recently, there has been the publication of a highly lucid 
phenomenology of physical illneSS53 ,a phenomenology of psychosomatics 
54, 
and 
studies which have made use of phenomenology in relation to physiological 
abnormalities55, all of which use many of the themes pioneered by Merleau-Ponty. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that some of the earliest theorists of language 
disorders, including Goldstein 56 , adopted 'figure-background structures' 
pioneered by gestalt psychology to look at the breakdown of linguistic 'objects' 
52 Mink-owski, E. 1933. 
5' Toombs, S. 1992. 
'413ullington, 1 1999. 
55 Gallagher, S& Cole, J. 1995. 
5' See: Goldstein, K. 1948, and, Strauss. A. & Kephmt, N. 19-5-S 
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undeT scrutiny, an idea that will be touched on m later chapters, and to an extent 
can be found in Merleau-Ponty's own work. 
The aim of this thesis is therefore to study a number of key areas in Merleau-Ponty's 
philosophy that are critical Mi his discussion of how we come to experience the lived 
world as meaningful, i. e. the way in which phenomena reveal themselves as a certain 
style. Although I cannot possibly cover all the themes that are relevant to 
Phenomenology of Perception, I hope to select those which seem particularly 
apposite in disclosing some of the principal differences in the dyslexic's intentional 
relationships with language. Furthermore, the themes I have picked are representative 
of the subject matter that will concern the following chapters. These will progress as 
follows: Chapter Two - Merleau-Ponty's methodology and his notion of a reduction; 
Chapter Three - the role of the lived body and operative intentionality in our 
perception of the world; Chapter Four - the body's orientation of space and 
perception of space, including the topics of depth and movement; Chapter Five - the 
idea of expression understood as a linguistic gesture, our capacity for Intersubjective 
communication, and the dyslexic's peculiar relationship with language; and, Chapter 
Six - the fundamental ground of temporality and its break with traditional 
conceptions of memory. These themes will be applied to some of the features of 
dyslexia that have been set out earlier in this chapter, and against the backdrop of 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology I will begin to describe the manner in which, when 
faced with situations which require the use of the written word - in particularly the 
tasks of reading, spelling and copying written work - aý,, slexics have a different so-le 
of'being-in-Me-world. 
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Hence, the emphasis of this thesis is philosophical, in both its methodology and in its 
appraisal of dyslexia. It is my mtention to proVide a group of descriptions that 
acknowledge dyslexia as a phenomenon which is profoundly debilitating for those 
who suffer from its problems associated with literacy. However, by taking a 
phenomenological approach to these problems the emphasis of my Interpretation will 
be on difference, i. e. instead of understanding dyslexia as a form of deficit or lack 
(whether this be a cognitive, neurological, physiological) I will stress the way in 
which dyslexics can be understood as having profoundly differem Mtentional 
relationships with written language, relationships which are marked by the peculiar 
style of dyslexia. Thus, as I will show in detail during the next chapter, because I am 
taking a qwte different sort of methodology to dyslexia than traditional research, i. e. 
experiential as opposed to objective, I am in no way challenging the explanations, 
observations and overall value of previous approaches taken to dyslexia - far from it. 
What I hope to provide in this thesis is the philosophical grounclu, ork to allow, 
firstly, those working in experimental fields of dyslexia research to expand and 
redefine some of the basic notions that are used without being called into 
philosophical question, such as perception, objects, subjects, spatial awareness, 
expression, meaning and time in relation to memory, and secondly, to provide myself 
with a theoretical foundation to use in future research concerning the interpretation of 
first-hand accounts through the application of phenomenological theory, 
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Chap er Two 
The Application of Merleau-Pontv's Implicit Method - An 
Intentional Approach to Dyslexia 
The primary concern of this chapter is that of methodology. This is of paramount 
importance for the type of project I am conducting, as any application of a 
philosophical discourse to a context that has traditionally been dealt with by 
empirical-based disciplines will have to be commensurable to an extent with both 
paradigms. The task of finding a methodologY that would suit all the needs of 
both the philosopher/phenomenologist and the scientist/psychologist is near 
enough impossible, yet some sort of productive translation is essential if my 
project is to be deemed a viable one. The role of finding some sort of communion 
between phenomenological description and dyslexic symptomatology is harder 
than the phenomenologist may at first think, for as I will demonstrate in this 
chapter, there is no 'natural' phenomenological framework with which to address 
the problems of dyslexia. As such, this chapter may be regarded as a type of 
problem solving exercise within which a number of somewhat 'un- 
phenomenological' resources will be utilised in order to establish a suitable 
methodology. 
As I am predominantly using Merleau-Ponty's brand of phenomenology to 
disclose the dyslexic Is unique manner of being-in-the-world. the main content of 
this chapter Is an account of Merleau-Ponty's own methodology, its relatlonshlp 
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with the notion of 'disorder' studied in psychopathology, and the limits of this 
frmnework in relation to my own project. The puzzle that has to be solved 
concerns the notion of disorder, more specifically, the manner in which Merleau- 
Ponty has utilised disorder in the Phenomenology of Perception, and the way in 
which I want to work his framework back onto a specific case of empirical- 
linguistic disorder. This raises a number of UnInediate and long-terin problems 
which need to be addressed in this chapter. 
Firstly, a number of preparatory issues concerning 'disorder' must be attended to. 
The most obvious question to be posed, and yet one of the hardest to answer is, 
how are we to understand the notion of 'disorder'? During this chapter I will focus 
on the definition of disorder offered by the medical model, and fiu-thermore, how 
phenomenology could offer a different approach to the emphasis of such a 
classification. Of major importance for both these topics is to understand the way 
in which, for both the psychologist and the phenomenologist, there is some type of 
disruption to be studied in cases ofdisorder. 
The second part of this chapter is an attempt to resolve the problematics 
conceming the application of phenomenology to dyslexia. Merleau-Ponty's 
relationship with both somatic and psychopathology is one that moves from a 
description of the abnormal in an attempt to articulate the general intentional 
structures of 'norTnal' being-in-the-world. Phenomenology of Perception's 
relationsbip with psychopathology is not without its problems, problems that I 
hope to brmg out in this and later chapters. Although many of the existential 
structures described by Merleau-Ponty Will be used during this projectý what must 
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be made explicit in this chapter is the manner in which they are being used, for it 
is Merleau-Ponty's belief that many of these structures are seriously comprormsed 
in pathological cases. If a phenomenology of dyslexia were to simply use the 
existential structures provided by Merleau-Ponty and explain how these structures 
differed in case studies of dyslexics provided by psychologists, then a suitable 
phenomenological investigation would not actually be taking place. The reasons 
for saying this will become clearer below, but my basic point is that In order to 
carry out a worthwhile phenomenological investigation into a disability or 
disorder such as dyslexia, one cannot only begin to describe the manner in which 
dyslexia is a breakdown of nonnal linguistic activity, but of greater value would 
be to try and describe the manner in which the dyslexic does maintain a 
relationship with language, i. e. by taking an inlentional approach to the manner in 
which dyslexics experience language in general, not just as a breakdown. 
As mentioned above, the notion of disorder is in one way or another marked by a 
disruption of Intentionality, and hence the primary task of the second part of this 
chapter will be a mapping-out of how an 'intentional stance' can be taken towards 
dyslexia. What wiH be of importance in the long-term development of this thesis 
will be to focus on the intentional relationship dyslexics have with the world when 
reading and writing activities are seemingly uninterrupted, and this will be 
focussed on explicitly in Chapter Five. Therefore, in order to help establish this 
type of intentional-based methodology and to help describe some of the problems 
defining disorder and dysfunction, I wil-I supplement Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenological texts by turning to the notion of an 'intentional stance' 
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provided by Daniel Dennett57 , and 
furthermore, the use of this idea in relation to 
psychopathology in the recent work of Derek Bolton and Jonathan HiU58 
The chapter will run as follows: Firstly, I will present Merleau-Ponty's critique of 
objective thought as a means to introduce the reader to the idea of an intimate 
dialogue taking place between the body and world, a dialogue which is 
constitutive of our everyday meanings. Furthennore, this critique of objective 
thought will also shed light on Merleau-Ponty's close relationship with exwnples 
of psychopathological disorders and experimental psychology. Indeed, Merleau- 
Ponty's connection with psychology in Phenomenology of Perception is 
somewhat ambiguous, for although he uses many case-studies from clinical 
psychology, in particularly gestalt approaches taken towards mental disorders, he 
is equally critical of psychology's methodology. This Will next lead me to a 
discussion of how both the medical model and phenomenology conceive of 
disorder, and how dyslexia may or may not fit into these notions. The final section 
of the chapter will introduce the idea of intentionality being disrupted in dyslexia, 
and will go on to highlight the limits of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology in 
connection with psychological disorder. To conclude with, I will try and map-out 
how an intentional framework may be used when describing dyslexia via the work 
of Bolton and Hill. By the end of the chapter, I hope to have articulated a 
methodology in line with Merleau-Ponty's brand of phenomenology that will 
attend to the problem of trying to describe a variant of psychological disorder that 
has an apparent disruption of mtentionality. 
57 See: Dennett, D. 198 1; and, Dennett, D. 1987. 
5' See: Bolton, D. &Hill, J. 1996. 
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Merleau-Pont-y's criticisms of oWective thought 
To give an account of Merleau-Ponty's methodology in brief is not without its 
problems, for although there is a method that operates in the Phenomenology of 
Perception, such a method is by no means explicit. Much of this implicit method 
is derived from the substantial criticisms of 'empiricist' and 'intellectualist' 
approaches taken to perceptual experience that are presented in the 'Introduction' 
to Phenomenology-, and therefore Merleau-Ponty's method is not defined first 
and then employed, rather, his phenomenological technique is disclosed In 
practice and movement. It could be argued that any type of phenomenological 
investigation is always incomplete. Thus, what the phenomenologist is faced with 
is a type of philosophy that is emerging firom, and immanent to, the enquliy itself 
It is for this reason that Merleau-Ponty may resist stating exactly what his 
methodology is, only that his descriptions are an attempt to return to the 'life 
world' of intentional relationships. What is key to this movement is a rethinking 
of reflection, more specifically what is to be reflected upon. As Merleau-Ponty 
puts it in the final chapter of the 'Introduction' - 'The Phenomenal Field': 
"The core of philosophy is no longer an autonomous transcendental subjectivity, 
to be found everywhere and nowhere: it hes in the perpetual beginning of 
reflection, at the point where an individual life begins to reflect on itself 
Reflection is truly reflection only if it is carried outside of itself, only if it knows 
itself as reflection-on-an-unrefelected-experience, and consequently as a change in 
[the] structure of our existence. " (p. 62). 
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Merleau-Ponty is attempting to find a method that will disclose a 'reflection-on- 
an-wireflected-experience' Via his critiques of empiricism and intellectualism. As 
can be seen in the above quote and preceding paragraph, although Merleau-Ponty 
is primarily critiquing transcendental idealism (under which term he is susceptible 
of including the views of Husserl), he does make a return to the empifical aspect 
of existence, and it is important to understand how the author is, in part, 
sympathetic to both these schools of thought. 
One of Merleau-Ponty's main aims is to rid his pHosophy of traditional 
metaphysical prejudices, primarily the 'either/or' doctrine of Cartesian dualism. If 
dualism is not dissolved, the attempt to reflect on the unreflected aspects of 
experience - the life world - will not be possible. As Merleau-Ponty states in the 
'Preface' to the Phenomenology.. : "Probably the chief gain firom phenomenology 
is to have united extreme subjectivism and extreme objectivism in its notion of the 
world. The phenomenological world is not pure being, but the sense which is 
revealed where the paths of my various experiences intersect.. " (p. xix-xx). 
Dualism's inability to account for everyday lived experience, the 'intersection' 
mentioned in the above quote, is due to attributing specific properties to specific 
substances. Both empiricism and inteflectualism represent a certain brand of 
I substance ontology', and privilege either the materialJobject (empiricism), or the 
act of categorial interpretation/subjectivism (intellectualism). Within the 
Introduction there is not only a critique of highly rigid scientific models, such as 
mechanistic physiology, but a critique of psychological models that rely upon 
causation and association, and ftu-thennore, intellectual ist-transcendental models. 
The overriding problem Merleau-Ponty has with these models is that they try to 
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reduce either the world or the subject to an objectifiable or measurable entity. The 
lived world is one of unreflected and lived experience which we may catch the 
style of, but never fully capture or comprehend, and hence the principal criticism 
of these substance ontologies is that they are proponents of objective thought. 
Brief criticisms of each model are (respectively): physiology is unable to account 
for the lack of correspondence between a stimulus and a phenomenon; psychology 
is attacked for reducing impressions and sensations to a non-meaningftd entity, 
and relying upon the idea of a metaphorical 'associative force', and 
intellectualism is attacked for privileging a constituting transcendental subject, 
and conflating notions of judgement and perception 59 . 
Although Merleau-Ponty is fimdamentally critical of these approaches, he does 
wish to interlace useftd elements firom both empiricist and mtellectualist methods 
of analysis for his own project. However, taking the lead from Gestalt 
psychology, the aspects of empiricism and intellectualism Merleau-Ponty wishes 
to preserve are sigmficantly modified in his brand of phenomenology. With regard 
to intellectualism, the author is sympathetic to the active role of the human subject 
in perception, although the formulation of this subjectivity as a transcendental, 
non-material consciousness is clearly rejected in place of the body-subject. 
Similarly, intentionality is also favoured by Merleau-Ponty, although the non- 
59 Merleau-Ponty's critique of these schools of philosophy, and the need to critique them, is dealt 
with in great detail during the 'Introduction' to the Phenomenology-, and when addressing cases 
of abnormal perception/intentionality in 'Part One' of the book concerning the body (Ch. I- 
Physiology; Ch. 2 - Classic Psychology, and, 
Ch. 3 - Intellectualism). I use the term 'schools of 
thought' not through choice, for Merleau-Ponty is fairly, unspecific about exacti-N, who's 
philosophy he is criticising. Although he does give some idea of who he may regard as fitting into 
certain schools by giving references in footnotes. the tendenc-, - for the author to hornogenise 
specific philosophies under a thematic title is great, For example both Kantian and Cartesian, and 
sometimes even Husserl's views concerrung subjectivity are placed under the title , 
intellectualism'. Although Mericau-Ponty is understandably more interested in themes rather than 
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material and dehberative conceptions of this theme are also abandoned. The 
empiricist school of thought is of benefit to the author due to its emphasis on the 
distinctive contribution made by all the senses during perception, and the 
significance of bodily organisation in illustrating human action, This greater 
respect for the body's role in perception is what previous phenomenologists had 
repressed, and although empiricism treats the body as a mechanical object. 
Merleau-Ponty is able to synthesise these aspects of each discipline into a 
phenomenology that articulates a dialogue between body and world. Thus, the 
reciprocal and mulually inclusive relationship between 'body-subject' and 'world' 
lies at the heart of Merleau-Ponty's whole enterprise, but it is vital for the reader 
to understand how these two poles are derived, i. e. through the lengthy critiques 
presented in the 'Introduction. Although Merleau-Ponty's direct criticisms of 
empiricism and intellectualism now move away from prominence in 
DL. 
rhenomenology.. their influence will permeate the rest of the text in the form of a 
starting point to Merleau-Ponty's own phenomenological based assertions. 
Furthermore, such criticisms will feature again in this chapter when discussing 
different conceptions of psychiatric and psychological disorder, and moreover, 
existential phenomenology's reaction to such models. 
The interactionism or dialogue between the body and the world which is 
constitutive of phenomena both produces and envelops formal categories, and this 
is what Merleau-Ponty wants to access in his study of the life world, a field of 
existence which is marked by ambiguity. The dialogue between the body subject 
and the world can be widerstood as the unreflected or preconscious aspect of 
authors, this general approach may weaken the legitimacy of his critiques of empiricism and 
intellectualism to his phenomenological approach. 
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existence that we only have a vague awareness of Before moving onto how the 
phenomenologist is to elucidate this fundamental dialogue, I must make clear how 
Merleau-Ponty conceives of the 'worldly' structure of existence, and why his 
strategy is not sunply introspective psychology. I have already remarked on the 
importance of a greater material emphasis in turning away from transcendental 
idealism, in that aspects of empiricism highlight the importance of various fields 
of meaning that are connected with our sensory capabilities - visual, audible etc.. 
In reaction to a realist point of view, subjectiVIsm clauns that these fields of 
meaning are an interior representation of certain stimuli. However, even if this 
were the case, in experiential terms, one is still. left with the everyday attitude that 
an orange is juicy or that the singer's voice is shrill. This everyday attitude is one 
which Merleau-Ponty is interested in studying from a philosophical distance, for 
although mistaken, such an attitude does understand perceptual fields as hmýing a 
meaning, meanings that go to make up the phenomenological 'world'. These 
meanings are clearly not immutable or universal, and are only produced in 
relation to the engagement with the body-subject. However, the more subjective 
side of this equation does not choose the meanings it encounters in perception, 
rather they are discovered within the dialogue: "the only pre-existent Logos is the 
world itself' (p. xx). 
hi this way Merleau-Ponty tiranscends traditional articulations of objective 
thought. The phenomenological life world is not a place that simply 'contains' 
objects in-themselves, moreover, neither is there a type of (transcendental) subject 
that merely constitutes objects in the world. Although the body-subject does not 
belong to the world along with other objects, neither is the body-subýject the 
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originating source of objects or prior to their very being. What has to be 
thernatised is the relationship betvveen body and world, for the world cannot be 
conceived without a bodily subject and the body without a world. As Merleau- 
Ponty writes in the introduction to Part Two of the Phenomenology.. : "Our own 
body is in the world as the heart is in the organism: it keeps the visible spectacle 
constantly alive, it breathes life into it and sustains it inwardly, and with it forms a 
system" (p. 203). One must note that by taking a more pragmatic, material 
approach to phenomenological description, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is 
underpinned by the 'I can' of practical engagement, rather than the 'I think' of 
reflective contemplation. 
I must make one last point concerning Merleau-Ponty's initial steps toward a 
methodology by defending the author against accusations of introspective 
psychology. Merleau-Ponty description of the body-world dialogue s clearly not 
a case where an objective world is presupposed, and a realm of psychic facts 
inexplicably coffespond to physical facts (i. e. they are non -communicable). 
Rather, by rejecting the notion of impressions constructing our 'mental life', there 
is a subsequent dissolution of the internal-external. dichotomy, and instead of 
having to infer the inexplicable link between 'inner menW life' and 'outer 
behaviour', situations are understood as meaningful. The act of reflective 
introspection is of consequence for Merleau-Ponty, but of greater importance is 
the ground of such introspection, that is, the manner in which mine and others 
style of being-in-the-world can be understood as imme(fiately meaningful. 
Merleau-Ponty's return to the life world of lived experience is thus also the 
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operung onto the realm of intersubjectivity, and to return to the above quote from 
'The Preface': 
"The phenomenological world is ... [where] my various experiences intersect, and 
also where my own and other people's mtersect and engage each other like gears. 
It is this inseparable from subjectiVity and intersubjectivity, which find their unity 
when I either take up my past experiences in those of the present, or other 
people's in my own. For the first time the philosopher's thinking is sufficiently 
conscious not to anticipate itself and endow its own results With reffled fonn In 
the world, the philosopher tries to conceive the world, others and himself and their 
inteffelations. " (p. xx) 
Disengagement as 'reduction', and its relation to psychological 
disorder 
Through Merleau-Ponty's substantial critiques of empiricism and intellectualism, 
he has begun to articulate a level of existence that we are only aware of as a 
general style. The pre-conscious, unreflected level of existential meaning is 
constituted by the body-world dialogue touched on in the previous section, and 
such meanings are marked by their generality and hence are indeterminate and 
ambiguous. To go back to the previous example of sensory fields in my 
perception of the world, my understanding of the orange being juicy is made 
possible because of a gearing of my body with the world in a certain situation, i. e. 
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eating the orange, and it is through this body-world relationship that such a 
meaning will disclose itself. This gearing of the body towards the world is still 
very much a part of pre-conscious existence, and it must be differentiated from a 
simple reflex reaction. A gearing or opening of the body towards the world can be 
equated with a process of interrogation. In the case of a simple reflex reaction, a 
response is given by the body to an attribute 'in the world'. However, we must 
remember that what the body is involved with is a dialogue. A response to a 
certain stimulus is merely a reaction from the body that is learned, and although 
A- I 
dus is also a pre-conscious response, it is also mechanistic. The interrogation of 
the world by the body-subject means that the body is not restricted to learned 
responses, rather, it is able to question the world in order to understand a situation, 
It will be asked how this capability of questioning is possible in the body-world 
dialogue, and it is now that we are introduced to the notion of bodily- 
intentionality. Although we will encounter intentionality in relation to a 
breakdown of action at the end of this chapter, I will quickly outime the basic 
connection of intentionality to the body-world dialogue. 
The role of intentionality will be dealt with at length in Chapter Three, but I feel 
that it is important to introduce the specific way in which Merleau-Ponty 
conceives of an 'operative' bodily intentionality in order to grasp the status of a 
body-world dialogue. The notion of intentionality that is characterised as a 
directedness towards something and which involves a deliberate act of 
consciousness is what is being overhauled by the notion of an operative, pre-thetic 
idea of intentionality, as this fonner stratum of intentionality is at the level of the 
'I think', and not the 'I can'. When I start to eat an orange, I do not get the feeling 
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that the orange is juicy because I have started to think about indeed 'judge', 
whether the orange corresponds to a list of crIteria. Rather, on Merleau-Ponty's 
terms, the orange may feel juicy and smell fresh because the body has geared 
itself towards the world - i. e. the body, and not reflective thought has started to 
question the world. We may interrogate or intend the orange on a conscious level 
- for example I may decide to count how many segment the orange has - but this 
level of intentionality will always be derived from the more fundamental level of 
bodily-intentionality. It is for this reason that originary intentionality can be 
understood as that which sustains the organic interactionism at the heart of the 
body-world dialogue - it is our fundamental link with the world 
Thus far in the analysis, Merleau-Ponty has provided us with highly useful 
descriptions concerning the preconscious level of eXistence, a level that comes 
before any categorial or scientific schematism. Scientific disciplines are based 
upon determinacy, and in philosophical terms are a reality-in-themselves. 
Furthermore, the indeterminate/ ambiguous level of unreflected experience 
envelopes scientifically constituted experience, as it both produces and extracts 
ftom categorial reflection. However, although Merleau-Ponty has provided an 
insightful account of a more original level of meaningful expenence, it is one 
A- thing to account for its existence and its unportance, and another to actually 
access this world. What is called for is a method that will allow the 
phenomenologist to reflect upon the body-world dialogue, without this reflection 
ccapturing' or 'violating' the unreflected level of existence. Even the most dogged 
philosophy of reflection will not be able to access the phenomena] field by 
meditation alone, for as Merleau-Ponty states in the chapter on 'Sense 
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Experience': "Between my sensation and myself there stands always the thickness 
of some primal acquisition which prevents my experience from being clear of 
itself. " (p. 216). Thus, if a Cartesian style reflection is inappropriate, and the use of 
induction is clearly unsuitable due to its reliance upon cause and effect, how is 
Merleau-Ponty to catch a non-distorted glimpse of the phenomenal field? The 
answer lies in disengagement, and Merleau-Ponty"s conception of the 
phenomenological reduction: 
"It is because we are through and through compounded of relationships with the 
world that for us the only way to become aware of the fact is to suspend the 
resultant activity, to refuse it our complicity ... or yet agam to put it 'out of play'. " 
(p. xiii) 
The emergent character of meaning via the body-world dialogue cannot usually be 
perceived, and to carry on a little fin-ther from the above quote, because the 
ongination. of meaning is usuaHy "taken for granted" it generally "gofes] 
unnoticed" (P. xiii). Instead of investigating the dialogue itself, philosophy, and 
especially science, has been happy enough to concentrate on the result of the 
dialogue. However, occasionally it is the case that the dialogue between body and 
world becomes de-synchronised, and in these rare occasions the presence of the 
normally obscured dialogue is made expl-icit. In these cases of abnormal dialogue, 
or as Remy Kwant puts it 'abnormal dialectics'60 , there 
is a disruption to one side 
"0 Kwant, R. 1963, p. 37. Although I have few objections to Kwant's extremely lucid commentary 
on the Phenomenology of Perception, I have preferred to steer awav from Hegelian terminology 
during this chapter. Although Mericau-Ponty is utilising a type of dialectic method in the 
body- 
world dialogue, and he employs the notion of synthesis in the text, the issue of 
Hegel's mfluence is 
a mute point in Phenomenology- Moreover, as Martin Dillon points out at great 
length, the type 
of dialectical method Merleau-Pontv is employing is critical of Hegelian and 
Sartrenan 'negative 
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of the process, and hence the fluidity and normality of ones existence is upset6l 
Within the Phenomenology.. Merleau-Ponty uses a great many cases of disturbed 
body-world dialogue in order to gam an insight into this usually obscured 
phenomenon. These cases usually take the form of mental illness or brain injury, 
or sometimes consist of psychological or physiological experiments (e. g. the 
inversion of vision experiment - p. 244-45). Hence, although the primary concern 
for the phenomenologist is to describe how the body-world dialogue is operating 
normally - i. e. how body-intentionality is in-tact With the world - to begin to 
understand how this operation is working in specific situations, Merleau-Ponty 
often looks first to the abnormal. In these cases, the floundering attempts of the 
body to re-synchronise with the world elucidate how the dialogue process is 
initiated in the first place. 
In order to articulate Merleau-Ponty's dependency upon such breakdowns, and 
emphasise the Phenomenologv of Perception's close relationship with psychiatry 
and psychology, disciplines which are underpinned by objective thought, I now 
want to describe how the author actually resorts to a plethora of case studies from 
psychology and psychiatry 62. Throughout Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty uses real medical case studies, most of which are taken from 
dialectics', and is akin to a self-mediation that develops the meaning of a situation without its 
character. See: Dillon, M. 1988, p. 208-223. 
6' Although a break-down of the body-world dialogue could be due to a severe change on either 
side of the equation, Merleau-Ponty concentrates almost entirely on the disturbed body-subject. 
The reader is thus left to ponder exactly what would a break-down in the 'world' would consist of. 
I think Merleau-Ponty would be more interested in changes akin to a paradigm shift, such as a 
situation where a liquid that normally freezes at zero degrees, now continues to solidify at ten 
degrees under 'normal' circumstances. The affinities Nvith Heidcgger in Being and Time are many, 
and although this is part of another discussion, one may took to examples such as the breakdown 
of processes involving equipment. e. g. hanunenng (Div, 1: 3 especial-ly sect. 15 and 16), and cven 
the more profound state of disclosedness encountered during the mood of 'Angst' (Div. 
1: 6 
espcciallý- sect. 40). See- Heidegger, M. 1962. 
62 These cases of various pathological traits appear in countless places throughout Phenomenology 
ofpercepHon, although they are more prevelant in Parts One and Two of the book. 
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experimental psychology, and applies his brand of phenomenology to the 
particular loss of action, or even expression, in the patient, The supposedly 
4 abnormal' plays a key role in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception 
because of its ability to illuminate what lies at the centre of that phenomenology, 
the role of the body-subject in dialogue with the world. 
The case of the injured war victim, Schneider, serves as a concrete illustration of 
the way in which the usually smooth dialogue between body and world can 
become modified to the extent that ones practical engagement with the world is 
impaired. Schneider suffers from a brain lesion in the occipital region of the brain, 
caused by a shell fragment. However, Merleau-Ponty believes that Schneider's 
difficulties, as well as pathological behaviour in general, should not be understood 
in a causal manner as a determined effect of the lesion, In the causal theory of 
behaviour, which as we have seen Merleau-Ponty rejects, a disturbance in a 
certain brain sector which serves as a 'receiving station' for particular stimuh- 
messages ought to impair the reception of those stimuli and their respective 
responses. Merleau-Ponty's story of events is that these cerebral lesions do not 
eliminate particular contents of experience, but rather ways of organising or 
structuring them. In cases such as Schneider's the intentional relationship that is 
required of a specific situation, often referred to by Merleau-Ponty as an 
'intentional arc', has the tendency to slacken and hence the body loses its 
spontaneous, anticipatory ability to inhabit linguistic, sexual, spatial (etc.. ) 
situations. As such, if one is to look at the problems of sexuality faced by 
Schneider 63 
, these 
difficulties highlight his different manner of being-in-the-world 
63Sec: Merleau-Ponty. 1962. *The Body In Its Sexual Being', especially. p. 154-158. 
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in comparison to those who are capable of initiating and sustaining sexual 
relationships. Thus, from a phenomenological perspective, these problems 
underline a difference in intentional relationships with a sexual world rather than a 
particular malfunctioning that is caused by a lesion in the brain. As Merleau- 
Ponty puts it: 
"What has disappeared for the patient is the power to project before him a sexual 
world, of putting himself into an erotic situation or, once the situation is outli ed, I in, 
of maintaining it or completing it up to the point of satisfaction ... If the tactile 
stimuli themselves have lost their sexual significance, it is that they have ceased, 
so to speak, to speak to his body" (p. 156) 
This manner of approaching cases of 'disorder' has great consequences for this 
chapter, and the thesis as a whole. Firstly, by criticising the approaches taken by 
objective schools of thought to cases of nonnal, but more often, pathological 
behaviour, this presents the reader of Phenomenology ofPerception with a chance 
to understand the importance of an intenfional relationship between the body and 
world. Thus, Merleau-Ponty has developed a type of reduction that will open ap 
the lived world for finther investigation. In this way, we now have a grasp of 
Merleau-Ponty's implicit methodology, and I can now go on to establish to what 
extent this is suitable for a phenomenology of dyslexia. Furthermore, through the 
above discussion of the Schneider case, I hope to have shown how Merleau-Ponty 
offers a quite different account of psychological disorder than that offered by 
clinical psychology and psychiatry. To understand just how Merleau-Ponty's 
plietionienology is different to standard notions of psychological disorder, I will 
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now turn to the classification of disorder, and why dyslexia disrupts these 
traditional classifications. 
The classification of disorder, its limits, and alternatives 
We have seen in the previous section that Merleau-Ponty uses many cases of 
abnormal perception and behaviour. The reader can interpret these examples used 
in Phenomenology.. as an attempt to grasp the dialogue between body and world 
in order to understand how normal meaning making emerges. Although this is the 
author's primary objective, by addressing these abnormal cases with his form of 
existential analysis, Merleau-Ponty has provided the reader With an alternative or 
complementaq way of understanding cases of disorder. In this section I want to 
discuss the concept of disorder: how this term has been traditionally used, how 
dyslexia does not fit comfortably with such a concept, and how Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology can offer a different perspective on disorder. Although this 
section may seem to move away from the general direction of the previous 
discussion, it is vital to tackle the notion of disorder if the final section of this 
chapter is to make sense. I will begin by looking at a classic case taken from 
psychiatric classification. Although dyslexia is clearly not a psychiatric disorder, 
the folloWing analysis of a 'medical' model is a classic example of objective 
thought underpinning a classificatory disciphne. 
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One author who has, over time, reconfigured his model in a number of ways to 
keep psychiatry a purely medical issue is Kendell. To give the reader a direct 
account of how the notion of disorder is formed, I now wish to look quite closely 
at his 'bencb-mark" essay of 1975, "The Concept of Disease and its Implications 
for Psychiatry"64. This essay can be viewed as a response to the attack from areas 
of sociology and psychology65 by somebody who clearly valorises the traditional 
medical model. Kendell begins his paper by discounting the notion derived from 
somatic medicine that a direct link exists between a brain lesion and the 
constitution of a psychological disorder. However, from a more critical point of 
view, problems creep into his account when he introduces the troublesome area of 
evaluation by discussing the topic of statistical norms and deviations, more 
specifically the idea of biological disadvantage. After introducing the idea of a 
person deviating- excess or defect- from a statistical norm, Kendell states his 
presumed standards for biological disadvantage: 
"Scadding avoided elaborating on what he meant by 'biological disadvantage'. 
Presumably, though, it must embrace increased mortality and reduced ferfility. 
Whether it should embrace other impairments as well is less obvious, and the 
consequences need considering carefully before deciding ... Provided that it can 
be 
established that a biological disadvantage is involved, their status as diseases is 
secured, "66 
64Kendell, R. 1975. 
65 For two seminal critiques of the mcdical model used in psychopathology, seeý 
Szasz. T. 1960, 
and, Laing, R. 1967. 
" Kendell, R. 19 75, p. 3 10. 
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Kendell seems to want to simultaneously uphold two positions in the need to 
maintain a "sharpness of meaning", as he wishes to exclude some diseases 
(psoriasis) from qualifying as an illness (Indeed, Kendell often conflates the 
separate notions of disease and illness). This is because, although they are 
regarded as diseases, certain anomalous diseases cannot count as such under the 
conditions of biological disadvantage. Not only does this highlight the ngidity of 
Kendell's use of biological disadvantage, and the statistical model in general, but 
when turning to psychological problems, this attitude reveals some worrying 
traits. Thus, following from this, Kendell goes on to highlight the deviance from 
the nonn in cases of schizophrenia and manic-depressive illnesses in the two Vital 
areas of fertility and life expectancy. With this hypothesis deployed, Kendell is 
able to claim that because the criteria for biological disadvantage are met by 
schizophrenia and manic-depression they are: "for that reason. justifiably regarded 
as illnesses", and furthennore: 
"The same may eventually prove to be true of some neurotic states and some 
types of personality disorder, but at present the evidence is not strong enough to 
justifý firm conclusions in these areas. 
Therefore, Kendell has not only constructed a set of cnteria for biological 
disadvantage that are tailored to classifying certain traits of psychological 
problems as an illness, but, from the evidence of the above quote, would seem to 
want to fit a good rnýWrity of psychological problems under the banner of illness. 
Mat lies at the centre of this exegesis of disorder is the problematical idea that 
6'Kendell. 1975. P, 312. 
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Kendell's concept of illness - including psychological disturbance - is always 
derived from physical criteria, the main problem here being that he cannot escape 
from some notion of tangibility and objectivity when confronting mental illness, 
whether this object be one of flesh and bones or statistical data- Because of this 
implicit trait, psychological disorders are underpinned by the idea of a loss of 
action. Instead of understanding psychological disorders as a qualitative 
difference, the mapping of a physical loss of action (physiology and somatic 
pathology) onto psychological disorders (psychopathology) renders such cases as 
disfunctional (read as non-fimction). In philosophical terms, the medical model is 
still underpinned by the 18th Century notion of a purely mentalistic, unified, and 
conscious concept of the self that we have encountered in the first section of this 
chapter. 
r) 
Before turning to criticisms of the medical model that stem from Merleau-Ponty's 
existential understanding of psychological 'disorder', I must first make one point 
clear. In criticising the medical model, I am not questioning the worth of medical 
research and practice in the area of mental health, as this would clearly deny the 
great improvements made in treating mental health patients during the 20th 
Century 68 . Rather than criticise that 
invaluable contribution of medicine to 
psychiatric care I think it is important to open up the methodological 
presuppositions that are being made by the medical/scientific model. This is 
primarily in order to help modify or supplement traditional perspectives, most 
clearly iii the case of turning to the patients experience of illness or disability. As 
we have seen in the previous section, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is less 
' Soc: Froeman, H. & Berrios, G. 1996. 
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interested in causes (e. g. a lack of serotonin production which causes depressive 
states), and more with the way M which the body-subject relates to the world. A 
person's continuing state of depression may be caused because of a low 
production of scrotonin, but this is not the problem for the depressive. Rather, 
their experience of the problem is a lowered ability to relate to the world and other 
people in a positive and spontaneous fashion. 
The consequences of this view of understanding 'mental illness' are that there is 
no immutable datum of nature, human or otherwise, that determines us to be such 
and such. There is no fixed essence of humanity which is somehow not attained in 
abnormal cases. Or, to put it in different ternis, there is a vital difference between 
normality and normalcy. We all, the supposedly normal and the supposedly 
abnormal, live at the intersection between nature and culture, as we live them in 
different ways, or as Merleau-Ponty puts it: "there are several ways for the body 
to be a body, several ways for consciousness to be consciousness"(p. 124). Since 
abnormal cases have a coherence and intelligibility all of their own - i. e. they can 
be understood- the difference between living the world normally and abnonnally 
cannot be that between sense and non-sense or order and disorder. It is not a 
contrast between a fulfilment of meaning on the one hand, as opposed to the 
absence of intelligibility on the other. What the phenomenologist would be 
interested in is trying to understand how a particular person is relating to a world. 
This is an incredibly important point to understand in relation to the final section 
of this chapter. For example: whether a person finds little trouble in relation to 
reading and writing skills, and is thus considered proficient in this area, or 
ý5 
whether a person finds reading and writing activities a major difficulty, and is 
considered dyslexic, both of these people will have a relationship with a lingWstic 
world. Although both the dyslexic and non-dyslexic wiH have a radically different 
manner of being-in-the-world in linguistic situations, both will be involved in 
practical meaning-making situations, As Merleau-Ponty indicates in one of his 
later works, The Prose of the World: 
"Whatever one diinks of the relationship of the patient to the healthy person, it 
indeed must be that, in its normal exercise, speech is of such a nature that our sick 
variations are and remain possible. It must be that it has at its centre something 
which makes it susceptible to these alienation's. By my language and by my body, 
I am accommodated to the other. 
3, ý 69 
Turning specifically now to how dyslexia relates to the medical model, I will 
make an initial point before hu-ning to some remarks made by Snowting. When 
considering the problems faced by dyslexics that were discussed in Chapter One, 
for example poor levels of reading, spelling, writing, co-ordination and numeracy, 
such problems can be (and often are) seen as a type of disfunction, especially if 
the dyslexia is chronic and never attended to. In this way, chronic dyslexia does 
have some affinities with the medical model's notion of dysfunction as non- 
functioning, as the dyslexic may have a very limited relationship with written 
language, Although dyslexia is now generally regarded as a developmental 
disorder, indeed Snowling is quick to point out that as recently as 1970 there have 
been calls for dyslexia to be the responsibility of medicine, the most widely 
6" Mericau-Ponty, M. 1974, p. 26. 
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quoted definition of dyslexia is still that of the World Federation of Neurology'O. 
But as we have seen in Chapter One, there are many vaned symptoms that seem 
to characterise dyslexia, whilst different sub-types of dyslexia (phonological, 
surface and deep dyslexia) have been accepted by some and rejected by others as 
specific forms of difficulty. This prompts Snowling into stating: 
"Thus, to put the medical view of dyslexia into practice is difficult. Clinicians are 
hard-pressed to decide whether a particular constellation of difficulties is atypical 
given an individual's age, intellectual ability and reading level; and certainly, 
reading and speffing behaviours ... cannot be counted as diagnostic. Taken In 
isolation these are a reflection of the level of literacy a child has attained and they 
say notfdng about the cause of the problem. , 71 
Snowling is not altogether dismissive of the medical model, and she highlights 
Miles' attempt to make an objective approach within this framework in the form 
of the Bangor Dyslexia Test. Although the Test has had a huge impact on 
diagnosing dyslexia in the UK, Snowling is qw'ck to point out alternatives to a 
diagnosis of dyslexia, predominantly the 'Educational Viewpomt'. Thus, what we 
can conclude firom the above is that the idea of dyslexia is fairly provocative. We 
have seen that dyslexia presents the medical model with difficulties when trying 
to attain an objectively based diagnosis of the entity in question, although there is 
good evidence from cognitive psychology 72 and neurobiologY73 to suggest that a 
grouping of these symptoms reflect more than a low level of literacy skills. 
70 Snowling, M. 1997, Chapter 1. 
" Snowling, M. 1987, p. 3. 
"-'See: Snowling, M. 198 7, and, Hulme. C& SnOwling, M, 1997. 
73 See: Frith. U. 1997; and, Stein, J. & Walsh, V. 1997. 
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Snowling herself offers a plausible cognitive-based account of the cases of 
dyslexia, although as we have already seen with the methodology that underpins 
Kendell's medical model, the emphasis of Snowling is also on a lack of 
phonological skills which lead to dyslexic dysfunction, 
During this section I have tried to articulate a number of points. Firstly I have 
tried to show the standard way in which 'disorder' is understood by the medical 
model, and what philosophical presuppositions underpin this approach. 
Furthermore, when looking at the phenomenon of dyslexia, we have seen that the 
implicit model at work in diagnosis is also the medical model. Not only do 
Merleau-Ponty's same criticisms apply to this approach, but there is much debate 
concerning whether dyslexia is capable of being diagnosed by the medical model, 
and even whether the symptoms associated with dyslexia are elements of a 
specific entity. What I have hoped to have shown is the suitability, if not urgency, 
for a phenomenological description of the dyslexic's experience. What I am 
interested in as a phenomenologist is the dyslexics style of being-in-the-world in a 
linguistic situation, and in the final section I want to map-out a method by which 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology could disclose the meaning-making process of 
the dyslexic in relation to written language. 
Taking an 'intentional stance' to 
The previous sections of this chapter have attempted to elucidate three mam 
points: firstly, how Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of pre-conscious experience 
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contains an implicit method, one which is located in the disengagement of the 
body-subjects' dialogue with the world (Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological 
reduction); secondly, that the reduction Merleau-Ponty relies upon uses cases of 
psychological disorder as an exemplar, and hence offers an alternative way of 
understanding mental disorders; and finaHy, that dyslexia is not altogether suited 
to the (philosophically suspect) diagnostic process adopted by the medical model. 
From these main points, I can conclude that a phenomenological investigation into 
the unreflected experience of dyslexics, in specific situations (reading, writing, 
spatial and temporal awareness etc.. ), is of great value to the existing literature in 
this field. What I must now show in this final section is how to apply Merleau- 
Ponty's method, a method which is attempting to disclose normal body-world 
dialogue, to a developmental disorder such as dyslexia. 
The main problem for a phenomenology of dyslexia, using Merleau-Ponty's 
methodology, is the theme that has run throughout this chapter - abnormality, 
What must be understood when reading the Phenomenology of Perception is that, 
first and foremost, the phenomenology bemg offered is not a phenomenology of 
abnormality. Hence, as I tried to argue in the introduction to this chapter, one 
cannot simply take Merleau-Ponty's eXistential accounts of psychological disorder 
(predominantly the Schneider case), and 'map them' onto existing examples of 
dyslexic symptoms found in psychological literature. If one were to simply take 
specific examples of the Schneider case , and 
from these examples derive that 
similar problems were happening in the case of the dyslexic, an actual 
phenomenology of dyslexia would not be taking place. For exarnple it would be 
methodologically suspect to move from the problems Schneider has with abstract 
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movements, such as pointing to a specified object (p. 103-7), to making the claim 
that Schneider's Inability to experience his body as a power of action in this 
situation is similar to what dyslexics experience when they are consistently stuck 
with a piece of text - i. e. they too cannot make the transitional from concrete to 
abstract. There may well be some genuineness to this similarity, but this would 
not constitute a phenomenological description as demonstrated by Merleau- 
ponty 74. Moreover, when looking at the Schneider case, the activities or situations 
were only problematic for the patient in that he had little relation at afl to this 
mode of interaction with the world, whilst in the case of dyslexia there is a 
definite interaction ofa kind, although this interaction may not be entirely smooth. 
ID the later case, the dyslexic person is engaged lin a reading or writing process, 
although the accuracy of this process may not be of a similar standard to non- 
dyslexics. 
What would seem central to this theme is a lack, or modification, of intentionality. 
One must realise that there is a double articulation of abnonnality at stake in the 
text: Merleau-Ponty is extracting from the abnormal, whilst I am hying to apply 
his descriptions to abnormality. To overcome this methodological difficulty, there 
is an impetus to look at the way in which - during linguistic situations - the 
dyslexic does have an intentional relationship with the world. Although dyslexia 
is a type of abnormality, there is a specific kind of meanmg-making at stake, and 
dius to try and articulate this manner of being-in-the-world one must take an 
intentional stance to cý)slexia. 
Criticisms of this particular type of manoeuvre have been aimed at myself ma commentrav 
repondirig to an article I have written on phenomenology and dyslexia (See: Widdershoven- G. 
1999. ). Although I do not agree with all of Widdershoven's highly pertinent comments, I owe a 
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To try and map-out the way in which an intentional stance can be taken to 
dyslexia, I will now turn to the work of Bolton and Hill in their book Mind, 
Meaning and Mental Disorder75. Bolton and Hill's main concerns are with 
philosophical psychopathology and the philosophy of mind, and their approach 
attempts to show that reason-based accounts of action can be subsumed within an 
account which takes intentionality to be a special kind of cause. Much of what the 
authors base their account on is derived from Dennett's theory of the intentional 
stance 76 . Although Bolton and Hill expand greatly on Dennett's own approach by 
applying it to cases of psychological disorder, the two sets of authors have a 
psychological understanding of intentionality. This initially presents a problem to 
this thesis, as the type of intentionality the above authors are all concemed with is 
characterised in terms of the 'directedness' of mental-states which are 'about- 
something' i. e. they are on the level of the 'I think' rather than Merleau-Ponty's 'I 
can'. Furthermore, Bolton and Hill are of the opinion that : "intentionality 
characterises not only states of mind, but, more generally, the information- 
carrying states in ftinctional, biological systems', 77 . TMs is clearly a different 
paradigm to the one in which Merleau. -Ponty is working, and although this is by 
no means a terminal problem, I will have to attend to these differences In the next 
chapter where the role of intentionality will be discussed in detail. However, 
philosophical differences apart, what I am interested in now is how Bolton and 
Hill adopt Dennett's intentional approach in order to understand how 
great deal to his criticisms and suggestions. and it is in response to these that I have had to 
scrutinise the methodology of this thesis in the form of this chapter. 
Bolton, D. &I till, J. 1996 
See: Dennett, D. 198 7; and, Dcrinett, D. 198 1. 
Bolton, D. & Hill, J. 1996, p. 19. 
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psycholoWcal disorders are still marked by intentional states - i. e. an account of 
their different meaning making processes. 
Working with the text Brainstorms in mind, Dennett proposes that three stances 
can be used in the prediction of behaviour: the physical stance, the design stance, 
and the intentional stance. The manner in which Dennett describes each 'stance' is 
in relation to artificial intelligence, taking a chess playing computer as an 
example. The prediction of behaviour can be derived from the physical stance via 
I --- Knowledge of the physical constitution of the computer (its 'hardware') and of the 
physical laws governing the subjects operation (i. e. the natural sciences). 
Prediction can also be based on knowledge of the computer's design (its 
programme or software), which has no dependency upon the physical constitution 
of the machine. These particular 'stances' can, in principle, be used for prediction, 
yet remain ineffective at higher levels of artificial intelligence. Prediction of 
human behaviour from the physical stance would require at least knowledge of 
brain processes i-n advance of current neuroscience, whilst explanation from the 
design stance would have to come from significant progress in cognitive science. 
The final 'stance' has no reliance upon knowledge of the computer's hardware or 
software, and instead is involved with predicting that the computer will make the 
most 'rational' decision when making a move in a game of chess. This, according 
to Dennett, is an intentional stance, and it attributes the computer with certain sets 
of 'beliefs' and 'desires', in effect, certam mtentional states. The moves made by 
the computer are regulated by these intentional states, carrying information about 
the progress of the game, and most importantly about goals. 
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The above theory may seem to open up more debate than is desirable considering 
the phenomenological themes in this chapter, however, intra-philosophical 
debates must be bracketed-off for the moment, and the structure of Dennett's 
account must be attended to. Dennett's imperative to take an intentional stance In 
order to predict high level functioning is, to a certain extent in keeping with 
certain aspects of folk psychology, and what is initially interesting for this essay is 
the connection between the dissolving of dualism via folk psychological 
explanations, and the similar aims we have seen in relation to phenomenology. Of 
even greater interest is the basic premise that elucidation of the intentional stance 
reinforces one of the main points of this chapter, that explanation in terms of 
intentional meaning making is paramount in understanding our being-in-the- 
world. 
The above assumptions back-up a number of issues raised previously in this 
chapter, predominantly, the type of Invesfigation I arn involved with is suited to 
taking an intenfional stance. However, Bolton and Hill are quick to point out that 
Dennett's notion of taking an intentional stance is not in keeping With 
explanations of abnormal behaviour 78 , indeed, this theory of 
intentionality would 
not seem to be able to address the double articulation of abnormality we have 
already seen in the previous section. In addressing abnormality, Dennett's 
intentional stance would equate abnormality with a lack of intentionality, similar 
to the Schneider case we have already encountered. Bolton and Hill also highlight 
that this lack of intentionality is also characterised by a lack of action in 
accordance with the specific goals involved in this situation- In cases of severe 
Bolton, D. & Hill, J. 1996. Chapter 7. 
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psychiatric disorder, such as states of Catatonia, there may be little or no 
intentionality involved in the patients manner of being, and thus, instead of a style 
of being-in-the-world the patient would be radicafly disengaged with the world. 
Furthermore, the lack of action can be attributed to the lack of a goal or situation 
for the patient. However, even in less severe cases of psychological disorder, and 
certainly in the case of dyslexia, there is a style of bemg-in-the-world, and 
although this style may be different to the rest of a community in certain situations 
(e. g. reading) there are most defmitely intentional processes at stake and hence a 
goal to be achieved in the situation. 
Instead of leaving the intentional stance in the realm of explaining 'normal' 
behaviour, in Chapter 8 of Mind, Meaning, andMental Disorder, Bolton and Hill 
suggest a heterogenous approach to varying degrees of psychological disorder. I 
will concentrate on the account they give of 'compensatory mechanisms' and 
'copm'g skills 79 , Bolton and Hill suggest that 
from previous experience, specific 
situations Will be given a certain representation, For example, when I find myself 
in a field with a bul-I I would generally judge the situation as 'Potentially 
dangerous', and the immediate goal would be to avoid the danger. The reason for 
this representation of the situation may be due to my parents telling me of the 
dangers of this situation, or previously witnessing the power/danger of a bull first- 
hand. Through the adoption of a certain representation I am thus able to act in an 
appropriate manner - i. e. in the case of a bull I would run. Now let us apply 
dils 
idea to my experience of dyslexia. 
7ý'Sec: Bolton, D. & Hill. J. 1996, p. 284,341 and 343-7. 
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Before the age of 13, the age when I suffered most from reading and wnting 
problems, I clearly had (to use Dennett"s vocabulary) a poor representation of 
linguistic situations, and hence, although there was some engagement with the 
situation, the lack of a clear goal meant that I was unable to act in an appropnate 
way in regard to printed language. In this way there is a breakdown of 
intentionality for myself as a dyslexic. The activity of reading has broken down 
for me because I have no clear understanding of what this situation represents to 
me, i. e. it is somewhat lacking in meanmafulness, and hence there is a dislocation 
of the reading process. However, and this is the critical point, this is not a process 
that is permanently dislocated -I am not in a continual state of stasis in relation to 
printed language. Hence, although the meamngfulness of the situation may 
become vague and the activity stops, there must be a type of coping mechanism 
that allows me to move out of static situation. Bolton and Hill suggest that in 
situations where intentionality is consistendy dislocated, the individual learns to 
cope with these difficulties by resorting to compensatory strategies. These 
strategies allows the individual to employ different representations to a situation 
in an attempt to recommence an intentional relationship with the world. Because 
the individual has lost an intentional bond with the world, action will have also 
stopped, and only once a different representation of the situation is adopted wifl 
there be any chance of recommencing action. The idea of becoming aware of a 
breakdown of linguistic meaning and the impetus to adopt a new attitude towards 
the requirements of a situation will be discussed through different themes in the 
following chapters, whilst the use Merleau-Ponty makes of compensatory 
strategies, or as he puts it 'replacement functions 80 , and the possibility of 
"' Merleau-Ponty, M. 1973, 'The Pathology of Language'. 
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dyslexics adopting compensatory strategies will be attended to detail in Chapter 
Five. 
A large part of the problem I have faced in this chapter is finding a way to account 
for intentionality in cases of psychological disorder. In the case of Merleau-Ponty, 
we have seen that he is able to articulate the incipience of different styles of 
intentional relafionships via his descripfions of the body-world dialogue breaking 
down. What I am wanting to find is a way of using his phenomenology to look at 
the abnormal features of language acquisition associated with dyslexia. We have 
seen that dyslexia is a type of psychological disorder, although it cannot be 
equated with a complete loss of mtentionality or action. What I have tried to show 
with recourse to Bolton and Hill is a type of methodology that wants to take an 
intentional stance to meaning making, and yet can be applied to psychological 
disorders. What has been ascertained via this recourse is that, what is most 
pressing for this phenomenological enquiry tnto dyslexia is a focus on how the 
dyslexic can partially overcome linguistic difficulties and have a different style of 
intentional relationship with written language. Instead of looking at how 
Merleau-Ponty describes psychological disorders in an existential manner and 
applying these ideas to dyslexia, I have to move away firom the temtory of 
dislocation, and describe how intenfionality is ivorking for dyslexics when 
engaged in with a linguistic situation. 
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Chapter Three 
The idea of the lived body and its implication for d-vslexia and 
phenomenolo2v 
The crux of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is the fundamental role of the body 
iii perception. The emphasis that is put on body and flesh by Merleau-Ponty is 
both pragmatic and historical; the valorisation of the body is as much a reaction to 
the Cartesian starting point taken by Husserl in his brand of phenomenology, as it 
is an anchor for his situation-based philosophy, a philosophy of practical 
immersion in the world. Again we see that the level of human expenence that is of 
consequence for Merleau-Ponty is the J can' and not purely the 'I think'. In this 
chapter I want to make explicit some of the themes that were only touched on in 
the previous chapter when mappmg out both Merleau-Ponty's and my own 
methodology. 
in the previous chapter I have tried to map out the maimer in which an implicit, 
yet highly revealing methodology is at work in Phenomenology ofPereeption. We 
have taken note that Merleau-Ponty is interested in the pre-reflective level of 
expefience that he situates in the (mostly) seamless dialogue between body and 
world. The manner in which the phenomenologist is able to catch a brief glimpse 
of this dialogue is via its very breakdown, and thus explicIt cases of such a 
breakdown (i. e. psycho/pathological conditions) are used by Merleau-Ponty in 
order to shed light on the various manners in which we are inexorably linked with 
the world. This has provided my phenomenological investigation into dyslexia 
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with something of a pToblem: how does one apply a phenomenological method 
that rests upon empirical cases of psychological or physiological breakdown to a 
type of linguistic disability that is also characteristic of a type of breakdown or 
dislocation? "' The way into answenng this is to fall back on one of 
Phenomenology's main tenets: the meaningfulness of experience. This is clearly 
not to say that all experience is meaningful, indeed the look of a word or sentence 
on a page may be completely baffling for a dyslexic person even if they have 
come across it time and time before. What is at stake for this investigation is not 
only what modes of experience are primarily dyslocated for a dyslexic person, but 
how they are able to go onto make meaning out of a linguistic situation that is of a 
more inter-subjective nature, indeed how the dyslexic is able to relocate 
themselves. This chapter will start to reveal just how Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology may be applied to cases of dyslexia via a concrete exposition of 
the body as our openHig onto the world. 
In the previous chapter on methodologY, I have introduced the notion of a 
dialogue existing between the body and the world. In an attempt to try and rid his 
philosophy of lingering dualisms, Merleau-Ponty has closed the gap between the 
two sides of this relationship: to think of the body one has to think of it belonging 
This also raises questions over the validity and possibility of WlYing Merleau-Ponty 's type of 
phenomenology to empirical cases, If one were to follow Husserl's method of 'brack-eting-off' the 
intentional object under scrutiny, the empirical existence of the object would be regarded as 
superfluous to the investigation. However, Merleau-Ponty's method makes use of no such specific 
reduction, only an all encompassing reduction which is primarih, based upon examples of body- 
world breakdown provided by the empirical sciences. This places Merelau-Ponty's philosophý- in 
all ambiguous relationship with the empirical sciences, On one hand Phenomenology of Perception 
and especially his latter work, Eye and Mind (Merleau-Ponty, M. 1964 (b)) and 7he I isible and 
The Invisible (Merleau-Ponty, M. 1968), are very much pioneering a philosophy that is trying to 
break iway from objective based disciplines such as mechanistic physiology and behaviounism, 
His criticism can at times be extremely harsh, and yet Merleau-Ponty does little, if anything, in the 
%%ýaý, of legitimising his own use of empirical examples. To go much further into this discussion 
would nican bringing up topics concerning the airn of phcnomenologý, as a discipline, its 
history. 
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to a world, and to think of a world, one has to think of it via a certain perspective 
- the body. In the language of The Visible and the Invisible, this relationship is 
'chiasmatic' or 'reversible'. Similarly, one cannot conceive of the body as 
existing alongside the constitutive mind or cogito. As the notion of a dialogue has 
shown, there is always a stratum of experience that one is not aware of when 
involved in a practical situation, a stratum that envelopes any type of intended act 
which is supportive of experience in general. Hence, there is not only a dynarmc 
and complementary structure that includes the conscious and the pre-conscious, 
but the status of the body is raised to that of originary. Although the principal aim 
of this thesis is to describe the problems faced by the dyslexic in terms of sense 
perception, what must be remembered is that a theory of sense perception 
presupposes a theory of sensuousness, which is itself an implicit theory of the 
body. indeed, for Merleau-Ponty this is exactly the case, for a theory of the body 
must be exhibited before a fully articulated theory of sense perception can be 
developed. This point will become clearer when describing how an object 
mamtams its unity in light of different perspectives. Thus, what has to be 
articulated in much greater detail in this chapter is the operation of the pre- 
conscious stratum of the body which is home to the synergistic and implicatory 
power of our senses, and which wifl go under the name of the 'body schema'. 
As will be explained in the first section of the chapter, one must be quick to point 
out the important difference between the notions of 'body schema' and 'body 
iniage', a discussion that will also shed light on the manner in which Merleau- 
Ponty conceives of intentionality working in his phenomenology. This discussion 
and its constraints. none of which can be dealt with at length here. For a wider discussion of thes 
issues I advise the reader to look at- Kockehnans. J, 198-5 
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will revolve around the inevitable anonymity of the body's role in perception, and 
will be supplemented by some concrete examples of just how the body schema is 
at work in our everyday experience. To supplement this discussion, I will then 
describe the manner in which the body comports itself towards learning and 
mamtainmg new skills (habits), and this theme will be discussed at length 
relation to dyslexia. Once we have a greater purchase on the pre-conscious body 
schema, the manner in which the body has a chiasmatic relationship With the 
world will hopefully become apparent. Through this dynamic interaction we will 
start to see how a certain unity of the world can be maintained despite an 
environment of difference. Furthermore, it will become apparent how such a unity 
is dependent upon a general synthesis grounded in the body, and not an intentional 
synthesis at a conscious level. This last topic will have significant beanng on 
dyslexia, whilst it will signpost the development of phenomenological themes in 
my later chapters concerning spatiality, language and temporality. 
The anonymous existence of the body schema 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of embodiment is undoubtedly a complex issue, one 
which is not helped by the somewhat critical and convoluted style of 
Phenomenologi, qf Perception. However, one of the easiest ways into his 
treatinent of the body is through the much-nusunderstood notion of the body 
image. Immediately I may have placed the reader in an awkward postion. for 
although Colin Smith's English translation of Phenomenolok, of Perception uses 
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the term body unage, I wish to point out that this is a highly misleading and value- 
laden term when used in the light of Merleau-Ponty's overall strategy. What 
Merleau-Ponty is most interested in when describing the body's anchorMg role in 
perception is the pre-conscious, habitual level of the body that is in anonymous 
dialogue with the world. What must be understood is that taking its traditional 
connotations into account, this is not the level of the body image. Indeed, a 
number of articles by Shaun Gallagher 82 have teased out the subtle and not so 
subtle differences between the two terms: body schema and body image. 
In Merleau-Ponty's original Phenomenologie de la perception, the author starts 
'Part 1, Section 3' with a reference to Henry Head's notion of a postural model 
(p. 98; French, p. 1148), an idea which is clearly in the realm of the pre-conscious, 
something which is an anterior prerequisite for perception. The phrase Merleau- 
Ponty attributes to this is "schema corporef', however, in the English translation 
we find the phrase "body InIage". In defence of the English translator, Merleau- 
Ponty does little to point out the specific differences between the terms body 
image and body schema. Even though I will deal with these notions in quite 
different ways, it is Merleau-Ponty's View that there is a continuous development 
between them and thus should be taken as elements of the same system. Although 
this may seem like splitting terminological hairs, once the philosophical 
implications of each term are made explicit, one will hopefully understand why 
Image' and 'schema' have to be approached qwte differently. 
Sccý Gallagher, S. 1996; and, Gallagher, S. & CoIc. J. 1998. 
Mcrlcau-Ponty, M. 1945. 
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In Shaun Gallagher's excellent exposition of the fimdamental difference between 
body 11nage and schema84, the author introduces a term that I now Wish to 
incorporate into my own vocabulary during the thesis, the term being 'prenoetic'. 
In previous chapters I have generally used the tenn 'pre-conscious', and yet this is 
precisely too general. The term prenoetic is clearly a modification of Husserhan 
terminology: the noetic act performed by the transcendental ego. Although 
Merleau-Ponty himself is not prone to employing the term prenoetic, it does 
indicate to the reader the type of territory Merleau-Ponty wishes to investigate, 
that is: what is happening prior to any goal orientated or 'intended' act In order for 
it to proceed in the first place? The answer is of course the anonymous anchonng 
role of the body, yet how are we to conceive of this body? In his paper Gallagher 
is quick to point out the ease in which body image and schema have been used 
interchangeably or conflated by psychologists during the 20th century. Gallagher 
locates three key differences between these notions: 
Intentionality: The body image has an intentional status, this being either a 
conscious representation of the body, or a set of beliefs about the body. Therefore, 
we only come into contact with the body image when the body is thematised; e. g. 
the ageing bachelor perceives himself as being 'unattractive' to the opposite sex 
because he has thematised his baldness. The body schema on the other hand, has a 
type of 'pre-intentional' operation that envelops mtentional and conscious 
awareness and plays an active, ever persisting role in monitoring and organising 
posture and movement; e. g. one is able to walk qwte easily even whilst holding a 
demanding conversation, 
84 Gallagher, S. 1996, 
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Mineness: The body image is experienced as an owned body, something that 
specifically belongs to a certain person. Conversely, the body schema operates at 
a subpersonal, anonymous level, and I have no direct awareness of some of the 
changes in posture my body schema is making; e. g. I may consciously decide to 
turn (my body) left on the pavement, the role of the body image, yet I make no 
decision in attuning certain groups of muscles to such an activity whilst I continue 
waMng. 
Parts and Wholes: Because the human cannot have a complete pictorial grasp of 
itself at any one time, the body image involves a specific, and hence only partial 
representation; e. g. the image of ourselves is usually that of our front, as this is the 
reflective surface which we have the most contact with. In contrast, the body 
schema functions holistically, involving a global adjustment of body parts, and 
therefore the individual sensory organs of the body act synergistically to fon-n a 
system; e. g. although I am having a drink, I have to remain partially upright so as 
not to choke, which in turn involves my back muscles constricting, which 
decreases the tension in by quadriceps etc.. etc.. 
Many of the differences that separate the body schema from the body image on a 
conceptual level will be discussed in greater detail below. However, so as not to 
fall back into a type of dualism, it must be emphasised that when expressed at a 
lived or existential level the body schema and image are very much two elements 
of a dynamic system - this system being the lived-body. 
In the case of eyestrain 
for example, die body begins to make cautomatic' postural and motor adjustments 
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prior to me becoming aware of an impending headache. Absorbed in the act of 
editing my latest work I am not explicitly conscious of my body's minute 
adjustments, which may include squinting or moving closer to the VDU screen, 
My body performs these functions, coping With the demands made on it in this 
particular situation, without my reflective, mtentional awareness. Such prenoetic 
adjustments Will determine intentional content, and hence the body Image, in 
important ways. In the case of eyestrain, body-schema adjustments may motivate 
me to deliberately (intentionally) fix on the room's environment or the screen itself 
as slowmg the editing process down: the fighting is too dim; the colour of the 
screen is too garish; or the length of the document is too long to edit in one 
session. Postural adjustments may allow me to continue working by keeping my 
attention away from my thematised body, and hence keep the thematisation of my 
body image - the eyestrain - to a minimum. In the end, however, the inadequacy of 
such adjustments may force me to become painfully aware of my bodily 
discomfort and reallse that I have develoPed a nauseating headache. 
Although we can now understand the body image and body schema as 
complementary elements In a dynamic system, the privileged element in Merleau- 
Ponty's theory of embodiment is clearly the body schema, i. e. the self-effacing 
stratum of the body. In language reminiscent of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty 
describes this anonymous, anchoring role of the body as one part of the "double 
horizon of extemal and bodily space" (p. 10 1). However, this does little service to 
the original description of the body Phenomenology of Perception is offering. 
Take for example the visual aspect of inspecting my swollen k-nee85. When under 
"1 say 'the visual aspect' because, as I NN-111 point out in greater detail 
below, the percept-ual act is 
neNer simpýv one of vision, or touch or taste etc.. as the body's sensory capacity is a systcm of 
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scrutiny, my knee is the part of my body that is thematised, and hence my knee is a 
figure that stands out against a double horizon. However, there is clearly a distinct 
phenomenological difference between the two elements of this horizonal structure, 
for althougb the perpetual field that my knee stands out from is in the background, 
one is still more or less aware of the receding strata. If one now attends to the 
bodily horizon, I find that my sensory organs are quite unapparent in the 
perceptual act, indeed my eyes only become 'visible' when they are reflected 
upon, and hence thematised as part of the body image. Again we come across the 
self-effacing phenomenon of the body, and by way of drawing attention to this 
feature I will draw upon Drew Leder's use of the HusserhaD expression: 
nullpoin, 86 . The idea of the body being a nullpoint can be taken two ways: if the 
body is viewed as the centre of a Cartesian style geometric system (i. e. as body 
image) it must be considered to be point zero; furthermore, precisely as the centre 
point from which the perceptual field radiates, the perceptual organs remain an 
absence or nullity in the midst of the perceived. With this in nund, we now can 
fully understand Merleau-Ponty's assertion that although two hands touching each 
other can intertwine, they can never fiffly coincide. Although both my hands have 
the potential to question an object as to its tactility, when one hand touches 
another, one hand will have to be thematised as an object, and hence lose its status 
as an anonymous, questioning agent. As Merleau-Ponty puts it: 
implications or equivilances; - e. g. the juicy 'taste' of the orange also implicates the tactile feeling 
of ripeness in an orange. 
'6 See: Leder, D. 1990, p. 13-15. Leder's use of the Husserhan idea of nullpoint (Nullpunkt) is 
relatively sinular to Husserl's own use in the second book of Ideas - i. e. the body is an ever- 
present 'here' to the surrounding 'theres' all around - although Husserl is enticised for his failure 
to compictely breakzawaý, firom treating the body as an object that eXiSts only in an intentional 
capacltý-. See: Husserl, E. 1989. 
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"When I press my two hands together, it is not a matter of two sensations felt 
together as one perceives two objects placed side by side, but of an ambiguous set- 
up in which both hands can alternate the roles of 'touching" and being 
'touched'... The body catches itself from the outside engaged in a cognitive 
process; it tries to touch itself while being touched, and initiates 'a kind of 
reflection' [Husserl - Cartesian Meditations] which is sufficient to distinguish it 
from objects, of which I can indeed say that they 'touch' my body, but only when 
it is Inert, and therefore without ever catching it unawares in its exploratory 
P---- fuitction7 (p. 93) 
We can thus formulate a general principle: in as far as I perceivethTOugb an organ, 
it necessarily recedes from the perceptual field it discloses. I do not feel the nerve 
endings in my hand, nor hear my ear, but perceive with and through such organs. 
From this key principle, one can deduce another important characteristic of 
embodiment, one that is concerned with the tacit constitution of the sensory 
organs, and discloses the interrelationship between perception and motility. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Merleau-Ponty is keen on pioneering a 
phenomenology that is free from the metaphysical misapprehensions found within 
the schools he refers to as 'empiricism' and 'intellectualism', although, at the same 
time he is clearly enamoured with some of their basic features. The type of tacit 
knowledge offered by the senses is a prime example of Merleau-Ponty's empiricist 
persuasions. Take for example our orange again: when I go to bite into one of the 
segments from my orange, my body is geared towards the act of manipulating the 
segment in the course of eating. During this act I expenence the multiple 
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sensations of texture, taste, aroma etc.. These sensations may be, perhaps naively, 
attributed to the orange segment itself, yet they are only made possible by my 
sensory organs. There are two important points here. 
Firstly, Merleau-Ponty's notion of perception is inextricably tied to the body's 
interaction with the world and hence movement. The classical distinction between 
perception and movement, as with the distinction between intelligence and ability, 
is highly artificial, separating in reflection what is united in lived expenence. 
Hence, although perception cannot be understood as a singular acý it does involve 
a type of motor activity or 'motility'. For example, I have to move eye muscles in 
order to focus or change my perspective. Although I may be performing a goal- 
directed activity -I decide to focus more closely on the multiple colours of a 
painting - the perceptual act will contain varying muscular movements, which I 
will have little or no awareness of at all. Moreover, the objects, which come to be 
thematised within my perceptual field, are permeated with a type of implicit 
motility. When I talk of an object being 'there', perhaps near or far from my body, 
this is only possible because my body affords 97 me the possibility of moving 
through space (a point which is related directly to dyslexia and is dealt with m 
detail during the next chapter). This is also the case on a more qualitative level. 
Although the sight of food can often be experienced as pleasurable and enticing, if 
I have already eaten too much, the plate of food may no longer be allUrIng, indeed 
it may seem repulsive. 
" The notion that characteristics of the world afford or penmt the body, a certain activity is 
introduced by J. J. Gibson. See: Gibson, 1 1986. 
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Because perception is fused with motility, the sensory world always imites our 
body to make an active response - to make thýe perceptual act meaningful. It is this 
t shared logic' within the lived-body and the world that generates an attitude or 
meaningftdness towards a specific situation. Moreover, these meanings are both 
enabling and constraining in that the lived-body is able to react to an attitude in 
light of its current project. For example: the glass is too far to reach (a constraining 
element); I will have to get out of my chair (the enabling element). Although 
Merleau-Ponty is keen to articulate a shared logic, what is most stfiking about this 
relationship considering he is pioneering a type of phenomenology, is that he is 
keen to emphasise the importance of the phenomenological object and thus my 
actions are motivated in response to an outer-directed concern. For example, when 
I go to take a mouthful of food from a plate I have to be consciously aware of the 
food as a thernatised object, yet the fork as an extension of my body needs little if 
any of my attention 18. When studying this active element of perception it is plain 
to see that one is no more aware of the actiVIty at hand than before. Although one 
could thematise the manner in which I walk, and hence pay attention to my body 
image, only a small aspect of this self-presencing can be glimpsed. Moreover, 
when I thematise, and hence reflect on an activity that is usually part of my body's 
tacit engagement with the world, it is often very hard for this activity to carry on in 
a smooth and successful manner - the stumbling block in manual activities such as 
trying to take a 'perfect' free kick in football is reflecting too much on the act 
itself The existence I lead through my body is one of an engagement with 
practical situations, and we now liave a far better understanding of why: 
" Therc is of course a major resonance here of Heldegger's compound expression 
'readN--to-hand' 
k--uhanden) and his fanious c. xample of hammering in Being and Time (Div- 1, 
Ch. 2 and 3). 
Heidegger. as with Merleati- Pontv, conceives of our (Dasein's) bcIng-m-the-world as a type of 
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"Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of 'I think that' but of 'I can' " 
137) 
This brings us on to a related second poInt regarding perception and the senses. 
Following Merleau-Ponty's disclosure of the body-schema's absent peculiarity, it 
is the case that I only come to know what my senses are capable of when I actually 
put them to use, that is, through experience. It is this strange lack of transparency 
and self-evidence that is idiosyncratic of our body, which means that I can only 
begin to realise the power of my sensory organs by attending to somediing that is 
other from them, e. g. the ingestion of my orange segment. What we find through 
our investigation of the world and its objects is indeed ourselves. Although our 
body "is our general medium for having a world" (p. 146) we are still very much of 
the world. This leads to a very interesting conclusion concerning our sensory 
organs. Although over time our senses seem to us to have a type of innate quality, 
this fixed view of sensorial capability is only artived at because the type of 
interaction one has with the world is marked by a certain typicality; e. g. as long as 
I am on sinfflar terrain, my next step should be as secure as the last. However, this 
does mean that to conceive of the sensory organs as having a fixed capability is 
merely a presumptive conclusion, and if we are to draw out Merleau-Ponty's 
argument to its logical extent one would have to treat the senses, and indeed the 
lived-body in general, as a mutable structure: 
"Although our body does not impose definite instincts upon us from birth.. It does 
at least give to our life the fonn of generality, and develops our personal acts into 
pragmatic concemfulness, which he later makes visible as care in Chapter 6. (Heldegger, M. 
1962. ) 
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stable dispositional. tendencies. In this sense our nature is not long-establi shed 
custom, smce custom presupposes the form of passiVity derived from nature. ' 
146) 
Mthough there is a distinctive style in which the lived-body conducts itself, 
because we are open to ever-new situations there is always scope in Merleau- 
Ponty's philosophy for a transgression of cultural and material boundaries. This 
point is investigated further in the Mowing section, where I attend to the body's 
acquisition of skills and habits. Along with the above descriptions concernmg the 
self-effacing constitution of the lived-body, finiher qualifications regarding the 
practical nature of the lived-body will shape the way in which we understand 
Merleau-Ponty's relationship with intentionality. 
The acquisition of skills and its relevance to dyslexia 
From the previous section we have learned that the body can be conceived of as an 
intentional object the body image, whi-Ist the stratum of the body that underpins 
our meaningfulness in relation to the world is the body schema. Perception, a 
capability which is indebted to motility. is substantiated by the tacit role played by 
the body schema. in particularly the sensory organs, and therefore the ground of 
such a perceptual act is marked by a certain absence or disappearance". The final 
" One of the most interestuag features of DreN-%- Leder's book The Absent Bo4v (see above 
reference) is the task the author undertakes in trying to articulate a phenomenologý of the inner, 
visceral activit-v of the bo(t, (Chapter 2). As NNith the surface disappearance of the *ecstatic* bodý, 
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point I made in the last section underscores Merleau-Ponty's belief that the lived 
body, in particularly the sensory organs, is a dynanuc entity, one that is quite 
capable of transfon-nations via its relationship with the world. Furthermore, in 
view of the body's capability of acquiring new skills and embodying them as 
habits, the idea of bodily flux and transformation becomes quite concrete; if it 
were not for the body's malleable vitality we would never be able to 'learn' skills 
such as climbing stairs, or incorporate supplementary organs into our body 
schema, such as a pen used to inscribe the world. A phenomenological anatomy 
cannot then be thought of as fixed over time, or even confined by the physical 
boundaries of the flesh. It must take account of the body as living process. 
Let us first see how the body (schema) is a malleable structure. The example 
Merleau-Ponty uses to illustrate the new application of a habit concerns the 
playing of a musical instrument. He cites the study of an organist (p. 145) who 
needs only an hours practice to be able to perform successftdly his musical 
arrangement on an unfamiliar organ. In response to the empiricists' claun that the 
organist has learned a new set of conditional responses to this unfamiliar 
instruinent, there is not nearly enough time for this to be the case, whilst M 
response to the intellectualist assertion that the organist has draw up a new 'mental 
map' Merleau-Ponty claims: 
Leder highlights that although the 'recessive' body is charactensed bý, a tý-pe of depth 
disappearance, this still offers the phenomenologist the possibilitv of extracting a certain 
meaningfulness from these activities which is non-biological. The authors deSCnptions are often 
quite revelatory, whilst one highly pertinent point is that through a phenonienology of the 
recessive b4, the reader comes to see how the strict dichotomy of an internal and external bodv 
starts dissolve due to the chiasmatic relationship between viscenlity and N-isibility - -an identity-in- 
differnce7 
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"He [the organist] sits on the seat works on the pedals, pulls out the stops, gets the 
measure of the instrument with his body, incorporates within himself the relevant 
directions and dimensions, settles into the organ as one settles into a house, he 
does not learn objective spatial positions for stop and pedal, nor does he conmiit 
them to memory. " (p. 145) 
We can thus understand why it is the body that is able to modify habitlial skills and 
not some representational capacity of intentionality, whilst such skills are again 
characterised by their withdrawal. However, the question must be asked: how do 
we come to acquire such skiffs to begin with, and does this not require an activity 
which is of the intentional order? This last question is challenging for Merleau- 
Ponty. Is it not the case that when I am trying to acquire a new skill such as 
learning how to perform a high jump, I mentally - hence intentionally - break 
down the activity into its sequential elements, and then try and apply this 
representational formula to my already acquired sUls such as running and 
jumping? Merleau-Ponty's reply would be, to an extent 'yes', but on a 
fundamental level 'no. 
As Merleau-Ponty's exwnple of learning a new type of dance shows (p. 142-3), 
there is undoubtedly an intended thinking through of the dance steps, which will 
require a certain amount of imagery with respect to our own body i. e. the body 
image. Yet no matter how carefully this new body image is structured, by virtue of 
the fact that we are trying to learn a new motor act it has to be the body schema 
ifseýf that grasps the relationship between already acquired habits and attempted 
new movements. For such a project to be concretely initiated: "it must first have 
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had, as it were, the stamp of movement set upon it. As has often been said, it is the 
body which 'catches' and 'comprehends' movement. " (p. 142). Once I have 
engaged my body schema with the thematised movement of the body image, a 
circuit between reflection and motility guides the body through the various stages 
of skill acquisition from novice to expert. It is only when I no longer have to 
reflect on the activity that skill acquisition recedes into habit. Skills are not learned 
through a Cartesian 'natural light of reason'; rather, habits and skills are learned 
through a natural tendency to practice. 
Whilst habits become sedimented into my tacit body schema, as a result of an 
ongoing environmental pattern some habits may have the tendency to become 
automatic, for example the manner in which I greet somebody. In more extreme 
examples, such as the drilled soldier, the time-tabled prisoner, or even somebody 
suffering from eating disorders, automatic habits may become more than just a 
mere idiosyncrasy, and turn into a character traieO. It is here that the 'I can' is 
crystallised into an 'I do', and the body is imbued with a certain style. 
Furthermore, the notion that the body-schema becomes encrusted with a style can 
be extended to the cultural world, in that my particular style is transferred onto the 
milieu around me - my clothes, furniture, books etc.. There is hence a certain 
paradox of identity between my body schema and my milieu, for although the style 
of my body schema permeates my cultural flesh, it is these cultural belongings that 
90 Although Merleau-Ponty's project is quite different from that of Foucault's (indeed Foucault 
mav be seen to conduct the flip-side or outside of Merleau-Ponty's project) there are themes such 
as ihe above that intersect between both authors. Common themes but with a different emphasis 
oscillate in and out of Foucault's texts, especially Discipline and Punish, where the shaping of the 
body is dealt with at length, whilst the idea of reversibihtý, is framed in terms of the "panoptic' 
power structure of the prison (See Part 3 of Foucault, M. 1977). An excellent essay on the 
dnlling/shaping of the male body is provided by Klaus Theweleit (Theweleit, K. 1998. ), whilst 
essays on eating disorders, and dieting in relation to the female body, bring out the dangers of 
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disclose who I am, to myself, but especially for others. We will see how much the 
motif of allerity is central to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological ontology when I 
attend to the mutualy inclusive themes of language and inter- subjectivity. 
Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of skill acquisition and habit formation attempt to 
transcend previous empiricist and intellectualist explanations by emphasising the 
importance of the implicit body schema in these activities. The two central ideas 
Merleau-Ponty is keen on refuting are the empiricist assertion of a conditioned 
response to sense-data via induction, and the inteHectualist assertion of the 
primacy of 'mental maps/representations'. Of these two approaches, Merleau- 
Ponty is perhaps more interested in the intellectualist account, for although he 
would vehemently deny the primacy of a representationalist model, he does 
concede that there is a need to reflect upon the body image during the acquisition 
of new skills. This goes the same for the modification of skills, even when such 
skills are well established and enveloped into our body schema. However, the 
ffirust of Merleau-Ponty's argwnent is that, in order for any type of leaming 
process to take place, a founding movement of the body is required, and as such, 
should be regarded as primary. Now, considering that the majority of recent 
research into developmental dyslexia has come fi-om the cognitivist school of 
psychology, and therefore regards a representationalist model as primary for the 
acquisition of reading, writing and speRing skills, Merleau-Ponty's descriptions 
may offer us some interesting alternatives. Although these initial conclusions Will 
be on a very general level (it would after all be hard to articulate at a specific level 
when regarding the body schema), these asswnptions Will become fleshed out in 
traming the body to slim, exercise or starve itself See (respectively). Cash, T. and Brown, T. 
1987, and, Bordo, S. 1998. 
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the next 'case study' chapter on spatiality, and especially when we consider the 
body's relationship with expression, 
Firstly, I will recap the main points of discussion concerning cognitive research 
into developmental dyslexia. In Snowling's highly influential account (see Chapter 
One), the author highlights what she regards as the main phonological deficits 
found in developmental dyslexics - verbal coding deficits and delays (verbal 
memory and phoneme segmentation) that are fundamental to dyslexia. Snowling 
examines how groups of 'dyslexic' children have specific problems With verbal 
memory, verbal labelling and other aspects of auditory processing, problems 
which are a result of "not having the phonological skills required to learn to read at 
the crifical time"91. Snowling's asserts that, because of a lack of phonological 
skills that are usually acquired during the pre-schooling stage, this bnngs about 
failure to progress to the alphabetic phase of literacy development; i. e. they are 
unable to tackle unfamiliar words in their reading and their spelling is dysphonetic. 
If the psychological tenmnology is stripped away from the above assertions and 
they are related to the type of descriptive language we have been dealing with 
previously in this chapter, I think the above argument can be split into two main 
points. Snowling is keen to characterise dyslexia as a fundamental group of 
deficits. These deficits are responsible for difficulties that occur in the decoding 
skills needed to convert orthographic codes (representations) into verbal meanings, 
but these phonological meanings are still conceived of as determinate 
representations. As such, these skills are marked specifically by a need to reflect - 
Snowling. M. 1987, p. 148. 
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to represent to my consciousness a type of image or code that allows a specific 
project to gain momentum; e. g. typing out this sentence. Specific areas of 
cognition needed for reading/writing/spelling would fit into Merleau-Ponty's 
system at the level of body-image, and as long as such areas of specific 
representation are not treated as primary, and rather thought of as continuously 
developing with the body schema, such an account is in keeping with our 
investigation of skill acquisition (or non acquisition in the case of the dyslexic). 
However, on further inspection, this may not actually be the case, for Snowling 
seems to want to treat everything at the level at the level of representation. Either 
Snowling wants to treat representation and reflection as primary, and thus 
considers the role of the body schema to be of little consequence (which may 
indeed be the case), or she has quite simply neglected the vital and initiating role 
the body proper plays in skill acquisition. Although I can only make some initial 
and general points at this stage, Merleau-Ponty's description of the lived-body's 
capacity to acquire skills highlights a number of the constraints and difficulties of 
the cognitive approach, and I can now make two initial conclusions. 
Firstly, and on a more general level, it would seem that the cognitive approach is 
constrained by its need to keep its explanations at the level of representation. It 
seems as though Snowling is aware that there may be something more originary 
than a simple lack of phonological skills, and that this may have something to do 
with an active and founding role played by the body, but this would be to go 
outside the remit of cognitive psychology. Indeed, this point is emphasised in 
some recent brain scanning research carried out by Snowhng and colleagueS92. In 
92 Abdulla, S. 1998. 
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this research Snowling argues that via the use of PET scanning, she found that 
dyslexic people showed sipificantly less actiVity in the left hemisphere than in 
control subjects. The least active region in dyslexics was the 'insular', an area that 
'. 'could be the site of the phonological representations that experts have long 
recognised as crItical to reading development. , 93 This strikes me as a little odd. If 
we are to treat Merleau-Ponty's notion of the lived body as an all inclusive system, 
i. e. the body scbema also includes the activity of the brain (as Leder is keen to 
point out 
94), 
then Snowling's research would seem to be a move away from the 
exclusive sphere of cognition, and may be able to compensate for the lack of a 
founding role of the body. However, the insular region of the brain is described as 
the site of "phonological representations". Clearly this is a speculative claim on 
behalf of Snowling, but it is clear that even when dealing with the matenal aspect 
of the body (and the brain surely must be part of our body proper), the need to 
make assumptions at a representational level is paramount. Whether such 
(representations' spinning around in the insular are metaphorical or not, this 
exemplifies the rigidity of the cognitivist model, and hence through my 
interpretation of Merleau-Ponty I am calling for an inter-disciplMary and more 
holistic approach to be taken towards dyslexia. 
My second conclusion is more assertive than critical, although it must remain quite 
general for the time being. The explanations offered by the cognitive model are 
highly informative in their own way, but they lack a material and bodily 
grounfiig. Using Merleau-Ponty's descriptions, I can make the general 
assumption that the dyslexic person may have problems acquiring phonological 
9' Abdulla, S. 1998, p. 1189. 
,. X4 See: Ledcr. D. 1990. Chapter 4 
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skills due to an 'unsteady' body schema in the context of communication. If we 
turn back to the differences between the body image and body schema, one of the 
main characteristics of the body schema was its cohesiveness -a synergistic 
system that is to be conceived of as a whole, rather than the singular perspective of 
the body image. It may well be that in the case of the dyslexic, their body schema 
may not be as cohesive as that of the non-dyslexic, and hence the fluidity and 
sureness of such an activity may well be impaired. 
This assertion would of course have to be contextual, for although the body 
schema is a type of general background for the lived-body, there are clearly 
specific features (muscles/neurones/metabolism etc.. ) that come to the fore during 
a ceftain situation. When trying to acquire new skills there is a general 'type' of 
schema that is steadily developed which is suitable for such a situation, and the 
more the schema is developed the less one has to reflect on the specific activity at 
hand (i. e. it becomes habit). However, m' the case of reading, writing and 
spelling this would not seem to be the case for the dyslexic. If we are to take the 
cognitive account into consideration, the reason why the dyslexic cannot access 
the alphabetic phase of single letter and whole word manipulation is because there 
has been a problem in acquiring phonological skills. In terms more close to 
Merleau-Ponty, the problem of not being able to acquire phonological skills is a 
problem to do with the body schema and its founding role in skill acquisition. It 
will therefore be asked: why does the dyslexic have specific problems forming an 
appropriate body schema with regard to phonological skills? This question is really 
meant for physiologist and possibly child psychologists, but we have already been 
given clues concerning speech-sound perception and production. Whether 
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Merleau-Ponty can shed any more light on this specific subject remains to be seen, 
as we will return to this topic in Chapter Five. However, what I can speculate on 
ftirther is how a dyslexics 'unsteady' body schema can be charactensed. 
The problem would seem to be the inability, or impaired ability, for dyslexics to 
sediment or habituate a type of schema that is suitable for phonological skills. This 
assertion opens up two main possibilities. The first is that the body schema 'in 
general', that is our background of bodily habits and postures - the body proper, is 
simply not suitable for the acquisition of phonological skills. The reasons for this 
are varied. From a physiological perspective, it may well be that my sensory 
organs, specifically the ears and eyes, are unsuitable for the processing of 
signifiers and their meanmgs. However, much research on this has primarily been 
conducted in relation to acquired dyslexia, and its application to developmental 
dyslexia has been unfounded. More likely, is that there is a neuro-physiological 
difference in the dyslexic brain, as we have already seen with both Snowling's 
research. However, in contrast to Snowling's view that such an area of the brain is 
the site of 'phonological representations', I would assert that it may be this part of 
the brain that allows us to develop a configuration of the body schema that is adept 
at acquiring phonological skills, not where such skills are stored and retrieved 
firom. Whether such an area of the brain is responsible for the initiation of an 
appropriate body schema may or may not be the case, but what I hope to have 
illustrated here is that without addressing such issues the cognitive model 'jumps 
the gun' somewhat by ignoring the bodily schematic basis upon which 
representations rest. 
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The second way in which fragmented sedimentation could be understood is via a 
close study of acquisition itself. In Merleau-Ponty's example of learning a new 
dance step we have seen that such a manoeuvre entails a hermeneutic movement 
between the body image and the body schema, i. e. between reflection and concrete 
movement. If we look at this on the level of phonemes and their attached speech 
sounds, there would seem to be a problem for the dyslexic to bodily comprehend 
the movement between reflection and concrete movement and hence an 
appropriate body schema is never properly developed. What would seem to be at 
stake is a problem of sedimentation, for the conversion of a phoneme into its 
speech sound (or vice-versa) is never made fully concrete for the dyslexic. The 
problem faced by the dyslexic is that the hermeneutic movement between 
reflection and concrete activity, a movement that would normally bring with it a 
greater understanding of a situation, is fragmented, and hence only an unsteady or 
superficial body schema will form. Whereas the connection between a phoneme 
and its speech sound will become a habit and hence anonymous for a non-dyslexic, 
the terrible problem faced by a dyslexic person is the continual presence of 
uncertainty regarding phonetic skills. The need to continuously and deliberately 
initiate the basic hermeneutic movement that sediments a phoneme and it sound 
means that the dyslexic is continually having to reflect back and check on what 
should be automatic. If one thinks of an acquired skill such as driving a car, 
deliberate reflection on changing gear may actually impair the activity, i. e. the 
'natural' flow and rhythm of the activity is altered. Now think of this in relation to 
the dyslexic maintaining a superficial rhythm in relation to reading, only to be 
continually disrupted by the need to re-initiate the bond between phoneme and 
90 
speech sound, and it will hopefully be understood that such a problem is not only 
debilitating but one that is Incredibly frustrating. 
A final consideration regarding skill and habit. In the previous phenomenological 
descnptions there are three phases involving skills: acquisition (founded by the 
body schema), habituation (the 'I can'), and crystallisation (the 'I do'). If one 
looks at these stages in relation to dyslexia, both the 'I can' and 'I do' stage are 
affected by a poor (or non) acquisition of phonological skills, whilst the way in 
which the two stages are affected brings out some interesting points. Taken m the 
context of communication, the 'I can' stage for the dyslexic should be viewed as 
the 'I cannot' or 'I can only just'. These labels are clearly negative in what they 
connote, and as such mark the breakdown of meaning or dis-ability of the dyslexic. 
As discussed in the last chapter, we can only gam so much from these disabling 
features of dyslexia, and a phenomenology proper must address how the dyslexic 
is able to cope with such situations and make communication a meaningful 
phenomenon. However, now let us look more closely at the 'I do'. Even in the 
case of dyslexia, the 'I do' in relation to communication does not simply revert to 
an 'I do not', for the dyslexic does very much have a relationship With language. 
What we find in the case of a dyslexic is an 'I do - but in a different style'. The 
dyslexic clearly has certain coping mechanisms that try and make up for the 
unsteady body schema that has developed in relation to phonetic skills, and 
therefore dyslexics do have the capacity to make linguistic situations meaningful. 
My above conclusions concerning an unsteady body schema is more in line with 
the 'I can only just, and are therefore only a partial phenomenology. However, 
what I hope to show is that when the notion of an unsteady body unage is fleshed 
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out with reference to spatiality, language and temporality, not only will we be able 
to get a better purchase on how dyslexia can be characterised in a non-cogrative 
(or pre-cognitive) manner, but we will also start to understand how such dis- 
abilities can be overcome and recognised as meamng-making situations. In this 
way, we will move from the partial phenomenology we have been dealing with 
above and try to articulate a phenomenology proper. The first example of this is in 
the next chapter, and will describe the move from spatial dys-location to spatial re- 
location. 
Implications for phenomenology and the disruption of language 
The above phenomenological descriptions concerning skill acquisition, habit and 
the pliable vitality of the body are on one level informative, and yet on another, 
they have very real philosophical consequences, most of all for the Husserlian 
notion of intentionality. I have thus far illustrated how the body schema, which 
encompasses both the ecstatic body of worldly perception and the recessive body 
of visceral and proprioceptive (muscular) perception, and the concretisation of the 
body schema in the form of habits, are all marked by the their very disappearance. 
Moreover, with Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of the lived-body there is another 
type of absence: an absence of explicit thought or belief on behalf of a 'conscious' 
subject. As he puts it in Phenomenoloxý ofPerception: 
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"Our bodily experience of movement is not a particular case of knowledge. it 
provides us with a way of access to the world and the object, with a 
(. praktognosia', which has to be recognised as original and perhaps as primary. My 
body has its world, or understands its world, without having to make use of my 
csyrnbolic' or 'objectifying fimction" (p. 140-1) 
The above quote makes two points quite clear. Firstly, the body is irreducible or 
original, in that our practical knowledge cannot be investigated any further by 
reference to more basic concepts such as cognitive abilities. Because of this, the 
body is also the foundation for such forms of knowledge, and is thus primary. 
Although representation is clearly one of our basic skills, it is always subservient 
to the lived-body's practical knowledge. Dreyfus makes an excellent point in this 
respect": although practical knowledge must have logical conditions of 
satisfaction, that is, whether or not the activity involved in my wider project is 
maintaining a certain regularity, there need be no representation of a goal, i. e. 
mentalistic intentional content. In an experiment conducted by Dreyfus, a master 
class chess player was able to conduct and win a high ranking game of chess 
simply by responding to the patterns on a chess board, wHe his attention was 
absorbed in complex mathematical procedure. Experimental or not the point 
Dreyfus underlines is that strategic and purposeftd action that is fitting of the 
games logical requirements, i. e. winning the game, is aH possible without having a 
plan or goal 'ijn inind'. In this way, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body 
is a movement away from the Husserhan project of transcendental phenomenology 
which attempts to bring to light the fundamental structures of transcendental 
95 See: Dreyfus, H. 1996. 
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consciousness. However, Merleau-Ponty's move away from the objectives of 
Husserl's project, more specifically their differing notions of intentionality, should 
not be understood as a clear break from his predecessor, for as he puts it In the 
'Preface' to Phenomenologv ofPereeption: 
"This is why Husserl distinguishes between intentionality of act... and operative 
intentionality ... Through this broadened notion of intentionality, 
phenomenological 'comprehension' is distinguished from traditional 'intellection', 
which is confined to 'true and immutable natures', and so phenomenology can 
become a phenomenology of origins" (p. xviii - my emphasis) 
Although Husserl recognised the existence of an "operating or latent 
intentionality"96 which is apparent in our desires and evaluations, this notion is still 
understood as being subservient to the synthetic power of constitution that is 
enabled by a transcendental consciousness. Thus, instead of simply overttmiing 
Husserl's project, what Merleau-Ponty attempts in his own phenomenology is an 
extension of certain themes by trying to think through the unthought elements of 
Husserl's project, most notably the idea of an operative intentionality. 
Furthermore, far from a wholesale rejection of an intentionality of act, it is clear 
P-- - from my previous study of the body image and acquisition of skills that even this 
fonn of intentionality still plays a certain role in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, 
albeit sequential to the body-schema. The question we are now faced with is how 
Q, Merleau-Ponty, M. 1964(a), p. 165. Indeed, the reader is strongly advised to consult Merleau- 
Ponty's essay entitled 'The Philosopher and His Shadow' for an in depth discussion of 
his 
relationship with, and extension of, Husserl's project, in particular the notions of reduction and 
intentionality discussed in Ideas 11. 
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Merleau-Ponty himself conceives of an 'operative intentionality', and why such a 
notion is cnfical to his phenomenology of the body. 
The part intentionality plays in Phenomenology of Perception is far from 
transparent. In Chapter Two, I introduced Merleau-Ponty's notion of the 
'intentional aTc', a device that persists through and around the body schema, 
binding together the lived body, and ultimately giving meanmg to the differential 
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structures that make up our political, cultural and ethical worlds .I also 
mentioned that considering the pivotal role the intentional arc is given by Merleau- 
Ponty, the term is rarely mentioned and little explained. I now hope to clarify the 
role and characteristics of the intentional arc, and further, understand why 
Merleau-Ponty gives such short shrift to such an important issue. 
The word 'intentionality' is used explicitly by Merleau-Ponty in both the English 
and the French editions of Phenomenology of Perception. Although Merleau- 
Ponty does refer to a type of 'motility', this is primarily used when relating to the 
spatial aspect of body intentionality, and thus the terms most often used are 
4primary intentionality', or more often, the Husserlian notion of an 'operative 
intentionality'. These definitions clearly liken Merleau-Ponty's notion of 
intentionality with the concrete motility of practical engagement with the world, 
and thus Merleau-Ponty is clearly marking the difference between a form of 
intentionality that is understood as an intentional act of consciousness that 
" See: Dreyfus, H. 1996. Dreyfus' article presents the the ftinction of an 'intentional arc' in a crisp 
and (perhaps too) simple fashion. However, the real purpose of the article is a 
defence of the 
somewhat abstract idea of an intentional uc via current research 
into neural nets and parrallel 
processing. The conclusion that skill aquisition can be simulated by neural net,, N-orks, 
but such nets 
will not be able to aquire our skills until they are grounded in a 
bod)ý like our seems to be quite 
convincing. 
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coffelates with an intentional. object and secondly, a novel form of operative 
intentionality that is established by the body. This is a critical distinction owing to 
Merleau-Ponty's wider thesis that the existential meanings which structure our 
experience are grounded in the pre-conscious engagement of the body with the 
world, and thus at the ftmdamental level of bodily engagement, there is nothmg 
deliberately aimed at or directed towards by consciousness. 
It is both my view, and that of Leder's, that to use the term 'intentionality' in a 
simple fashion and without qualification is somewhat misrepresentative of 
Merleau-Ponty's project, as it brings too much transcendental baggage to such a 
central feature of his phenomenology, The danger of such a simple 
characterisation is to still present Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology as a philosophy 
of representation which privileges a traditional characterisation of subjectivity, an 
accusation that could be directed towards certain post-structuralist criticisms of 
Merleau-Ponty, most notably criticisms made by Deleuze in his book concerning 
Foucaule". Thus, the tenn Leder applies to Merleau-Ponty's fonn of basic 
intentionality is the Greek expression - ecstasis, and our pre-reflective relationship 
with the world is anchored by the 'ecstatic body'99. This phrase captures the idea 
of the body having a determinate stance and yet constantly projecting away from 
itself, that is, standing (stasis) out (ek), and is clearly indebted to Heidegger's use 
of the expression in relation to temporality' "0. 
9' Deleuze, G. 1988, especially Toldings, or the Inside of Thought (Subjectivation)'. 
' See: Leder, D. 199 1. Chapters I&2 especially. However, it should be noted that the way this 
term Is translated and presented in Phenomenology... is 'ek-stase' (see the chapter - 
'TernporahtN-'). 
I (X) Soe: Heidegger, M. 1962, DIN islon 11. 
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In Merleau-Ponty's project of indirect ontology initiated in The Visible and 
Invisible, one of his alms is to devise a new vocabulary that avoids some of the 
presuppositions and metaphysical trappings that are a part of the language used In 
his phenomenological descriptions in Phenomenology-, a vocabulary which he 
believes is still grounded in the dualism constitutive of a 'philosophy of 
consciousness', e. g. the object/consciousness distinctionlol. Thus, one of the tasks 
in his later writing is to find a way of expressing the notion of, and role played by 
an coperative intentionality' without resorting to traditional vocabulary (i. e. 
'intentionality'). Although one can possibly locate the role of bodily intentionality 
within the broad term 'flesh', more specifically the divergence, folding, spread or 
'6cart' of the flesh'02, Merleau-Ponty is more specific in a working note 
concerning intentionality m. relafion to ontology, where he refers to: a 
"spatiallsing-temporalising vortex" 103 . 
This characterisation is certainly an apt one, 
for as Merleau-Ponty demonstrates even at the time of Phenomenoloýý..., the 
body's latent intentionality not only infuses a situation with a certain 
meaningUness, but this meaning (sens) should also be considered as a form of 
spatial directedness and presence to the world'04. Thus, taking a lead from 
Merleau-Ponty's own revision of his philosophical vocabulary, any attempt to 
'0' Merleau-Ponty, M. 1968, p. 130,157-8,183 and 200. In an afterward to his book The 
Phenomenology ofMerleau-Ponty, Madison locates Merleau-Ponty's problems With language as 
stemming from an unpayable debt to HusserL and the desire to develop a phenomenology which 
was still faithfW to the tradition. Madison makes a highly pertinent point when he says that, even 
in the late Mefleau-Ponty, and quite unlike Heidegger: "it is in swing from consciousness, 
subjectivity, Husserl, and the tradition that Merleau-Ponty pursues his inquiry. That is to say that 
Merleati-Ponty never wanted simply to abandon Husserl; he wanted to overcome transcendental 
philosophy, but, so to speak-, from the inside. " (Madison, G. 198 1, p. 288). 
10' See: Merleau-Pontv, M. 1968. 'The Intertwining -The Chiasm'. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1968, p. 244. 
I will discuss this theme in greater detail in Chapter Four of the thesis. See: Merleau-Ponty, M. 
1962. 'The Spatiality of Ones Own Body and Motility', and 'Space' (esp. p. 265). Furthermore, in 
his chapter on 'Temporality' in Phenomenology... Merelau-Ponty shows that the template or 
model for the operative intentionality of the body is grounded in the ek-static nature of 
temporality. 
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express the foundational role played by 'operative intentionality' should be done 
so in a way that tries to avoid connotations of consciousness, directedness and 
representation. Indeed, by taking the previous Working Note from The Visible and 
the Invisible into account, I propose that in an attempt to gain a greater purchase 
on the term 'operative intentionality', and ftathermore to avoid some of the 
transcendental connotations it might convey, it may well be helpful to refer to the 
body's 'dynamic synchronicity, and I will refer to this expression in the following 
Chapters of the thesis. In explanation of the term dynamic synchronicity, I have 
chosen the word 'dynamic' because of the body's continuous movement and 
engagement with the world, and 'synchronicity', because of the body's anonymous C7 
inception of a spatiality and temporality, and the coexistent and implicatory 
constitution of a unified body schema and a unified object. 
This last theme concerning a concrete, reciprocal relationship between the lived 
body and worldly objects highlights the way m which Merleau-Ponty has 
attempted to think through the unthought elements of Husserl's notion of 
intentionality, as this Pre-reflective, practical relationship cannot be understood in 
the forni of intentional structures which belong to a transcendental consciousness. 
If one takes Cartesian Meditations as an indicator of Husserl, he argues that the 
sameness of an object through its varying perspectives and temporal sequences is 
only possible via the 'intentional effect' produced by the synthesis of 
consciousness. The production of an enduring object is only possible through the 
synthetic intentionality of consciousness, and thus it is an enquiry 'into the 
transcendental ego's capacity for synthetic constitution that Husserl is most 
interested in. As Husserl puts it: 
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"Synthesis, however, does not occur just in every particular conscious process, nor 
does it connect one particular conscious process with another only occasionally. 
On the contrary ... the whole of conscious 
life is unified synthetically" 105 
However, the notion of synthetically producing intentional objects is clearly at 
odds with Merleau-Ponty's investigation of lived experience, and although there 
may be such 'sy-ntheses' to be discovered, these are merely products of Husserl's 
brand of mentalistic analysis. In reply to this, Merleau-Ponty states: 
"I start from a unified experience and from there acquire, in a secondary way, 
consciousness of a unifying activity when taking up an analytical attitude ... I am 
[therefore] obliged to suppose an act of synthesis ... My act of perception, 
in its 
unsophisticated fonn, does not itself bring about this synthesis; it takes advantage 
of work already done, of a general synthesis constituted once and for all, and this 
is what I mean when I say that I perceive with my body or my senses, since my 
body and my senses are precisely that familiarity with the world bom of habit, that 
implicit or sedimentary body of knowledge. " (p. 238) 
The phrase 'sedimentary body of knowledge' is a key one, and should disclose 
more information regarding the 'intentional arc'. What Merleau-Ponty seems to be 
saying is that, because the body is of a type that allows us to pick up habits, we 
always already have a congealed substratum of bodily experience (the sedimented 
body of knowledge) whicli implicitly lends itself to our situatedness and 
infuses it 
'ý'5 Husscr, E. 1977, pA2. 
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with a certain logic. It is because of this logic, or "autocthonous/basic 
organisation" (p. 234, footnote 1), that our experience is rendered as unified. The 
body's sedimentation of habits into a type of implicit knowledge is, like the habits 
themselves, something that frustrates specification because of its very 
disappearance and hence opaqueness. In language that owes someti-iing to 
Heidegger, our very Being cannot be described as being something. However, 
what Merleau-Ponty can articulate is the style in which such implicit knowledge is 
conveyed, and moreover, the ground of such knowledge. Our practical knowledge 
infuses our situation in a manner which is akin to an implicit arc, and although 
Merleau-Ponty uses the expression 'intentional arc', there is precious little that is 
conscious or intentional about it. The ground of such sedimented knowledge is the 
general synthesis that Merleau-Ponty considers more fundamental than the 
synthesis induced by consciousness. Such a general synthesis is nothing other than 
the fact ffiat we negotiate the world first and foremost via our body, more 
specifically our body schema. 
The above description is a type of hermeneutic movement which both starts and 
ends With the body schema. The problem faced by Merleau-Ponty (and the reader 
for that matter) is trying to get a grip on something which is paramount in giving 
our experience a unity and meaningfulness, and yet by its very nature is subject to 
erasure. The manifestation and ground of such knowledge are the two sides of a 
similar phenomenon. The way in which our sedimentary knowledge is absent and 
yet 'charged' gives us a certain amount of purchase on this phenomenon, but it is 
the grounding of such knowledge, the way in which the body and its senses are 
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urafied as a synergic system, that really illUMMates how we experience the world 
as something Unified. 
There is one more factor that highlights Merleau-Ponty's divergence from 
Husserhan intentionality, something Zaner is quick to point out 
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. The problem is 
that of distance, thickness or more specifically, depth. Merleau-Ponty asserts that 
if consciousness were the constituting agent of our world, there would be no 
distance or discrepancy between world and consciousness, indeed: 
"intentionality would carry us to the heart of the object, and siMultaneously the 
percept would lose the thickness conferred by the present, and consciousness 
would not be lost and become bogged down in if' (p. 23 8). 
However, as I have shown with the charactensation of our body image at the start 
of this chapter, although we can reflect on worldly objects and thus have a 
conscious relationship with them, such objects can never be grasped in their 
entirety. Just as an image of our body can never be made present all at once, 
neither can any other object of the world. 
The hermeneutic inteftwining of the body schema and the body image is such thaý 
although an object is thematised through reflection, the world continually presents 
itself to the body schema as a sort of badly formulated question, a confused 
problem with which the body schema is able to communicate with. To take the 
example of a glass, 'the' glass of a certain reflection can never be completely 
1 "6See Zancr, R. 197 1, pý 1 77-78ý 
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revealed by such an act, for if it were, there could be no immanence to my 
perception - the object would not be of my world, but of a transcendental world. 
Because of the body-schema's intimate dialogue with the world, we are able to 
sustain a certain grip over an object and yet this grip will always be fluctuating or 
ambiguous as the ob ect will always retain its own unimpeachable depth. This may j 
not come as a surprise, for just as the worldly object is an ambiguous phenomenon, 
so is the coffelative body-schema, a phenomenon that is also characterised by 
anonymity and generality. Thus perception is truly something that is fluctuating 
and ambiguous: at its most basic level perception is not an 'act', it is a movement 
that takes place in an atmosphere of generality. I take an interest in an object only 
because it offers itself up to me as something to be questioned, thereby standing 
out against its background. However, in as far as my dynamic synchronicity is 
somedfing that remains anonymous, an investigation of such an object can only be 
one of general interrogation. I may be able to reveal more of a phenomenon's 
characteristics through such an investigation and thus get a better grip over an 
object, yet such an investigation is a movement, and because of this there is always 
the density of something originally acquired which prevents my experience from 
being clear to itself The world is experienced as something unified only because 
we exist on an ambiguous and general level, and this generality can be attributed to 
the correlative depth of our body and world. 
Earlier I drew attention to the connotative problems attached to what Merleau- 
Ponty expresses as 'operative intentionality', and in an attempt to diff-use such 
problems I used the expression 'dynarmc synchronicity'. We 
have seen just how 
there is a coffelative relationship between the generality of our 
body and the 
1 -1 011- 
world, but if there is something familiar that seems to be lying in the background 
of such a correlation, it is the chronos of such a synchronicity. That our body is 
constitutive of a temporal order allows for a certain elan, a fluidity of our body 
schema and a subsequent unity of our perceived world. This topic is clearly central 
to the issues both Merleau-Ponty and I are dealing with, and a full discussion of 
the influence and problematics of temporality will be presented in a later chapter. 
One final point. When discussing the purposivness of dynamic synchrofflcity 
(operative intentionality), I asked what motivated such skilful action without a 
resorting to a represented purpose or goal. The long deferred answer to this is a 
phrase I used in relation to perception: gaining a maximum grip on a situation. 
Goi-ng back to my early example of eyestrain, the way in which I avoid the onset 
of such a problem is primarily down to my body schema's unreflective capacity to 
find an 'optimum' distance from the screen. In the case of picking up a fork, I 
want to maintain a maximum gnp over the instrument in order to succeed in my 
task, i. e. eating. In the chapter on 'Space' from Phenomenology of Perception 
Merleau-Ponty tells us: 
"My body is geared into the world when my perception presents me with a 
spectacle as vaned And as clearly articulated as possible-This maximum 
sharpness of perception and action pomts clearly to a perceptual ground, a basis of 
my life, a general setting in which my body can co-exist with the world. " (p. 250) 
The basis of the next chapter is the dyslexic's dyslocation and consequent re- 
location of spatiality, and therefore the above issues conceming maximum grip. 
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spatiality and space will be looked at in detail. However, with a lead taken from 
107 Dreyfus 
, we can make one initial conclusion: the notion of 'maximum gnp' 
suggests that the motivating power behind skilful action is in fact a tendency for 
the body to try and reduce a sense of disequilibrium. Of course between birth and 
death equilibrium can never be achieved, and hence we are continually moOng -a 
movement away from disequilibrium. Nevertheless, 'maximum grip' must not be 
taken too literally, for certain situations require a light or subtle touch. What is 
experienced as eqaibrium and disequilibrium is contextual, and relies upon the 
skills we have built up to negotiate specific situations. 
This chapter has tried to chart the need for a phenomenology of the body prior to 
any phenomenology of the world as perceived. The phenomenon that underpins all 
others is the anonymous level of the body proper - the body schema. It is because 
the body schema and its organs operate as a synergic system that we exhibit a 
'dynanue synchronicity' which allows us to pick up skills and habits. Our body 
schema envelops such anonymous habits, and the congealment of these skills 
contributes to a sedimentwy body of knowledge that infuses our world with a unity 
and meaning. Such a movement is hermeneutic, not causal, and there is a 
metaphysical privileging of the body over a constituting transcendental ego. 
Although intentionality does play a part in such a hermeneutic movement, the most 
fundamental aspect is the anonymous and general characteristic of the body 
schema. 
107 See: Dcyfus, H. 1996. Section 2. 
104 
Chapter Four 
Spatiality, depth. and dys/re-location 
This chapter is primarily interested in Merleau-Ponty's phenonienological 
descriptions of spatial onentation, space perception and lived-space. These 
descriptions are mostly taken from Phenomenology ofPerception, and can be seen 
as having a diml concern. Merleau-Ponty is initially interested in how it is possible 
for the body to orient itself within space, that is, how we actually come to have a 
spatial level. This question will lead us back to some of the topics discussed in the 
previous chapter. These will include the role of body-schema, sedimentation and 
dynwnic synchronicity (my reworked name for the notion of body-intentionality), 
whilst it will expand upon topics that have only been previously touched upon, 
primarily the bearing of motion on dynamic synchronicity. This initial dimension 
of spatiality questioned by Merleau-Ponty is therefore more concerned with how 
our experience of space is grounded. This ground, perhaps unsurprismgly, is 
situated as a trope of the body-schema, our pre-noetic openness to, and connection 
with the world. Although this will primarily act as a refinement of the previous 
chapter's descriptions of the lived-body (i. e. reciprocal relationship of body 
schema/itnage), what it will provide is the initial staging of a context in which 
some of my initial descriptions of dyslexia can be thematised. 
The second and perhaps more urgent area of concern for Merleau-Ponty is the 
question of how space actually reveals itself This question is more relevant to the 
final section of the previous chapter where I discussed the structunng of 
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perception and the capability of experiencing a unified 'object' in a milieu of 
difference. As such, I hope to elaborate on some of the fairly key themes and 
notions related to perception that may have seemed a little vague in the previous 
chapter (indeed even in Merleau-Ponty's text itself): intentional arc, maximum 
grip, and disequilibrium. What Will hopefully become apparent is the intimate 
relationship between space and perception, and furthermore, the difficulty of 
thematising such notions. It is this difficulty that lies at the heart of this chapter, 
Merleau-Ponty's examination of spatiality and space, and arguably his 
examination of 'the thing and the natural world' in general. 
At its most basic, Merleau-Ponty is (as usual) chaflenging the empiricist and 
intellectualist conceptions of space, i. e. space is neither an object nor is it a 
synthesisMg act of the pure subject. The way in which he thematises this problem 
is through an interrogation of 'depth'. This investigation holds the key to much of 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of space as it reveals his ideas concerning size, 
distance and position, and, I believe, is the central notion that bridges the 
philosophy of Phenomenology of Perception and his later writings, nwnely Eye 
and Mind 108 and The Visible and the Invisible. From this investigation I Will 
progress to an exploration of movement, a phenomenon which is intinsic to 
perception, and which will bring me back to some of the previous discussion 
concerning dynamic synchronicity and motion (motility). This witi be a further 
development in contextualising some of my previous descriptions of dyslexia and 
the body-schema, which will be facilitated by Drew Leder's notion of dys- 
appearance. From this position I Will chart how the dyslexic is not merely 
For the English translation of the essay 'Eve and MMd, see: Merleam-Ponty, M. 1964 (b). For 
an excellent introduction to the topic of space and depth, sm Stcinbock, A. 1997. 
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involved in situations of dys-location, but a reciprocal relationship of dyslocation 
and relocation. This is imperative for the type of experiential phenomenological 
description that I discussed in Chapter Two, and will reveal a different manner in 
which dyslexia can be interpreted (i. e. the difference between using 
phenomenological description to explain why such a pathological phenomenon 
has ansen [comparative phenomenology], and using phenomenology to describe 
how a phenomenon reveals or unfolds itself [experiential phenomenology] 109 ). 
One final point concerning the role of this chapter and its relation to Merleau- 
Ponty's own project. Although the main text I am using In this thesis is clearly 
Phenomenology of Perception, two things I atn aware of are: i) that I am not 
simply following the chronology of the text itself, and ii) that it is impossible to 
introduce all of the key notions and themes (implicit or explicit) that go to make 
up the text. Of course, as Derrida has shown us time and again' 10, the text will 
always be greater than the smn of its parts, thus escaping a definitive reading, and 
therefore a pragmatic decision has to be made on my behalf concerning which 
themes and notions firom Merleau-Ponty's own project are going to be of most use 
for my experiential description of dyslexia. The reason why I say this is in way of 
a disclaimer, in that this chapter marks a distinct move from Part One of 
Phenomenology of Perception - 'The Body'- to Part Two of the text - 'The World 
as Perceived', and therefore passes over any discussion of the key chapter 'The 
Body as Expression and Speech' from Part One. As mentioned above, I want to 
avoid simp4v following the chronology of Phenomenolo& of Perception, and I do 
not feel it necessary to have introduced the field of language before movmg onto 
'09 See also: PlUlpott, M. 1999. 
"' See: Demda, J. 1978. 
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some of the arguments presented in Part Two of Merleau-Ponty's text. The 
primary purpose of this chapter is to thematise my initial conclusions via an 
inquiry into space, and therefore the topic of language, clearly a (if not the) central 
issue for dyslexia, will be given individual treatment following this chapter, and 
again later in the thesis. Furthermore, I cannot possibly re-present all of Merleau- C; 
Ponty's study of perception provided in Part Two of the text, and by focusing on 
the chapter entitled 'Space' (and to a lesser extent the earlier chapter 'The 
Spatiality of Ones own Body and Motility') I am not denying the possible 
contributions to be made by the accompanying chapters in Part Two, but believe 
that the 'Space' chapter is most pertinent to a phenomenology of dyslexia. As 
Merleau-Ponty reminds us in Eye and Mind: "... there is no one master key to the 
visible, and color alone is no closer to being such a key then space is. "' " 
The body's orientation of space 
Of the numerous areas of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology one could turn to after 
the previous chapter's elaboration of the lived-body's role in perception, it may 
not seem immediately obvious why I should tum to the topic of space. As a long 
standing category of philosophical investigation it may seem a suitable area 
within which I could contextualise my immediate remarks concerning the 
troublesome body-schema of the dyslexic, mdeed as we will see, this is an area 
that has already been pioneered by previous psychological research into dyslexia. 
1" Merleau-Ponty, M. 1964 (b), p. 18 1, 
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The reasons for the importance of the investigations into the topics of space and 
depth for both my and Merleau-Ponty's projects will become clear during the 
chapter, but as an initial clue to why I have chosen to investigate these issues I 
will again bnefly turn to the French edition of Phenomenology of Perception. 
The question is one of meaning. In the previous two chapters I have discussed 
how Merleau-Ponty's anti-dualistic philosophy accredits situations with meaning. 
in this way neither the body-subject nor the world can be said to 'posses' 
meaning, rather, it is the intimate dialogue between the lived-body and the world 
that generates a meaningfulness to situations. As I discussed in the previous 
chapter on the lived-body, our experience is always structured into a relationship 
of significant figure against the double horizon of a receding background to the 
figure, and the background of our body schema: 
"As far as spatiality is concerned, and this alone interests us at the moment one's 
own body is the third terni, always tacitly understood, in the figure-background 
structure, and every figure stands out against the double horizon of external and 
bodily space. One must therefore reject as an abstraction any analysis of bodily 
space which takes account only of figures and points, since these can neither be 
conceived nor be without horizons. " (P. 10 1) 
Thus, within such a relationship there exists a meaningftd phenomenon - 
something makes sense. Interestingly, as the English translator of Phenomenoloka, 
of Perception points out (p. 253). in the original French Merleau-Ponty uses the 
intentionally ambiguous expression sens in his text. Not only does sens connote 
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the idea of a situation 'making sense', i. e. something is meaningful or significant, 
but it also connotes a sense of direction or way. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty there is 
more than an implicit relationship between meaning and direction/orientation. 
Although this may not seem explicit in experience, spatial orientation is a 
fundamental aspect of all meaningful perception. This will become more concrete 
during my next investigation into the body's orientation of space - its spatial 
level. However, at this moment all I want to show is that this initial link between 
meaning and space is relevant to my initial descriptions of dyslexia, as they have 
been predominantly concerned with the breakdown of linguistic meaning. 
What is of initial interest to Merleau-Ponty's investigation of space, an 
investigation introduced in his discussion of the lived-body and spatiality in Part 
One of the text is how the body is able to take the world's bearings, that is, how 
an object can appear to be the 'right' way up, inverted, behind in front 
etc ... 
indeed, what these very words actually mean to us. However, we are 
immediately faced by a problem that may, In principle, seem familiar. Just as 
meaning is generated within the intimate dialogue between body and world, and is 
thus always prior to any reflection, we cannot step beyond spatial orientation in 
order to understand how it unfolds. As Merleau-Ponty puts it himself in the 
chapter 'Space': 
"The primordial level [of space] is on the horizon of all our perceptions, but it is a 
horizon which cannot in principle ever be reached and thematised in our express 
perception ... [each] setting itself 
is spatially particulansed only for a preViously 
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given level. Thus each of the whole succession of our experiences, including the 
first, passes on an already acquired spatiality" (p. 253). 
The notion of a primordial spatial level, a 'level of all levels', may evoke themes 
from the previous chapter, primarily the body-schema's anonymous and general 
existence, and indeed such descriptions are immanent to the investigation of 
space. On principle, just as the outward-sensory and inward-visceral network of 
the body proper cannot be thematised in its totality, the primordial spatial level 
con the horizon of all our perceptions' can never be reached qua the level of all 
levels. As the first level, it cannot be spatially particularised, because it cannot be 
referred to a preceding anchoring setting 'anywhere' to be expressly perceived. 
The primordial spatial level is always already there, but it is in no particular place. 
Consequently, although it envelops all our observations, or is at least presupposed 
in every perception, it cannot be expressly perceived or grasped. Again we are 
faced by the paradox of perception: we cannot fully grasp the features that 
structure our perception, in this case a primordial spatial level, because as soon we 
focus on such a feature we abstract ftom, or freeze, its very being. Again Merleau- 
Ponty turns to examples of abnormal perception, in this case, experiments on the 
disintegration of spatial levels. 
As a first example he chooses Stratton's experiment by which the images, through 
special glasses, appear unreversed on the retina (p. 243-44). According to this 
experiment, someone who is made to wear such glasses first experiences the 
envirorument as upside down. A symptom of this mversion is that objects seem to 
lose there usual mewimg, e. g. tools seem to lack the ease with which they can be 
manipulated. On the second day of the expenMent, the environment no longer 
appears to be inverted, but the person senses that his/her own body is upside 
down. Between the third and the seventh day the body gradually begins to occupy 
a 'nonnal' position again. What is highly relevant to this stage of the experiment, 
and our own investigation, is that the body begins to revert to a normal position 
more quickly if the person involved is active, i. e. mobile, within the environment. 
This reversion could not happen, notes Merleau-Ponty, if the person is completely 
motionless, for: 
"the body still presents itself against the background of the former space, and, as 
far as the unseen parts of the body are concerned, right and left preserve their 
former localisation to the end of the experiment" (p. 245). 
During the process of the experiment as a whole, external objects gradually begin 
to look 'real' again, and the goals of actions which were at first harder to achieve 
now fail to cause problems. At the end of the experiment when the glasses are 
removed, objects are no longer inverted, but do again appear 'peculiar' for some 
time, whereas motor reactions remain reversed for some time: the person reaches 
out his/her right hand when it should be the left hand. 
Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of this experiment is not only revealing for an 
investigation of spatial orientation, but is also informative of the inter-relation 
between lived-body, its movement and spatiality. As is usual for Merleau-Ponty, 
[its own reading of the experiment is against the backdrop of intellectualist and 
empiricist interpretations. Briefly: intellectualism, because it conceives of a purely 
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mentalistic constituting subject, should be able to explain the subject's actual 
experience of inversion, thus, since the sub . ect knows it is wearing correctional 9 
glasses, the subject should make allowances for this when constituting its visual 
field; in the case of empiricism, because space is a property of the 'real' external 
world, the empiricist is at a loss to explain the fact that objects gradually right 
themselves even though the subject continuously wears the correctional glasses 
(p. 245-8). As Monika Langer highlights' 12 , space 
is neither an empirical 
relationship which is passively registered by the retina, nor an intellectual 
outcome which is constructed by a non-spatial, transcendental ego. The 
experiment reveals that the content of experience is not orientated in itself, for the 
subject would be able to alter such a state. However, if spatial positions such as 
C. up' and 'down', 'left' and 'right' are therefore conceived as simply relative, then 
to what are they relative, and how is it that one ever comes to have the experience 
of such positions with a feeling of assurance? What is, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, 
the "absolute within the sphere of the relative, a space which does not skate over 
appearances" (p. 248), which enables the subject of Stratton's expenment to 
characterise his own body and his environment as either upright or inverted? 
It is far from easy to present Merleau-Ponty's answer to these questions in a truly 
coherent manner, for not only does he move through a number of auxfliary 
experunents thereby constantly deferring his answer, but his previous 
investigations from Part One of Phenomenology of Perception bear heavily upon 
any such answer' 13 . One 
initial conception of an answer to the riddle of 
112 See- Langer, M. 1989, p. 82. 
"3 See the chapter on 'Space' in Phenomenology-, especially p. 243-267, NN-here Merleau-Pontý- 
uses a number of expeniments bý- Wertheimer, Nagel and Koffk-a and a nurnbcr by Stratton to 
articulate the break-down and consequent re-alignment of the perceptual/spatial %vorld. Also see the 
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orientation is offered by Kockelmans. Kockelmans seems to take Merleau-Ponty's 
lead that "the possession of a body implies the ability to change levels and to 
tunderstand' space, just as the possession of a voice implies the ability to change 
key" (p. 25 1), and tells us that what is of importance for the orientation of our 
environment is not my body as it actually is now, as a thing in objective space (i. e. 
the body image), but my virtual body as a system of possible activities (i. e. the 
body schema), the 'phenomenal place' of which is fixed by its situations and its 
tasks - "My body is there where there is something to be done" 114 . The emphasis, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, is therefore on the body-schema and, most Importantly, its 
movement widiin the world. This will be returned to with explicit reference to 
I.. . dyslexia in the later half of the chapter. 
An upside down world is a novel, unusual perceptual experience, and yet one 
which only remains novel for a certain period of time. That we can eventually find 
our bearings in such a world so that even it can be 'set right' and eventually 
inhabited or 'lived in' is Merleau-Ponty's major finding in the onentation 
experiments. Although the disorientated subjects are clearly not returned to the 
primordial novelty of early childhood thereby encountering the onset of worldly 
perception, Stratton's experiment does disrupt elements from the network of 
learned directions and bearings that have been built upon successive beds of 
sedimented experience since birth, e. g. the entrance to the cellar is regarded 'low' 
earlier chapter 'The Spatiality of one's own body and motility', where the Schneider case 
introduces a number of issues concerning position and direction, predominantly: the 'intentional' 
capacity of the subject to locate abstract objects in the world (referred to as pointing), at which 
Schneider cannot succeed, and, the pre-noetic capability of Schneider's lived-body to complete a 
task such as using a fork to feed oneself (referred to as grasping). 
,, 4 See: Kockelmans, J. 1970, p. 286. This text seems to be regarded by other cornmentators on 
Mericau-Ponty as a seminal secondary text on the subject on Space, although surpnsingly it is 
almost entireh, concerned Nvith Phenomenolog5, qj'Percephon rather than Merleau-Pont-y's later 
work concerning depth and flesh. 
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because I have learned to bend down 'lower' than my level of my head m order to 
enter. Put another way, Stratton's experiment reveals the inner dynatrucs and 
coming-into-being of certain habits. Thus, a direct link between this and the last 
chapter should now be apparent: as much as the body-schema is crucial for the 
adoption of skills and habits, such habits are not merely accompanied by, but 
infused with meaningUness by way of a certain spatiality. This observation may 
not seem so revelatory considering my discussion of skills in the previous chapter, 
and I am in no way accrediting such an observation to just Merleau-Ponty. As 
Straus, among others, has argued"' perception itself requires movement, indeed 
that which is perceived is always infused by at least an implicit presence of 
movement. The spatial level of objects in my environment, the pen 'right here' or 
the forest 'way over there', is only possible for an embodied being with the 
capacity to move and negotiate his/her spatial envirortment. As Merleau-Ponty 
states: 
"To invert an object is to deprive it of its significance. Its being as an object is, 
therefore, not a being-for-the-diinking subject, but a being-for-the-gaze which 
meets at a certain angle, and otherwise fails to recognise it. This is why each 
object has its 'top' and its 'bottom' which indicate, for a given level, its 'natural 
position, the one which it 'should' occupy ... 
[TIhis gaze takes a grip upon things 
only in so far as they have a general direction; and this general direction in space 
is not a contingent characteristic of the object, it is the means whereby I recognise 
it and am conscious of it as an object. " (p. 253) 
"5 Straus, E. 1963, p. 233-36. 
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We may ask: in what way does a person in an InVerted visual field not 'live' in it, 
cannot get involved in it, cannot easily move about or manipulate objects in it? 
Indeed, in what way do we sense there is something unusual about our 
perception? The two principal and implicatory answers offered by Merleau-Ponty 
and broached in the above quote are concemed with 'maximum' grip and spatial 
meaningfulness. Firstly, as I have already described m Chapter Three, perception 
is continuous process of interrogation, a process that is guided by the fluctuating 
grip - or as Casey puffs it 'tensional arc" 
16 
_ over a field of vision (although this 
equally applies for other sensory fields, e. g. touch). Because the subject of the 
above experiment is suddenly introduced to a persisting inverted field, the body's 
grip over the field is that much slacker than a 'usual' upright field. Because of this 
slackening of tension that would usually hold the body and its field together in 
pre-noefic dialogue, the field will seem confusing and hard to live in. What is 
provoked by this confusion is a new gestalt of possibilities, i. e. ftirther 
interrogation and hence movement of the body. What is revealed in a slackening 
of grip - the body's tensional arc - is that perception is permeated by (amongst 
other attributes) a spatiality and a meanmgfulness which are reciprocal, reversible 
even, in that they implicate each other. This brings me back to the point I made at 
the start of this section in relation to the ambiguous meaning of the French word 
'sens', for one reason why an inverted visual field seems 'unreal' or peculiar is 
because inverted objects are deprived of both their 'full' significance and their 
direction. As Merleau-Ponty puts it they have lost the power of 'the gaze' (p. 278- 
80). Whilst 'the' spatial level is utterly dependent upon the network of the lived- 
, 16 See. Caso-, E. 1993, p. 55-56. 
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body, meaningful perception rests upon a certain spatial dimension, a chmension 
which is reached by an appeal to a level of all levels. 
Let us take stock for a moment. Through his use of inversion experiments and 
continuing ftorn his discussion of spatiality and motility in Part One of 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty's basic finding is that 'the' spatial 
level is only a certain form of possession of the world by the lived-body, 'it' is no 
specific 'thimg' in particular, rather the spatial level appears as a certain spatial 
style or attitude, i. e. the cuhnination of previous spatial engagements which act as 
the backdrop for current and ftiture spatial orientation. As we will see more 
clearly in the next section of this chapter, and especially in relation to Merleau- 
Ponty's mature ontology, spatiality is a meaningful phenomenon, whilst meaning 
should also be considered a spatial phenomenon, i. e. there is a certain 'depth' to 
meaning, or in Merleau-Ponty's later language, they are "reversible'. The notion 
of depth will be expanded upon in the next section, but one can immediately see 
that perceptual meaning has very little to do with a logical sense of meaning, and 
only partially to do with a quantitative sense of meaning. The notion of a spatial 
level brings this out quite clearly. An orange may be characterised as 'quite near', 
thus bringing out more of a positional, and thus quantitative awareness of how I 
find the orange meaningful, an awareness which can be subjected to a process of 
measurement, e. g. the metrification of the distance between my 'body' and the 
object. However, what must not be lost in the technological urge to measure, is 
that thc orange's spatial position also implies that it is simultaneously 'within my 
reach' - the orange is part of my immediate sphere of possible action. Now, 
depending on my current metabolic and digestive state (let us sav that I am 
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hungry), the orange may seem quite 'tempMg' or 'desirable', and thus the 
quantitative/positional awareness of the orange is simultaneously a qualitative 
awareness; the meaningftilness of the orange is profoundly plurivocal in that I am 
aware of it in a whole host of different ways, whilst another person may be aware 
of the orange in a completely different way. 
Whilst the perception of a certain phenomenon within our environment is 
structured by a figure-background relationship, which in turn will have a certain 
spatial level, such a phenomenon will always have a qualitative, deeper, thicker 
layer of meanmg for the person who engages in that situation. It is this aspect of 
Merleau-Ponty's interrogation of space, i. e. the occurrence of a presumptive 
quantitative and moreover qualitative relationship with space, that marks it out 
from previous conceptions of directionality and positionality. Furthermore, the 
notion of space as a qualitatively meaningful nexus is something almost 
completely ignored by previous research into dyslexia. With this in mind, I will 
now try and see how these initial investigations into spatiality bear on my 
descriptions of dyslexia and the body-schema from the previous chapter. 
Depth, lived-space and eguilibrium 
Iti the first part of this chapter I have presented Merleau-Ponty's initial 
descriptions concerning how a spatial level always lies in a processional fashion 
to the body's 'current' spatial position and sense of direction. In this way, 
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MeTleau-Ponty provides an introductory theoretical underpinning that describes 
how the body generally (not always) finds itself with situational sense; i. e. a 
direction/position that is intrinsically meaningful. Because spatial location is 
inherently meaningful, such situational sen5e cannot be regarded as permanent or 
fixed as the situation will offer up a greater or lesser possibility of interrogation 
for the body, i. e. the unfamiliar space will prompt ftirther interrogation and hence 
movement by the body, m an attempt to maximise the body's gnp and clanty of a 
situation. Thus, what Merleau-Ponty has shown the reader is that the body's sense 
of spatial direction and position is granted not only by immediately preceding 
spatial direction/positions, but of greater consequences, by the spatial orientation 
and meaningfulness sedimented into the body in all previous spatial 
direction/positions. What I hope to present in this second part of the chapter is 
how these initial descriptions can be related to the dys-location peculiar to 
dyslexia, and on a more philosophical level, the way in which Merleau-Ponty 
extends his notion of 'the' level of all spatial levels with his phenomenology of 
depth. 
It is debatable whether Merleau-Ponty offers a fully coherent phenomenological 
account of depth in Phenomenoloýy QfPerception, and questions may still be 
asked of his various discussions about depth between the late 1950's and the 
posthumous publication of The Visible and the Invisible' 17 . During the Chapter 
'Spacc' in Phenomenology- depth is treated as a specific topic in the second 
The question of depth is one which. perhaps more than any other, permeates the main text of 
7he Osible and the Invisible, althougli cxpiicit mention of the topic is rare as it subsumed under 
the guise of notions such as 'chiasm' and 'reversibility'. Nterleau- Ponty is more explicit in the 
'Working Notes'. see especially note from November 1959 (p. 219). Also of great interest for the 
development of depth as a central notion are the essays Fit, andkfind. and The Philosopher and 
his Shadow, the latter in: Mcricau-Ponty. 1964 (a). 
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quarter of the chapter (p. 254-67), whilst the topic is articulated implicitly in the 
second half by describing the phenomena of movement (p. 267-77) and the 
somewhat obscure topic of 'lived space' (p. 280-94). That Merleau-Ponty offers a 
wide range of accounts in and after Phenomenoloýý... is in no way a serious 
criticism, for as we shaH see, because of its very character depth cannot be My 
described - it is always in excess of a final explanation or characterisation. As 
such I will look at a number of characterisations Merleau-Ponty gives of depth 
from Phenomenology... to his later period, whilst I wil-I also consider Gibson's 
views on 'occlusion' and depth. 
If Merleau-Ponty's project is considered as a phenomenology of lived-experience, 
in my opinion, his descriptions of how depth is intrinsic to perception are amongst 
his most revealing and intuitive as they are so close to what I (and others) actually 
experience. Although Merleau-Ponty offers some good examples of how depth is 
actually experienced, the previously mentioned article by Steinbock seems to sum 
up the 'originality' of depth extremely well. As he puts it: 
"As I open the door to my study all the ob ects in the room - the desk, the j 
typewriter, the chair in the comer, the plantý the bookshelves - take on a 
significance and thus a spatial configuration UMque to the situation. The drapes 
are drawn insulating me in a quiet contemplative ambience. The keys of my 
typewriter rush towards me and tilt vertically anticipating my mtention to type; 
objects in the room turn in to face me - some even boldly challenge my intention. 
The floor, which according to a carpenter's level is flatý dips in the nuddle and 
then slopes up near the window to embrace the wall; the wall on my left wraps 
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around the large bookshelf, the plant in the distance is brought closer; the chair to 
my right faces me frontally as if to tug on other objects while vying for my 
attention, leaning in, pulling me towardif 118 
The ambience of the room, the offering up of objects as tools to be used and the 
way the room dips and curves with scant regard for orders of metrification - these 
are some of the ways in which a phenomenology of depth is bringing an account 
of perception back into the phenomenal world of lived experience, whilst evading 
both the transcendental and 'natural' attitudes. In Phenomenoloýý... Merleau- 
Ponty's rejuvenation of depth is introduced, as usual, via criticism. Initially, the 
philosophical tradition to fall victim is predominantly Empiricism in the form of 
Berkeley, a position which is akin to the oversight made by the geometer and 
his/her level. The mistake of the empiricist is to have treated depth as an invisible 
entity that only exists in relation to height and breadth, that is, as a juxtaposition 
of simultaneous geometric points, Because this juxtaposition of points forms one 
single dimension the viewer of this situafion will only be able to 'see' depth if it is 
conceived of as breadth seen from the side i. e. breadth in profile. One initial 
cnticism of this account is that space here is being treated as strictly isotropic, and 
may be considered as a characteristic of the natural attitude - e. g. it is self-evident 
to both myself and a man I meet in the street that the tower block on the horizon is 
a 'long way away' from us both. Furthermore, if this attitude is maintained then 
depth cannot be accounted for as an actual entity for to do so would entail the 
God-like omnipresence of abandoning one's point of view and inspecting space 
from every simultaneous position. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, "For God, who is 
1 "Steinbock. A. 1997, p. 3i8. 
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everywhere, breadth is immediately equivalent to depth. Intellectualism and 
empmcism do not give us any account of human experience of the world; they tell 
us what God might think about it. " (p. 255). What such an attitude takes with it is 
the impulse to think of depth as a dimension which only exists as a relation 
between objects or points. What this position ignores is the perspective, the 
"indissoluble link", tension and grip that exists amid the body and the world: 
"More directly than any other dimensions of space, depth forces us to reject the 
preconceived notion of the world and rediscover the primordial expenence from 
which it springs: it is, so to speak, the most 'existential' of 0 dimensions ... it 
cannot either be extracted firom, or even put into that perspective by 
consciousness ... By rediscovenng the vision of depth, that is to say, of a depth 
which is not yet objectified and made up of mutually extemal points, we shall 
once more outrun the traditional alternatives and elucidate the relation between 
subject and object. " (p. 256). 
Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of depth conceived as a construct within isotropic 
space have shown us how depth must be rediscovered as a lived phenomenon, 
whilst the previous example from Steinbock has started to articulate how this 
lived experience manifests itself. Thus, how is such an approach to depth to be 
considered as philosophically significant? Probably the most interesting assertion 
made by Merleau-Ponty is that depth must be considered as the primary or 
'primordial' level rather than a derived third level. Edward Casey offers a useful 
three point synopsis of how this claim can be understood'19. Firstly depth is not 
119 See. Casev. E 199 1, p. 10, In this article, Case-, - provides an excellent conunentary on how 
James, Gibson and Mcrleau-Pontv all contribute to a re-valonsing of depth. 
122 
constructed or derived but concretely given. Second, depth is less of a dimension 
and more a dense medium in which body-subject and world are both immersed. 
As such, depth is more than just an invisible mediator, it is a visible and tangible 
phenomenon which has a genuine quantitative and qualitative thickness. Thirdly, 
priMOTdial depth is that which subtends objectified metricised. depth, existing as 
an aura or 'volununosity' (p. 266) which, as Merleau-Ponty puts itý allows for it to 
be: "a pre-objective standard of distances and sizes. " (p. 267). To articulate these 
points in more detail I shall now describe how Merleau-Ponty attends to the 
themes of, firstly, size constancy and, secondly, the unity within multiplicity of 
perception. 
The natural attitude is once again bracketed-off by Merleau-Ponty in his account 
of size constancy, as this perspective emphasises the 'apparent' size of an object 
in varying positions rather than the way in which the object is actually 
experienced. The criticism is again one which applies to measurement in that a 
ball being thrown toward me neither starts small nor gets bigger as I try to catch 
it. Instead of the ball's apparent size, what is of consequence here is the clarity, 
hold and grip I have of the ball in relation to distance; i. e. there exists a certain 
maximisation of grip I have of the ball at a certain distance - too far or too close 
and the grip or 'tensional arc' will slacken. Thus, in the case of reading from or 
wnting on a page, when I am in contact with the same words over differing 
distances from the page it is not the words' size that changes but the grip that 
exists between the triad of page, body and distance. Indeed, through this account 
Nterleau-Ponty is putting not only an emphasis on the pnmacy of depth, but that 
over and against the other dimensions "concerned with the relationship of things 
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amongst themselves ... depth immediately reveals the 
link between the subject and 
space. " (p. 264). Furthermore, In that a 'firm' or 'steady' tensional arc can be 
sustained whilst reading, one must remember from the first part of this chapter 
that such an arc is the basis for a meaningiul situation. This capacity to maintain a 
firm tensional arc may be thwarted in cases such as short or long sightedness and 
may call for instrmental assistance in the form of glasses, and although dyslexia 
is not necessardy a problem of the eyes incapacity to focus at a certain distance, 
there certainly is a problem in terms of a loss of meaning in a linguistic situation, 
i. e. a slackening of the tensional arc. I shall return to this point at the end of this 
section. 
The next way in which the rejuvenation of depth is thematised by Merleau-Ponty 
is via an account of how a cube maintains its unity, owing something of a debt (at 
least in choice of example) to Husserl's famous analysis of the die in Cartesian 
Meditations 120 . The approach taken to how an object maintains its unity through 
disparity is similar to that of an objects' size and its distance firom the body, 
however at this stage in the account of depth the theme of spatio-temporality is 
explicitly introduced. Merleau-Ponty's basic point is that, as with the capacity of 
the two eyes to provide monocular perception, so primordial depth allows for the 
six faces and twelve lines of the cube in their varying appearances to co-exist as 
the same cube. The key to understanding this is what Gibson cafls the 
c occlusionary' power of depth, or as Merleau-Ponty states: 
"" See Husserl, E. 1977. Secfions 17-19 of the Second Meditation. 
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"This being simultaneously present in experiences which are nevertheless 
mutually exclusive, this implication of one in the other, this contradiction into one 
perceptual act of a whole possible process, constitute the originality of depth. It is 
the dimension in which things or elements envelop each other, whereas breadth 
and height are the dimensions in which they are juxtaposed. " (p. 264-265 - my 
emphasis) 
The key expressions I have emphasised here are crucial in understanding the way 
in which Merleau-Ponty is offering his positive account of depth. The faces of the 
cube do seem to exclude each other in different phases of perception yet remain 
simultaneously present or 'co-existent' via depth's capacity to implicate or fold 
the cube's faces into one another. With juxtaposition we find a power that works 
to exclude by setting apart objects "at separate points on a planifonn gnd of 
homogenous space... whereas envelopment acts to conjoin. " 12 1 This 'natural' 
envelopment that depth allows for is exemplified by ambiguous drawings such as 
the duck/rabbit or those of Escher, for it is depth's power to envelop that allows 
for the duck or rabbit to appear by eclipsing each other whilst co-existing. Thus, 
going back to Steinbock's description of a room whicb dips In the middle and 
curves in the comers with varying patches of shade and light, although the objects 
in the room are intermeshed with each other, there exists a certain tension between 
them as they eclipse and de-eclipse each other by establishing varying levels of 
significance with by body (e. g. useful, far away, high up, juicy). This tension 
among objects must always be thought of in relation to my body, and has the 
paradoxical characteristic of 'surface depth', or as J. J. Gibson calls it 'occluding 
Scc: C ascy, E. 199 1, P. 11. 
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edges', i. e. the ability for perceived surfaces to extend behind and bend under one 
another etc. . 
122 What Merleau-Ponty has rejuvenated in his account of depth is the 
ambiguous, that tension which exists among presence and absence, visibility and 
invisibility, sameness and otherness - an 'identity-in-difference'. 
As I have tried to indicate in the summing-up of the preceding paragraph, 
characterisations of depth such as its voluminosity, ambiguity, and thickness 
stretch from Phenomenology of Perception to Merleau-Ponty's work around the 
time of The Visible and the Invisible. Indeed, one of the most lucid accounts he 
offers of depth is in a quote from Eye and Mind. We see here that the notion of a 
primordial depth cannot be My captured or exhausted, and thus the urgency of 
his return to such a key notion in the late 1950's and early 1960's: 
"... three centuries after Descartes, depth is still new, and it insists on being 
sought, not "once in a lifetime" but all through life. It cannot be merely a question 
of an unmystenous interval, as seen from an airplane, between these trees nearby 
and those farther away ... The enigina consists in the fact that I see things, each 
one in its place, precisely because they eclipse one another, and that they are 
rivals before my sight precisely because each one is in its own place. Their 
exterionty is known Mi their envelopment and their mutual dependence in their 
autonomy ... Depth thus understood is ... the experience of the reversibility of 
dimensions, of a global "locality" - everything in the same place at the same 
time ... a voluminosity we express in a word when we say that a tbing is there. " 
123 
'22 See: Gibson, J. 1986, p. 189-202. It is remarkable just how close Gibson's theory of visual 
perception is to Merleau-Ponty's more global account of perception, and yet there is no mention of 
Merleau-Pontv anNAvhcre in Ae Ecological Approach to Vlswl Perception. 
'23 Mcdeau-Ponty, M, 1964, pý 180. 
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I will look more directly at the role depth has to play in Merleau-Ponty's explicit 
ontology of the flesh in later chapters concerning temporality and the 
intersubjectivity of language. To close this section I want to look at Merleau- 
Ponty's descriptions of 'lived' space for not only do they seem to act as a bridge 
between phenomenology and ontology, but also include a helpful point 
concerning pathology via Minkowski's revealing descriptions of schizophrenic 
space 124 . The account of lived-space comes at the end of the chapter on 'Space' 
in 
Phenomenology... and includes such varying descriptions of anthropological 
spaces as 'the spatiality of night', 'sexual space', 'mythical space', and as 
mentioned, 'schizophrenic space'. Although acting as a type of metaphysical 
underpinning to the previous secfions, the purpose of this final secfion of the 
chapter on 'Space' is slightly unclear, a facet which may be due to the inherently 
mysterious, excessive and ambiguous anthropological spaces Merleau-Ponty is 
dealing with. This said, the way in which I read this section is that Merleau-Ponty 
wants to underscore the genumely tangible and immanent nature of primordial 
depth (referred to in this section of Phenomenology... as 'pure' depth), 
characteristics which underpin the capability of the body's forniation and coherent 
defonnation of meaningfid perception. 
With 'dark' space (this latter term is from Minkowski), what is being suggested is 
a mediwn rather than dimension which, distinct from a clear space exemplified by 
the tension characteristic of a here-there structure, is a more mtimate, fleshy, 
direction/ess and pathological space that underpins the very heterogeneity of 
Mmkowska, E. 1970. See especlally Chapter 7 on psyChopathology and lived-space. 
127 
primordial depth. What I take Merleau-Ponty to be saying is that the 
anthropological spaces he investigates are exemplars 125 of the way M which lived 
or dark space outstrips and exceeds any form of reflection or objectification 
because, by its very nature, it is infinitely fluctuating - beyond the ego - and 
"belongs much more to becoming than to being" 126 . With clear space a tension 
exits In the fold between the 'here-there' perception which allows for distancmg 
and reflection, whilst in the case of dark space there is a pre-reflective one-ness of 
the body with such a space - there is no tension and no distance. What Merleau- 
Ponty infers from this description is that, what actualy protects the 'sane' person 
from delusion is: "not his critical powers, but the structure of his space: objects 
remain before him, keeping their distance" (p. 29 1). 
In the examples of schizophrenic space provided by Minkowski, patients suffering 
from hallucinations and paranoid delusions seem to be confined to pathological 
bouts of living in a 'dark' space that lacks distance, reflection and distinction. 
Manifestations of such problems, for example the man who experiences a paint 
brush outside his window entering his head (p. 290), reveal a collapsing of the 
tension between body and world, resulting in the overwhelming proximity of the 
object, e. g. the paint brush. What is lost for the patient is the power to reflect and 
distance himself from the perceptual field, resulting in the whole array of objects 
"5 1 say exemplars, for as Merleau-Ponty points out ( p. 287, especially footnote 4), the 
"description of human space could be developed indefinitely. ", whilst going on to state that dance 
and aesthetic perception could be used to strengthen his argument. 
120 Minkowski, E. 1970, p. 5. The notion of a dark- space of pure heterogeneity, that is, non- 
geornewcal space, has certain affinities with Bergson's anterior notion of duration. Furthermore, 
the resemblance between Merleau-Pont-N, and Mink-owski's 'dark space' and Deleuze and 
Guattari's 'smooth space" (as opposed to 'striated' metricised space - See ' 1440: The Smooth and 
the Striated' in A Thousand Plateaux) is quite apparent in terms of their structure, albeit that 
smooth space operates at more of a strategic and political level (See: Bergson, H. 1991 - and, 
Dcleuze, G. and Guattan. F. 1987. ) 
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within the field becoming significant. As Merleau-Ponty shows in this key quote 
conceming the two major spatial levels of perception: 
"Clear space, that impartial space in which all objects are equally important and 
enjoy the same right to existence is not only surrounded, but also thoroughly 
permeated by another spatiality thrown into relief by morbid deviation from the 
non-nal ... This second [dark] space which cuts across visible space is the one 
which is ceaselessly composed by our own way ofprojecting the ivorld, and the 
schizophrenic's trouble consists simply in the fact that the permanent project 
becomes dissociated from the objective world as the latter is presented to 
perception, and withdraws, so to speak, within itself The schizophrenic no longer 
inhabits the common property world, but a private world, and no longer gets as far 
as geographical space: he dwells in the 'landscape space', and the landscape itself, 
once cut off from the common property world, is considerably Impoverished" 
(p. 287 - my emphasis) 
The above quote offers a good summary of the argument being offered at the end 
of the 'Space' chapter, and is a useful model to work with in relation to dyslexia. 
What both Minkowski and Merleau-Ponty seem to be suggesting is that in cases 
of 'nonnal' perception one of the main factors that contributes to a declaration of 
4normality' is the relatively stable interplay and balance between the two levels of 
dark and clear space. What is constitutive of 'normal' perception is a certain 
degree of objectivitY, which is needed in order to distance oneself and reflect upon 
a situation, whilst perception must also mamtam a certain degree of strictly 
personal interest in the situation - "a 'lived' distance binds me to things which 
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count and exist for me, and links them to each other. This distance measures the 
4scope' of my life at every moment. " (p. 286). This raises two specific points. 
Firstly, the levels of clear and dark sPace, which to an extent can be considered 
the subjective-pathological and the objective -normative poles of perception, 
would seem to have to achieve a type of equilibrium in order for somebody to live 
within the "common property world7, i. e. a common set of cultural meanings 
attached to specific situations. We have already come across the idea of 
maintaining a certain equilibrium when describing the hold or grip of the tensional 
arc at the level of clear space, yet the achievement and continuation of such a 
cmaximum grip' has remained somewhat vague. As the first few lines of the 
above quote indicate, it would seem to be the case that there is an immense 
amount of 'behind the scenes' work being done by the interaction of clear and 
dark space that directly feeds into the grip one has over a situation. Thus, in the 
case of lived-space, it is as though two levels of pre-reflective dialogue are taking 
place: at a micro level (a level of expression), achievement of the tensional arc is 
made possible via a dialogue between body and the world, whilst at a macro level, 
the dialogue between body and world is made possible via a primordial dialogue 
between dark and lived space. Although the meanineulness of a situation is 
produced or expressed within the tensional arc of a body-world dialogue, it is the 
more primordial ontological fold of dark and clear space that actually allows for 
the tensional arc. 
This brings me to my second point concerning the characteristics of the 
eqwlibnwn between clear and dark space. Such an equilibrium must be of a 
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general nature, in that it will fluctuate from person to person owing to their "own 
way of projecting the world" that will have built up through the sedimentation of 
habits and their own geographical facticity. In this way, the role of an equilibrium 
between dark and clear space can be related to the way that we are attuned to 
different spaces. For example: I find no particular problem in negotiating the 
streets, shops, road signs and general layout of the city, whilst I would have 
extremely limited ability when negotiating the terrain of the desert of jungle. The 
question that could be raised at this poInt is: how is such an equilibrim be 
conceived of, or indeed measured? However, such questioning would be 
misguided, as this form of spatial 'attunement' cannot be quantified or measured 
owing to it working at a pre-reflective level. Indeed, if there is to be a standard for 
spatial attunement, it is a question of pragmatics 127 ; i. e. to be 'attuned' 'balanced' 
or in a state of 'equilibrium' is to be pragmatically engaged with the present 
situation - my body can negotiate a route Erom train station to university. 
Although Merleau-Ponty is hardly explicit on this point, the way in which he 
articulates such pragmatic engagement is through a certain flexibility, or, as he 
tenns it, 'play': 
"Sometimes between myself and the events there is a certain amount of play 
(Spielraum), which ensures that my freedom is preserved while the events do not 
cease to concern me. Sometimes, on the other hand, the lived distance is both too 
small and too great: the majority of the events cease to count for me, while the 
'2' Although I Nvant to draw attention to the inherently pragmatic standard of spatial attunement, 
Cataldi makes an interesting case for an crnotional level of spatial attunernent between dark- and 
cicar space (p. 52-52), whilst her general thesis is to draws attention to the affective level of 
'depth' as a general notion in the work of Merleau-Ponty of Gibson. See- CataU, S. 1993. 
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nearest ones obsess me. They enshroud me like the night and rob me of my 
individuality and freedom. " (p. 286) 
Under Merleau-Ponty's tenns, those who rnight be said to posses 'nonnal' 
perception have the bodily capacity for a certain playftdness and balance in 
specific situations, and rather than possessing a universal form of ammement that 
all others share, the way in which some-body's spatial-attunement articulates 
itself is as a certain style. Thus, if we go back to the first quote of this section, 
those who share in a 'common property world' are marked-out by sharing a 
similar style in specific situations, e. g. when greeting a good friend at my doorstep 
I step towards him, reaching to shake his hand with a smile on my face. 
The notion of the dyslexic's bodily style and expression will be the main topic of 
the next chapter, although I wifl emphasise its importance in the final section of 
this chapter. For now, what is of concern is how dysleXia can be related to 
Merleau-Ponty's account of spatial attunement. Chronic cases of psychopathology 
seem to be accounted for in the second half of the above quote, marked by a lived- 
distance which is either too small or too great. Note that even in cases of 
hallucination and paranoid delusion Merleau-Ponty is keen to show that lived- 
distance is never completely absent there still is a lived-distance present for the 
patient albeit one which is un-attuned - in a state of disequilibrium. Now in the 
case of dyslexia we have already seen when attending to the theme of 'apparent 
size' that in a textual linguistic situation (as opposed to spoken), there is a 
slackening of the tensional arc between body and world and hence a peculiar 
deprivation of meaning for the dyslexic. Thus, when this phenomenon is 
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invesfigated at the level of lived-space, it would seem that spatial-attunement for 
the dyslexic suffers a persistent susceptibility for a decrease in the aforementioned 
6play' - "which ensures that my fireedom is preserved while the events do not 
cease to concem me" (p. 286). 
I am in no way suggesting here that the dyslexic be aligned with cases of chronic 
psychopathology, as the distortions of lived-distance will not be of the same 
magnitude and will only be related to linguistic situations. However, there clearly 
must be a pathological trait to dyslexia if it is to be legitimated as a specific 
developmental phenomenon, and what seems to be at stake in dyslexia is a 
peculiar tendency for lived-distance to become too far for the dyslexic. Contrary 
to most of the psychopathological cases illustrated by Minkowski and Merleau- 
Ponty, instead of becoming exclusively Involved in a singular object (e. g. the 
paint brush) and thus suffering firom a type of 'nearness' disposition, the dyslexic 
is susceptible to a of MiVolvement with the text for it be meaningful. 
If one goes back to the above model, the objects (letters, words, syntax) of the text 
diminish in their concern for me, they become undifferentiated so that - "all 
objects are equally importanf' (p. 287). Because the objects of the text diminish in 
their impact on me, there is a resulting de-attunement and disequilibrium, which 
consists in my freedom outweighing the impact of the objects in the text. This de- 
attunement common to dyslexia I will refer to as a 'dys-location'. What is 
commoti to cases of chronic psychopathology and dyslexia is a reduction in their 
power to interrogate. Instead of the case of a schizophrenic patient becoming 
overpowered by a single location and losing his/her freedom, dyslexia seems to be 
marked by a loss or loosening of location. This tendency is characteristic of an 
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overpowering freedom which results in the dyslexic failing to settle upon a fixed 
meanmg which is representative of the previously mentioned 'common property 
world'. I interpret this as such: the dyslexic has a style of engaging with the 
linguistic world that suffers from a lack of fixity, and the inter-subjective correlate 
of such a style is such that the dyslexic falls outside of the niles of speech-sounds, 
spelling, grammar and syntax encompassed by a 'common property world'. 
Although these assertions are on a general level, what I have tried to articulate 
here is the way in which the lived-sPace of the dyslexic has the tendency to slip 
into a disequilibrium of dark (pathological) and clear (normative) space, in that 
clear space becomes undifferentiated. Because of this there is a loosening of the 
dyslexics grip over a linguistic situation, and the meaningfulness of the text 
becomes acutely diminished for the dyslexic. What remains for me to show in the 
final section of this chapter is how these assertions relate to movement, and why 
this tbetne seems to impinge specifically on the pathology peculiar to dyslexia. 
Movement, dvslexia and dvslocation 
To conclude this chapter I will try and thematise some of the conclusions reached 
iii the previous section by firstly looking at the theme of movement and secondly 
seeing how this applies to the phenomenological experience of dyslexia and 
previous empirical research. Finally, through these consideration I will be able to 
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describe how there is not only a level of dys-location in dyslexia, but a reciprocal 
level of re-location. 
lin the previous section we have seen how Merleau-Ponty offers a positive 
conception of depth in the guise of primordial depth, a voluminous medium that 
subtends the unity of objects and relations of distance (the here-there structure) 
through its occlusionary envelopment. What is implicit in Merleau-Ponty's 
descriptions of approximate size, distance and the unity of an object is fully 
realised in his description of movement: the indivisibility of time and space, and 
the role of the body. Owing something of a debt to both Straus and Bergson'28 , the 
importance of temporality in relation to depth's power of envelopment its very 
thickness, is briefly introduced as an introduction to Merleau-Ponty's account of 
lived distance and movement. In one remarkable paragraph he states: 
"... co-existence, which in fact defines space, is not alien to time, but is the fact of 
two phenomena belongmg to the same temporal wave. As for the relationship of 
the perceived object to my perception, it does not unite them in space and outside 
time: they are contemporary. The 'order of co-existents' is inseparable from the 
4order of sequences', or rather time is not only the consciousness of a sequence. 
Perception provides me with a 'field of presence' in the broad sense, extending in 
two dimensions: the here-there dimension and the past-present-future dimension. 
The second elucidates the first. " (p. 265) 
12' The debt to Strauss is made c-,, plicit by Merleau-Ponty ( p. 265, Footnote 1), NNIfflst Bergson's 
I, anious example of the dissolvMg sugar cube from Matter and Memory is used on pages 263-4. 
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A number of points need to be emphasised here. Firstly, not only does depth 
include a voluminosity and thickness in relation to sensory perception, but this 
also entails a past-present-future thickness of time. Moreover, what is of immense 
philosophical importance is Merleau-Ponty's final statement above, that time is 
the dimension that elucidates the dimension of sensory perception. What Merleau- 
Ponty seems to be articulating is another example of intuitive phenomenological 
description, whilst adding a temporal dimension to the idea of a tensional arc. If 
one is to work widiin the attitude of atornistic space and time, the time and 
position of the body-subject pole of perception (here) must be thought separately 
from the object pole (there), i. e. there is a theoretical separation of here from 
there; light cannot hit the object and the body simultaneously. However, what is 
being stripped away from such an attitude is what one experiences in a field of 
perceptual spatio-temporal presence. Because of the depth's durational. thickness 
it is possible to see a pen over there at the same time because there exists a 
tensional arc between body and object in the satne living present - i. e. a field of 
presence. Thus, the fold of body and world is temporal as well as spatial. 
With his notion of depth as that which contemporaneously unites and separates, 
Merleau-Ponty has shown that phenomenologicaly, one can co-exist with an 
object Within the same 'temporal wave'. However, by introducing a temporal 
dimension to the thickness of depth one is confronted by the paradox of co- 
Oustence: although I am of the same temporal wave as the object there is also a 
recognition -a reflective awareness - that I am have not completely coincided 
with the object. Thus on the here-there dyad, my body (here) has a certain hold 
over the object (there) and yet because I am aware that the object (there) is not my 
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body (here) the situation is always open to ftirther interrogation. Therefore, the 
tensional arc that holds together my body and the object is always subject to 
change under the duress of the future, and rather than the body's capacity to re- 
gear itself with the world portraying an isolated tensional arc, what is at stake is 
the intentional. In the previous chapter I tried to compensate for some of the 
philosophical trappings which are conveyed by the term 'operative intentionality' 
by suggesting the new expression 'dynamic synchroMcity'. Although I am not 
claiming that notions of an 'operative intentionality' and a 'intentional arc' are 
interchangeable, the dynamic synchronicity of the body clearly provides the 
ground for such an 'arc", and my new expression hopefufly underscores the open- 
ended, ever-changing character of perception interrogation, that is to say - our 
perception of space is not static, but dynamic and moving. 
Although Merleau-Ponty's investigation of movement is eager to take issue with 
(although not entirely refute) the understanding of movement offered by the 
logician and psychologist, what I take from this investigation is the way in which 
he tries to animate the somewhat static descripfions he has previously given 
concerning our perception of space. What is being questioned in this section is 
how a moving object is able to maintain its unity whilst appearing to be in motion, 
and the manner in which Merleau-Ponty attends to such a question may now seem 
familiar. Instead of conceiving the problem of movement as something which is 
solely concemed with how a movmg object can stil-I be the same object despite 
different positions, what is at stake is a phenomenon which one is aware of before 
it is thematised and hence known in its different aspects. It is only when a 
'moving' object is thematised as changing specific points and positions in space 
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that one is faced with the problem of the logician or psychologist, that is: "the 
identical object in motion and ... the relativity of movement which means that it 
destroys the movement" (p. 275). Clearly of interest to a phenomenological 
description of movement is the pre-objective being of a non-thematised mobile 
object, defined primarily in terms of 'behaviour' and not static properties: 
"If we want to take the phenomenon of movement seriously, we shall need to 
conceive a world which is not made up only of things, but which has in it also 
pure transitions. The something in transit which we have recognised as necessary 
to the constitution of a change is to be defined only in terms of the particular 
manner of its 'passing'... It is not I who recognise, in each of the points and 
instants passed through, the same bird defined by explicit characteristics, it is the 
bird in flight which constitutes the unity of its movement; which changes its place, 
it is this flurry of plmnage still here, which is already there in a kind of ubiquity, 
like the comet with its tail. " (p. 275) 
The thesis offered by Merleau-Ponty is that our knowledge of movement is 
always of a moving thing without having any explicit awareness of the different 
objective positions the moving object takes on a specific course. As with the study 
of a cubes' unity through its different parts, the fluidity of movement, understood 
as the 'behaviour' of a moving object is made possible through the implicatory 
co-existence of the object in motion. The mistake made when studying movement 
is to conceive of a juxtaposition of changing points and positions of the object in 
motion, when phenomenologicaly the body is able to maintain a hold over the 
object because it is "present to the same perceiving subject and enveloped in the 
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same temporal wave" (p. 275). Thus, it is the temporal aspect of depth's spatio- 
temporal density that allows for the continwty of a movmg object, ftu-thennore, 
such a temporal wave can only exist itself in its mutual imphcation of the past and 
future. The temporality of space is truly characterised by its thickness. 
How does this investigation of movement impinge upon what has previously been 
said of dyslexia and space? Furthermore, although we have identified movement 
as a moving objects mode of 'passing', its pre-objective 'behaviour', how is the 
body a part of this living present? Indeed, how does the body's dynamic 
synchronicity 'stutter' in the case of the dyslexic? Such questions, and the 
vocabulary contained within, are for the most part alien to the psychologists 
paradigm, and within the context of cognitive driven dyslexia research this is the 
case a fortiori. As I have tried to impress in previous chapters, I am not going up 
against explanations (i. e. phonological difficulties) offered by cognitive 
psychology, because the type of narrative I am offering here is descriptive- 
inlerpretative rather that explanatory. Whereas the psychologist aims to locate 
and examine the cognitive deficits causing dyslexia, the phenomenological 
investigation is one which wants to describe how the phenomenon of dyslexia is 
manifest at an experiential level, and how this relates to the horizon of 'meaning' 
for the dyslexic. Although the experiential-descriptive aims of my project are 
quite distinct from a causal story, I am quite happy - as is Merleau-Ponty himself - 
to use explanations offered by the psychologist as a point of departure, and 
believe it is quite legitimate to give equal weight to conflicting narratives. The 
reasm why I may be going over some old ground here is that, rather than the 
cognifive-phonological model I looked at m the previous chapter, I am at this 
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point more interested in some of the leads offered by new work being pioneered 
by, amongst others, John Stein which pays attention to the role of movement in 
visual peTception"9. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, apart from early research dating from the 50's and 
60's 130 , 
it is only until recently that research on the possibility of a visual deficit 
involved in the problems of developmental dyslexia has started to gain interest. 
The possibility of visual factors being at least part of the cause of dyslexia have 
been discredited by those wishing to develop the phonological deficit model, and 
thus very little attention has been paid to perception and dyslexia even as an 
explanatory story. The cognitive-phonological model may concede that there 
seems to be a disruption of perception in dyslexia, i. e. the dyslexic may 
experience it as such, but such a disruption is only the result of underlying 
cognitive non-performance. Secondly, even when perceptual difficulties have 
been discussed as a either direct cause or as a result of cogmitive factors, the issue 
of spatial direction and space perception has received minimal treatment. Now, 
considering the way in which this chapter has studied spatial orientation, spatial 
perception, and the ontological significance of spatiality in the form of primordial 
depth, if reading and writing are taken as meaningful activities, moreover 
activities that are inherently laden with a sense of direction, then the contexts of 
space perception and depth are not simply factors connected to or impinging on 
perception, but are part of the jiundamental basis for perception. For Merleau- 
12') See: Stein, J. & Walsh, V. 1997; Stein, I (ed) 199 1, and, Stein, J. et al. 198 8. For recent 
evidence in support of Stein and colleagues work-, see: Everatt, J., Bradshaw, M. & Hibbard, P. 
1999 
' and, 
Slaghms, W. & Rvan, J. 1999. 
110 See: Spache, G. 1969. This is an mteresting collection that includes themes taken from Gestalt 
psycholop, such as the figure-background structuring of perception. and utilises authors such as 
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Ponty, to be embodied is to be situated in an environment, to be orientated and to 
have a position and direction - it is to peTceive as a body through all its senses. 
What is phenomenologicaly co-originary with perception is meaning, and a 
necessary trope of meaning is its 'hold' on the world -a sense of direction. 
One study that puts a greater emphasis on both visual perception and spatial 
direction and adds an empirical dimension to Merleau-Ponty's arguments in 
relation to dyslexia is by Waites. "' Although the study is clearly not 
phenomenological in Merleau-Ponty's sense of the term, indeed Waites is keen on 
themes such as 'sensations' and the 'external world'. there is an emphasis on the 
importance of pre-reflective bodily awareness and directionality as a requisite for 
movement such as reading and writing. The argument offered is fairly 
uncomplicated: the authors postulated that if children have difficulty manipulating 
and repeating a symbol of direction, the most basic of which they take to be an 
arrow or pointer, this may indicate the presence of additional problems in 
manipulating language symbols, specifically the alphabet. From this basis, the 
authors studied the capacity to write the alphabet of 198 children with specific 
developmental dyslexia. They found that not only are dyslexic children much 
slower than the "normal population" (their phrase) in acquiring the ability in their 
early school years, but at age ten, almost 40 percent of the dyslexic children were 
still making errors compared to only 15 percent of control subjects. What is of 
special significance is that almost the same percentage of fourteen year old 
dys)exics were making exactly the same mistakes, and the authors conclude that 
dyslexic children still unable to write the alphabet correctly by the age of ten have 
Goldstein, whilst use of the Gestalt figure has been used againvcry recently to highlight the 
diffieulty of dyslexics seeing rows of figures. Sm Lewis, J, and Frick, R- 1999. 
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a primary difficulty in manipulating abstract language symbols in space. 
Although the study makes no further claims than this, from the perspective of 
Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of space perception and space, it is exactly once 
such preliminary conclusions have been made by the psychologist that one has to 
look to the experiential level of dyslexia; i. e. how does the dyslexic experience the 
alphabetical symbol relating to him/her in a specific situation, that is, a spatial 
situation. Thus, instead of studying the degree to which the dyslexic child differs 
from a norm when tying to write the alphabet why not study the different style in 
which the dyslexic has a hold and grip over symbolic objects at the pre-reflective 
level, the manner in which such symbols offer themselves up or retract from the 
body as an object for ffirther or lesser interrogation, indeed, the experience a 
dyslexic has of linguistic space being endowed with a certain meaning. But what 
of reading and writing? These are activities underpinned by their need to flow, to 
be in motion. If one is to engage pragmatically with textual language through 
reading and writing then what is at stake is not static, individual symbols, but a 
process which is moving. This seems to impinge heavily upon dyslexia. 
The story offered by Stein and colleagues is a causal-explanatory story, but one 
which puts a greater emphasis back onto dyslexic experience. Stein's theory is 
based upon a neurophysiological deficit in dyslexia, specifically, that the brain's 
magno-cellular pathway which controls eye movements needed for reading and 
writing skills fails to send adequate 'stabilising information' to the visual cortex in 
dyslexics. Because there is a marked reduction of stabilising information, 
information which allows the flow and smoothness of reading/writing to persist 
Waltes, L. 1980. 
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this results in unsteady eye movements which may lie behind dyslexic phenomena 
such as, words blurring and moving around the page, a loss of position on a page, 
and (more controversially) poor balance and co-ordination. Thus, although SteM 
is working on a neurophysiological level, the emphasis here Is on how the 
dyslexic finds it much harder to develop the 'common' ability (i. e. the sedimented 
skill or habit) to sense the most rapid changes in motion around him/her, 
especially in what is seen and heard. The conclusion that can be drawn from this 
is that the poorer the ability to detect a change in motion, the worse the reading, 
writing and spelling. 
The first use that can be made of phenomenological description that relates to the 
above has already been at work in the preceding section of this chapter in relation 
to unity and lived space, that is, a type of genetic account of dyslexia that I have 
characterised as 'comparative phenomenology' in Chapter Two of the thesis. This 
type of account is not necessarily describing the lived-experience of dyslexia, 
rather it is utilising some of the key notions Merleau-Ponty has refined through 
his descriptions of space perception and understanding the manner in which 
dyslexics deviate from such notions. 
In the first two sections of the chapter the underlying assumption is that to be 
spatially orientated and to perceive an object is to have a meaning, a significance 
which is grounded in the body's dialogue with the world. In the precedi-ng section 
I have already made two substantive assumptions regarding dyslexia in the 
context of space. Firstly, symptoms such as blurring or moving words, the 
inability to recogmse words, and the passing over single words or sometimes 
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whole lines of text, can be interpreted as a peculiar slackening of the tensional arc 
or fold that brings an object and body together in the form of a co-existence and 
presence. Secondly, when looking at the notion of lived space, it would seem that 
such a slackening of the tensional arc is characterised by a deprivation of 'lived 
distance'. It is my assumption that the dyslexic suffers from a deprivation of lived 
distance, i. e. the affordance of 'play' created by a chiasm of pathological, dark 
space and nonnative, clear space. This transpires due to a certain disequilibrium In 
favour of clear space (" [an] IMPartial space in which all objects are equally 
importanf' p. 287) which is experienced by the dyslexic as word(s) offering up a 
general and vague meaning rather than an individual specific significance. To this 
extent, descriptive phenomenology is interpreting what is happening at a pre- 
objective level for the dyslexic (a slackening of tension), and fiu-thermore, why 
this phenomenon is occurring (a disequilibrium of pathological and normative 
space). However, what is most important for a more positive phenomenology of 
dyslexia (i. e. how reading and writing is experienced by the dyslexic 132), is the 
impartiality of dyslexic space; or from a reversed perspective, the lack of 
individual-pathological involvement the dyslexic brings to the text. 
Now this conclusion seems to bring us back to what both Merleau-Ponty has said 
about movement and what Stem and others have said about dyslexia and motion. I 
start from the above conclusion that more than those in the same hnguistic 
conununity, the dyslexic experiences the written word as a space which is 
predominantly an impartial space, one which only embraces a vague and indistinct 
level of meaning. This can be directly applied to the role of dynamic 
112 Philpott, Mý 1999, 
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synchronicity and motility, for the type of dys-location. experienced by the 
dyslexic is indicative of a faltering or stuttering of dynamic synchronicity, that is, 
the body-world dyad cannot establish a smooth and pragmatic dialogue. This 
faltering arises because dyslexic space is more normative/impartial than 
pathological/personal, and thus because of the overpowering freedom of dyslexic 
space the text falls short of offering itseýf up for further (and thus jutural) 
interrogation. 
Fundamentally, dyslexic space does not lend itself to smooth, accomplished 
movement which is elucidated by the sequential thickness of a past-present-future 
temporal wave. It is not simply isolated words themselves that fail to offer 
themselves Ereely, but their position, the context of words, their spelling and 
granunar, and the background of the page. What is at stake here is the 
aforementioned behaviour or pure transition of the reading and writing process as 
a whole, the "mode of its passing" (p. 275) which is orgamsed by the pre- 
objective dialogue between body and world (text). Thus, the dyslexic's experience 
of space is meaningful, but inasmuch as the mode of its passing is far from 
smooth, this singles out the dyslexic from the rest of his/her linguistic commimity. 
The different style of dyslexic space is representafive of the dyslexic's different 
manner of being-in-the-world, and it is through the key themes of expression and 
iemporality that the dyslexic's being-in-the-world will be elucidated in the final 
chapters of the thesis. 
I think the above descriptions beg one more specific question, a question that sees 
a return. to a more explanatory account and a specific concurrence with Stem and 
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company's theory concerning motion and dyslexia: if dyslexic space is 
experienced as more impartial and less personal than the majority of people, what 
is it that is stoppIng the dyslexic from getting personally involved with the text? 
The answer to this question relates back to Chapter Three's account of skills and 
habits, and will draw again on Drew Leder's work. 
In Chapter Three I discussed the acquisition of skills such as reading and writing 
(I will focus on reading here), and the consequent sedimentation of skills into 
habits by recourse to the reciprocal levels of the lived-body - the body schema 
and body image. Once a major skill such as reading becomes automatic (i. e. pre- 
reflective) it transcends the level of simple habit (I can) and becomes an ability 
that disappears into the background of my existence (I do). As such, major habits 
like reading form the way in which I sustain a dynarmc synchronicity between 
body and world, that is, they fonn the background to which I find situations 
meaningfid. As Merleau-Ponty himself says of vision: 
"What I lack when my eye moves passively, is not the objective representation of 
its shift in the orbit, which in any case is not given to me, but the exact gearing of 
my gaze to objects, without which they are incapable of fixity, or indeed of 
genuine movement ... If we can ever speak of movement without an object in 
motion, it is pre-eminently in the case of our own body. The movement of my eye 
towards the t1iing upon which it is about to focus is not the displacement of an 
object in relation to another object, but progress towards reality. " (p. 279) 
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The acquisition and consequent mastery of sUls such as reading is thus 
dependent upon the lived-body, and as I put it in Chapter Three, the ability to read 
and write for the dyslexic is not characterised by the 'I do', but the 'I do - but in a 
different style'. What seems to have happened in the case of dyslexia is that the 
body schema is unsuited to the task of habituating the skiHs of reading and wnting 
to the level shared by its surrounding linguistic community, a case of 'I can only 
just'. As we have seen in the above descriptions of dyslexia and movement, the 
consequence of this is to leave the dyslexic with an impairment in his/her dynamic 
synchronicity in a Imiguistic context. At this point much rests upon the assertion 
that the dyslexic has an unsuitable body schema in order to become proficient at 
reading and writing, and if one is to push this argUlnent any further and ask what 
ties behind this apparent 'unsUltability' then a physiological based explanatory 
account is called for. 
fn the context of space perception and movement, it would seem that Stem and 
others offer a strong empirical correlate for the above phenomenological 
descriptions. What these authors attribute as the primary cause of dyslexia is the 
diminished performance of the magnocellular pathway in the brain. This results in 
the dyslexic being slow to sense very rapid changes in the linguistic environment, 
and it is because of this that the dyslexic is unable to develop a satisfactory body 
schema which can fully habituate the skills of reading and writing. Stein's model 
seems to offer itself as an excellent explanation of why there is a disruption of the 
body schema and thus dynamic synchronicity in dyslexia, whilst my task as a 
phenomenologist is to elucidate how such phenomena are experienced by the 
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dyslexic. The above descriptions will have hopefully gone some way towards 
doing this. 
This brings me to my final point concerning the experience of dyslexic space and 
the nature of this dys-location. On numerous occasions I have underlined the 
absence or recession of sensory organs in their interaction with the world, a 
phenomenon referred to by Drew Leder as 'focal' disappearance. However, Leder 
also creates the term 'dys-appearance' which draws attention to the breakdown of 
an activity, and I think this is helpful in accounting for the way in which the 
dyslexic can sustain a relationship with the written word. Leder's argument is 
fairly intuitive: the somatic and sensory levels of the body which disappear in the 
form of the body schema are somefimes thematised, and as such reveal 
themselves in moments of error, pain, illness or novelty. As Leder puts it: 
"The body most comes into view at such times of disruption, presenting itself as a 
problem to be solved, whether on the plane of ordinary experience or 
philosophical reflection ig 
133 
In the context of language this seems to happen all too frequently for the dyslexic; 
the unsuitability of the corporeal schema results in its very thematisation and 
hence a lapse of dynamic synchronicity. Apart from drawing attention to the 
crucial, yet absent role of the body schema, the notion of dys-appearance also 
underscores the way in which dynamic synchronicity only lapses rather than 
breaking down completely. This is important because, as I have been trying to 
1; 3 Leder, D. 1990, p. 132. 
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stress in all my arguments, the dyslexic does find language meaningful, albeit in a 
different style when compared to those in the same linguistic community. Thus, 
although the spatiality of the dyslexic can be characterised as a type of dys- 
location, such a phenomenon is necessanly accompanied by a re-location; in 
Merleau-Ponty's later language, these are 'reversible' phenomena. The dyslexic is 
prone to experiencing reading and writing as confused. In phenomenological 
terins, this expenence of confusion is the realisation (reflection) that there is a 
slackening of the gazes pre-reflective grip over an object. Although such a lapse 
of dynamic synchronicity is disruptive to the flow of reading/writing, the body 
schema is immediately at the service of adapting itself to the puzzle at hand; it is 
re-locating itself in order to carry out the intemal pragmatics of the activity. 
Quoting from The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty says: 
"For when an illusion dissipates, when an appearance suddenly breaks up, it is 
always for the profit of a new appearance which takes up again for its own 
account the ontological fimction of the first... The dis-flIusion is the loss of one 
evidence only because it is the acquisition of another evidence ... What I can 
conclude Erom these disiflusions or deceptions, therefore, is that perhaps "reality" 
does not belong definitively to any particular perception, that in this sense it lies 
alwaysfurther on" (p. 40-4 1) 
What I have tried to show in this chapter is that spatial orientation and the 
perception of space not only bring with them an inherent mearung, but the 
ontological ground for such meaning is to be located in Merleau-Ponty's 
revitalisation of depth. Depth is that which grants the visibility and accompanying 
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invisibility of the world, allowing for the coherent style of objects at rest or in 
motion. As such, depth is not merely spatial, but as the above quote ag 
suggests, the depth of the world is spalio-lemporal. These key notions have been 
applied to the way a dyslexic person experiences space, and the main conclusion K- 
reached is that dyslexic space, certainly in relation to the written word, is more of 
an impartial than personal space thus hindering the way in which the dyslexic 
relates to reading and writing. Although the dyslexic suffers ftom a type of dys- 
location m the form of a stuttering dynamic synchronicity, this is not entirely 
representative of a loss of meaning, but a peculiarly unsmooth relation to space- 
language-meaning which is enabled by a concurrent re-location. I will now turn to 
the theme of expression to gain a better understanding of how the notion of style 
is directly tied to language and the body. 
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Chapter Five 
The Incoherent Deformation of Language in Dyslexia 
If Merleau-Ponty's primary interest in Phenomenolqy of Perception can be 
located in the foundational activity of perception and the concurrent role of the 
body, during the period after bis opus magnum until his turn towards the overtly 
ontological themes broached in The Visible and the Invisible, the author became 
more interested with the theme of language. As I will try to show with this 
chapter, this growing interest in a phenomenology of language is in no way a 
specific break with his stance in the Phenomenology... for the grounding role of 
perception is still critical. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty's concern with language is quite 
evident as he devotes a whole chapter at the end of 'Part One' of the book to the 
descrlption of gesture, speech and expression - 'The Body as Expression, and 
Speecb' -a text that will be examined in detail during the first part of this chapter. 
However, what is apparent in his writing on language after 1949 is a specific 
calling into question of the genesis of meaning, a questioning which, although it is 
still founded on the intimate relationship of body-world perception, is thematised 
in the context of language. Reiterating a phrase previously used m my chapter on 
habit and the body, Merleau-Ponty states in a key essay 'On the Phenomenology 
of Language': "Organized signs have their immanent meaning, which does not 
anse from the 'I think' but from the 'I am able to"' 134 
"4Sm 'On the Phenomenology of Language' p. 88, in: Merleau- Ponty, M 1964(a). As is indicated 
in the text, this paper was originally presented in 1951 at the first Colloque international de 
ph6iome$nologie, Brussels. 
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Now it is this capacity to work within and create ftom organised signs and their 
immanent meanings that would seem to evade the dyslexic, perhaps not in totality. 
but in a persistent fashion that hinders fluent commUrUcation. The central problem 
for the dyslexic would seem to be that, more often than most, when encountering 
the written expression meanings are precisely not immanent. This may come as no 
surprise after the conclusions of the last chapter for, by following Merleau- 
Ponty's lead, I have shown that the dyslexic's (and non-dyslexic's) relation to the 
wntten word is inherently a spatial-situated relation which is characteristic of the 
world-body dynamic of perception. What is of specific importance for a 
phenomenological study of dyslexia is that the spafial-situatedness of reading and 
writing is a form of directedness which is necessarily intertwined with meaning. 
In that there is a loss of immanent meaning for dyslexics With language I came to 
the conclusion that this was manifest in the form of a peculiar dys-location; that 
is, a realisation that the dynamic synchronicity between world and body has 
become de-synchronised which is accompanied by a reciprocal attempt at re- 
location, Because this is a repetitive activity for the dyslexic, the phenomenon of 
dyslocation becomes incorporated into the pre-reflective body schema, it becomes 
habit - the style of dyslexia. Therefore, the status of the relafionship between 
organised signs and immanent meaning has become paramount for this thesis. 
Wbat is at stake in this chapter is the elucidation of not only how the dyslexic is 
'deficient' in possessing immanent meanings, but more importantly, how the 
dyslexic is able to express him/herself - the expressive style of dyslexia. What I 
iiiteiid to substantiate is that dyslexia should not be viewed simply as a 
susceptibility to a breakdown in perception, language and meaning, but such 
I; -) 
phenomena are intrinsical-ly tied to the dyslexic's style of expression - the waý, 
dyslexics fmd the world and word meaningful. 
Phenomenology and expression - speech and gesture 
"What we have said earlier about the 'representation of movement' must be 
repeated concerning the verbal Unage: I do not need to visualize external space 
and my own body in order to move one in the other. In the same way I do not 
need to visualize the word in order to know and pronounce it. It is enough that I 
posses its articulatory and acoustic style as one of the modulations, as one of the 
possible uses of my body ... the word 
has a certain location in my linguistic world, 
and is part of my equipment. " (Phenomenology... p. 180) 
In previous chapters I have tried to emphasise the philosophical importance of the 
self effacing stratum of the lived body - the body schema - understood as a pre- 
reflective level of the body that engenders our situatedness with a meaningfulness 
and style. What is of primary interest for this chapter is that the status and genesis 
of 'meaning' is exemplified in Merleau-Ponty's investigation of language 
(especially his writing between 1949-53), and such an investigation necessitates 
an engagement With the theme of presence, and moreover a re-engagement with 
the theme of depth. 
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In the context of spatiality, the dynarnic synchronicity that develops between the 
body schema and environment aflows the body to navigate its current terrain 
without having to bring abstract meanings such as lek up, nearer etc.. to 
reflective attention. Thus, in the course of action, spatial locations are pre- 
reflectively 'given' as a result of the body's previous directional experience and 
sedimentation of 'sens' (direction/meaning). In that there is a sedimentation of 
meanings, there is a certain hiddeness and depth to our spatial direction. 
Furthermore, this depth is also apparent in our perception of space, most notably 
in our experience of objects in our perceptual horizon being simultaneously 
present: "depth ... 
is the dimension in which things or elements envelop each 
other" (p. 264-5). If there is a tension or ambiguity here between the depth 
involved in the sedimentation of spatial directedness and the enveloping depth 
associated with our perception of space, it is precisely because depth is not simply 
a spatial notion but one which is underscored by temporality, an attribute which is 
constitutive of the tension that exists between the presence and absence of objects 
in our perceptual field. This should come as no surprise in tight of the previous 
chapter, for although temporality was not dealt with at any great length, it was 
established that the enveloping power of depth in perception allows for a co- 
existence of disparate elements -a coherency of meaning that is granted and 
subtended by a coherency of spatio-temporality: "As for the relationship of the 
perceived object to my perception, it does not unite them in space and outside 
time. they are contemporary" (p. 265). Now, in that language - both its spoken and 
written form - is a power of expressive meaning par excellence, in what way does 
language have a relationship with presence and meaning, and ftu-thennore, how 
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will an investigation of language disclose the underlying coherency of temporality 
and perception? 
"... the word, far firom being the mere sign of objects and meanings, inbabits 
things and is the vehicle of meanings. Thus speech, in the speaker, does not 
translate ready-made thought but accomplishes it. Afortiori must it be recognised 
that the listener receives thought from speech itself. " (p. 178) 
As indicated in the above quote, and in keeping with Merleau-Ponty's thesis that 
the 'mind' cannot be characterised as separate from the body, one of his central 
propositions concerning language is that 'thought' taken as mental representation 
does not exist prior to speech. Indeed, it is language that helps to establish 
thought. Although language and thought can be reflected upon as abstract 
concepts, it is Merleau-Ponty's view that to think of something, and thus to know 
something, is to be able to express it in words. Kwant offers a helpful empirical 
gmide concerning this thesis, observing that as long as our verbal or written 
expression remains vague our capacity to relate our thought to others - and 
sometimes to ourselves - also remains vague 
135 
. For example, 
it is often the case 
that our ideas concerning a certain topic may become far clearer and more 
effectual when such ideas are openly expressed, either verbally or as text. 
Although we have already encountered the phenomenon of the body being 
engaged with pre-reflective meaning in the context of spatial direction, it is 
13' Scc: Kwant, R. 1963, p. 5 1. Although Kwant makes a good pomt here, he does seem to suggest 
that a lack of abiliq, to express a subject matter is a direct reflection of a persons lack of 
understanding of this subject matter. Considenng the context of my project is developmental 
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perhaps less obvious just how meaning and expression are intimately tied 
together, especially when we are considering expression as the spoken or written 
word. Nevertheless, if one looks to other forms of expression such as painting or 
sculpture (which Merleau-Ponty does to a far greater extent in his later 
writings 136) or even to music (as Merleau-Ponty does quite often in his chapter on 
language in Phenomenology... ), the meaning of a painting or sequence of music 
cannot be separated from the mode of expression such as the aggregate of brush 
strokes or the use of harmony and counterpoint. This co-existence of meaning and 
expression holds for language just as it does for the painting or piece of dance and 
is perhaps the central point that Merleau-Ponty is making In the chapter 'The 
Body as Expression, and Speech'. If language is to be taken seriously as a topic 
for phenomenology to study, the inclination to separate expression firom meaning 
must be overcome in order to describe the 'existential meaning' (p. 182) beneath 
the conceptual meaning of words: 
"Thought is no 'internal' thing, and does not exist Mdependently of the world and 
of words ... The new sense-giving intention knows itself only by donning already 
available meanings, the outcome of previous acts of expression. The available 
meanings suddenly link up in accordance with an unknown law, and once and for 
all a fresh cultural entity has taken on an existence. Thought and expression, then, 
are simultaneously constituted, when our cultural store is put at the service of this 
tinknown law, as our body suddenly lends itself to some new gesture in the 
fonnation of habit. The spoken word is a genuine gesture, and it contains its 
language disordcrs. I am far from happy with this assertion in that dyslexics may have a very good 
understanding of a topic, and yet may have major difficulties expressmg their ideas in Nk-niting. 
1 36 See especially Indirect Language and the Vioces of Silence (Merleau-Ponty, M. 1974) and, Eye 
and Mind (Merleau- Ponty, M- 1964 (b)). 
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meaning in the same way as the gesture contains its. This is what makes 
commumcation possible" (p. 183) 
Although some of the above quote will need ffirther explanation during this 
section, one pomt that is initially quite clear is that there is no prior and interior 
world of meaning, in the form of ideas and thoughts, which in turn needs to find 
an external form in the guise of symbols or vocal sounds. Rather, as Merleau- 
Ponty puts it in his refutation of the approaches taken to language taken by 
intellectualism and empiricism: "the word has a meaning" (p. 177). 1 will come 
back to the important point Merleau-Ponty makes in the above quote that concems 
the interpretation of the spoken word as a 'genuine gesture'. For now, I want to 
give weight to the claim that meaning and expression are to be thought of as 
different sides of the same coin, for as indicated at the beginning of this section 
what is also at stake here is a certain temporality - an immanence of meaning in 
language: "Behaviour creates meanings which are transcendent in relation to the 
anatomical apparatus, and yet immanent to the behaviour as such" (p. 189). 
In ternis of presence, the abstract notions of meamng and expression are co- 
existent or co-present; there is no logical or temporal delay, a type of 'foHowing- 
on' of the expression from the meaning. This is not to say that this fonn of co- 
existent presence is a totalising form of presence, a direct window onto the 
objective truth of an expression and its necessary meaning, for the total meaning 
(if one can speak of such a thing) of a 'fact' or 'experience' can never be ftilly 
i-etidered. Rather, the co-existent presence of language is a part of a wider 'field of 
presence' which is not only a co-presence of particular meaning and expression, 
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but a presence which is enveloped by the sedimentation of previous linguistic 
expressions and which searches out ahead of itself in the anticipation of future 
expression. Furthermore, as we will see in the unfolding of this section, such a co- 
presence is also the presence of the other - the interlocutor of communication. In 
his essay 'On the Phenomenology of Language', Merleau-Ponty states: 
46 our present becomes the truth of D the other knowing events. It is like a 
wedge we drive into the present, a milestone bearing Witness that In this moment 
something has taken place which being was always waiting for or 'intending to 
say' [voulait dire] ... At this moment something has been 
founded in signification; 
an experience has been transformed into its meaning, has become truth. Truth is 
another name for sedimentation, which is itself the presence of all presents in our 
owli. , 
137 
This is the depth of language, an wnbiguity that we have already encountered in 
tenns of the lived body and the perception of space, and a depth that will 
underscore Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of language as a style rather than an 
objectively-based system of signs. Before moving onto Merleau-Ponty's notion of 
language as a style, and fin-thermore the way in which style is instituted M 
language, I first need to articulate the difference between what Merleau-Ponty 
calls the 'spoken word' and the 'speaking word', and secondly, to clarify what 
Merleau-Ponty means when he equates the activity of speech with the gesture. 
"' Mericau-Ponty, M. 1964 (a), p. 96. 
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Many commentators concentrate quite heavily on the difference and yet reciprocal 
dependence of the tenns 'spoken word' and 'speaking word' when introducing 
Merleau-Ponty's notion of language in Phenomenology-, however, although 
such terms prove useful in conceptualising the chapter on expression and speech, 
it is interesting that Merleau-Ponty himself only uses these terms in the last few 
pages of the chapter, almost as though he is wary of providing a simple definition 
of the complex and overlapping facets of language in the body of the chapter. 
Again we can look towards the theme of depth to illustrate the reason why 
Merleau-Ponty would want to draw a distinction between the everyday chatter of 
the spoken word, and the speaking word which is more representative of an 
original, silent and creative fonn of language. We have already seen in the 
previous chapter that the perception of an object in space is always enveloped by 
other ob ects in our visual field, whilst this particular visual field is itself j 
enveloped by the sedimentation of our previous experience and possible future 
experience. In this very same way, although there would seem to be a one to one 
reference between an expression (spoken or written) and the meaning it 
supposedly refers to, this common possession of meanings is nothing more than 
an acquired meaning which has been passed on over time across a certain cultural 
group. This is the status of the spoken word, and it is this phenomenon of 
language that gives rise to the misapprehension that expressions are merely a 
container for an interior and prior 'meaning'. As Merleau-Ponty puts itý the 
spoken word: "enjoys available significations as one might enjoy an acquired 
fortune. " (p. 197) As with the perceptual depth that envelops space, there is also a 
depth that envelops the spoken word, and it is the more original and creative 
159 
phenomenon of the speaking word that Merleau-Ponty is interested in retrieving. 
Talking specifically about the role of a speaking word, Merleau-Ponty states: 
" [the speaking word] is the one in which the significant intention is at the stage of 
coming into being. Here existence is polarized into a certain 'significance' [sens] 
which cannot be defined in terms of any natural object. It is somewhere at a point 
beyond being that it airns to catch up with itself again, and that is why it creates 
speech as an empirical support for its own not-being. Speech is the surplus of our 
existence over natural being. But the act of expression constitutes a hnguistic 
world and cultural world, and allows that to fall back into being which was 
striving to outstrip it. Hence the spoken word... " (p. 197) 
Because of the complicated subject matter Merleau-Ponty is ft*g to deal with 
(i. e. using language to express the different levels and effects of language) the 
above quote may seem a little ambiguous. Although he talks of speech (spoken 
word) being an 'empirical support' for the significance of existence (speaking 
word) one must not take this as a philosophy that falls back into the view that 
expression and meaning are separate entities. Rather one must treat the spoken 
word and speaking word as we did the reciprocal layers of the lived-body: as a 
complimentary system. Indeed, this parallel is an important one, for as Merleau- 
Ponty shows, it is language conceived as a 'genuine gesture' that mediates 
between the spoken and speakmg word. The spoken word is very much akin to the 
status of the body image, it is the visible aspect of our 'languagely being' that is 
displayed as a type of cultural commodity, whilst the speaking word is akin to the 
invisible, self-effacing role of the body schema, a more primordial level of speech 
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that is constitutive of the pre-reflective, existential meaning of language. Earlier in 
his chapter Merleau-Ponty argues that although words are often understood as 
arbitrary conventions, if one were to radically reflect on a logos of language that 
is characteristic of a more 'silent order': "It would then be found that the words, 
vowels and phonemes are so many ways of 'singing the world', and that their 
function is to represent diings not ... by reason of an objective resemblance, but 
because they extract and literaBy express, their emotional essence" (p. 187). 
Therefore, it is through the reciprocal relationship of the spoken word and the 
speaking word that we are able to grasp the observation Merleau-Ponty makes in a 
previously encountered quote, that: "available meanings suddenly link up in 
accordance with an unknown law, and once and for all a fresh cultural entity has 
taken on an existence" (see above quote, p. 183). But what then of this unknown 
law, what of language as gesture; in what way is Merleau-Ponty's early 
interrogation of language an investigation into style? 
In confirmation of, and expanding upon, Merleau-Ponty's revalonzation of the 
body, it is the pivotal role of the body that grounds Merleau-Ponty's early theory 
of language. The notion of "a gestural meaning, which is immanent in speech" 
(p. 179) acts as an intermediate in a number of ways, and in Merleau-Ponty's later 
138 language can be understood as playing a chiasmatic role in his phenomenology 
On a conventional linguistic level, the linguistic gesture is between the notion of a 
tiatural sign with a fixed meaning and a conventional sign with an acquired 
meaning, for although the gesture does have a real mean-mg, this meaning is quite 
138 See the final chapter and numerous working notes in The lisible and the Invisible on the topic 
of the chiasm and its mediating, reversible role, and Chapters Nine and Ten of Martin Dillon's 
comment, ary. (Dillon, M. 1988. ) 
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capable of change over fime and within specific cultural formations "9. On a more 
linguistic-existential level, it is between the silent order of language and the 
conceptual schema of objectified language, i. e. between the speaking word and 
spoken word. Thirdly, on a existential level, the gesture operates at the 
intersection of (put abstractly) the physiological and conceptual, i. e. the lived 
body. Indeed, the gesture is the signifying capacity and mark of the lived body. 
For this reason, and on a final communicative or intersubjective level, the gesture 
operates at the intersection between other bodies, it mediates our capacity for 
communication. Thus, the gesture is not only the mark of my lived body, but the 
mark of allerity: 
"The communication or comprehension of gestures comes about through the 
reciprocity of my mtentions and the gestures of others, of my gestures and 
intentions discernible in the conduct of other people. It is as if the other person's 
intention inhabited my body and mine his. The gesture which I Witness outlines an 
intentional object ... It is through my body that I understand other people, just as it 
is through my body that I perceive 'things'. The meaning of a gesture thus 
'understood' is not behind it; it is intermingled with the structure of the world 
outlined by the gesture, and which I take up on my own account. " (p. 185-6, my 
emphasis) 
As can be seen from the above quote, the linguistic gesture has a type of 
intentional status. Such a status is clearly one which is part of our operative 
intentionality, which I have termed dynamic synchronicity, and it operates at the 
"9 For a discussion of Merleau-Pontý`s position in relation to conventional and natural signs, seeý 
Dillon, M. 1988. Chapter Ten, especially p. 187-94. 
162 
pre-reflective level of our existence. The gesture is pre-theoretical as it merely 
outlines the intentional object which we come to have a greater or lesser grip over, 
that is, as an object of knowledge. In this way, the linguistic gesture is meaningful 
in that we are able to take up the immanent, bodily and emotional 'essence' of 
language in the act of expressive communication, and although such expression 
will always face the flattening power of cultural conceptualisation through its very 
reproduction, the linguistic gesture will still underpin the way in which language 
is used, i. e. the creative action involved in expressing ourselves time and again, 
whether through the sound of our vocal chords or the ink in our pen. Therefore the 
notion of the linguistic gesture lies at the centre of Merleau-Ponty's claim that 
expression is contemporaneous with meaning. 
The key term that I have emphasised above is that gestural meaning is 
'intenTningled' with the structure of the world. I think this is a key phrase from 
Merleau-Ponty's chapter on language in Phenomenoloýy--- and possibly his thesis 
in general, for it is a concrete example of the way in which there is neither 
meaning bestowed on the world nor meaning induced from our worldly 
experience, rather there is (quite literally) a reciprocal dialogue between the body 
and the world. We have already seen this dialogue in the way the body has a 
certain pre-reflective dialogue with the way it negotiates spatial direction, notions 
of distance, movement and the perception of space in general, whilst the 
acquisition of skills and the way a body sediments self-effacing habits is another 
example of Merleau-Ponty's interest in operative body-intentionality or 
4 praktognosia' (P. 140). However, although the linguistic gesture shares a similar 
status to other praktognostic phenomena, how does it reveal itself to us Ln 
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communication as specifically linguistic? Merleau-Ponty tells us that verbal 
gesticulation specifically aims at a relation to the other - its task, to communicate: 
"... here what nature does not provide, cultural background does, Available 
meanings, in other words former acts of expression, establish between speaking 
subjects a common world, to which words being actually uttered in their novelty 
refer as does the gesture [non linguistic] to the perceptible world. And the 
meaning of speech is nothing other than the way in which it handles this linguistic 
world or in which it plays modulations on the keyboard of acquired meanings. " 
186) 
The particular attribute that characterises the linguistic gesture is that it operates 
within a specific cultural background. Thus words that are spoken or printed are 
linguistic gestures that have settled into a cohesive pattern limited to a specific 
cultural group whether this be a specific language - Japanese - or a regional 
idiom widiin a certain language. In terms of the genesis of meaning, the 
interdependance and co-existence of an expression and meaning are far from 
arbitrary, for the link between them has occurred through former acts of 
expression within a certain cultural setting. Dillon is qwte clear on this point and 
asserts that: "The claim being made is clear, and is never retracted in Merleau- 
Ponty's later wnting: in order to be able to conceive of language as having an 
origin, we must conceive the sign as originally meaningfuL and as deriVMg that 
meaning fi-om its own physiognomy - and from its reference to the world. " 
140 
Dillon, M. 1988, p. 189. 
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What Merleau-Ponty locates in the linguistic gesture is a creative opening onto the 
world which has a genuine meaning, and yet is based upon previous experience of 
linguistic gestures, gestures which are grounded in the pre-reflective action of the 
body. Our capacity to use language, our means of communication, therefore holds 
an ambiguous (in the positive sense of the word) position between the 
sedimentation of previous uses of language which are shared between a specific 
community, and our perpetual openness to the world through the operative 
intentionality of the body. This is the basis for the reciprocal relationship between 
the spoken word and the speaking word. As I wifl show in the next section, this 
reciprocal relationship is in fact an a-symmetrical relationship which will be 
sustained through the process of sedimentation. However at this stage, Merleau- 
Ponty's early account of linguistic gesture in Phenomenology of Percephon 
should hopefully introduce the reader to the way expression carries with it a pre- 
conceptual, as he says, 'emotional essence' of existential meaning, a meaning 
which is dependent on the shared marks and sounds of communal expression 
(spoken word), but which is always infused with a silent, onginary plane of 
language which is grounded by the body and always opens onto the plenitude of 
the world. As one commentator puts it: "we are the material truth of language 
through our body, which is a natural language. It is through our body that we can 
speak of the world because the world in tum speaks to us through the body. " 141 
Althougb language appears to be impoverished through its conceptualisation at 
the level of the spoken word, such an attitude is to deny the real depth and 
creative power of language, for as we have already seen with the perception of 
space, language is a power of action and is therefore inherently ambiguous. I will 
O'Neill, J. 1970, p. 62. 
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deal with the role and structure of sedimentation explicitly in the next section with 
reference to the notion of 'institution', however, I want to finish this section with 
a brief comment on the proximity of this ambiguity in the genesis of meaning, and 
how Merleau-Ponty conceives of this as a certain style. 
In this first section to the chapter I hope to have established that language, or to 
put it more concretely expression, is inherently meaningful; 'the word has a 
meaning' we are told. Furthermore, language is grounded in the linguistic gesture, 
and thus through the perceptual openness of the body. These two points are to 
prove crucial in my criticisms of cognitive psychology's approach to dyslexia, for 
little attention is paid to the genesis and creativity of meaning in the form of a 
body world dialogue, indeed the body is not at issue at all, whilst expression is 
viewed in the inferior sense of phonemes acting as an empirical housing for pre- 
established meanings, i. e. expressions as mere representations. What is not 
accounted for is the mutability, CTeativity and ambiguity of language, that is 
language as a certain style of 'coherent deformation'. As Merleau-Ponty declares 
so eloquently In his essay 'On the Phenomenology of Language: 
"I say that I know an idea when the power to organize discourses which make 
coherent sense around it has been established in me; and this power itself does not 
depend upon my alleged possession and face-to-face contemplation of it, but upon 
my having acquired a certain style of thinking. I say that a signification is 
acquired and henceforth available when I have succeeded in making it dwell in a 
speecli apparatus it was not originallY destined for... I had to throw them off 
center and recenter them in order to make them signify what I intended. It is just 
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this 'coherent defonnation' (Malraux) of available significations, which arranges 
them mi a new sense and takes not only the hearers but the speaking subject as 
well through a decisive step. " 
142 
Although the above quote was published 6 years after Phenomenolýy... and the 
language is influenced more by Merleau-Ponty's reading of SaussUnan linguistics, 
the point he is making is representative, of the approach I have taken to language 
in this section. The notion of style has already been broached in the previous 
chapter: it refers to the bodily acquisition of habits that recede into the 
background of our experience, and through the process of sedimentation inform 
our perception of the world in the form of dynamic synchronicity. The way in 
which we conduct our pre-reflective dialogue with the world is a certam style of 
comporting ourselves - our being-m-the-world. When I see my friend approach 
from a far it is not concrete discrete features of his appearance that I perceive, but 
the style of his movement, the way he walks or waves outlined against my 
perceptual horizon. This also holds for language for "what I communicate with 
primarily is not 'representations' or thought, but a speaking subject with a certain 
style of being and with the 'world' at which he directs his aim. " (p. 182) This use 
of the term style will be critical in Merleau-Ponty's notion of 'institution', as it 
opens up his phenomenology of language to a wider, historical based interrogation 
of how the individual is able to become incorporated into the symbolic systems of 
cultural institutions. However, at this juncture I merely want to point out that in 
engaging and 'understanding' the expressions of the other, I am becoming 
142 Merleau-Ponty. M. 1964 (a), p. 9 1. 
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intenningled with their intentions - their style of being. To demonstarte this, let us 
take the example of familiarising oneself with the style of an author. 
in starting to understand the style of an author one does Indeed come to 
familiarise oneself with new meanings which come into existence for me througb 
the available words in a text, but such meanings are not derived from them as a 
conclusion is derived from its premises. Rather, I am opened up to an origmal 
sound which provokes a 'coherent deformation' of my previous exposure to 
available significations and which arranges them in a new sense - the authors 
style. The linguistic gesture contains an immanent meaning which goes out ahead 
of itself, is in excess of itseýf, and therefore opens onto the plane of 
intersubjectivity and alterity. As Kwant states: "It is like a wave whicb contracts 
and expands to throw itself forward beyond its own confines. " 143 It is the excess 
of the linguistic gesture that makes communication possible, the possibihty of 
both understanding the style of others and expressing myself through language. 
Furthermore, at this point we are once again brought back to the idea of co- 
presence and the theme of temporality, for once we start to acquire an authors 
style in a text or group of texts, our intentions start to interniingle with one 
another in a co-presence, what Merleau-Ponty will refer to as an intentional 
transgression 144 , which is structured by not only the 
future anticipation of the 
author's words, but a simultaneous recovery of these meanings which continue 
our understanding of such a style: 
KNN-ant, R. 1963, p. 57. 
W Mcdcau-Ponty has taken this term from Husserl, most obviously firom Chapter 5 of Cartesian 
Meditations (Husserl, E. 1977), and he uses it as a way of expressing the reversibility of language 
between the speaker and the other which is thernatised in terms of presence. He uses the phrase in 
die final sections of 'On the PhenomenoloU of Language' (Merleau-Ponty, M. 1964 (a)), and in 
PhcnomenoloU and the Sciences ofMan (Merleau-Ponty, M. 1974. ). 
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"The way will be open for the speaking subject (and for others) to go straight to 
the whole. He wil-I not need to reactivate the N,, -hole process; he wffl posses it 
emmently in its result. A personal and interpersonal tradition will have been 
founded. The Nachvoilzug, freed from the caufious gropings of the Volkiig, 
contracts the steps of the process into one slngle view... [the significative 
intention] becomes 'available' in turn because in retrospect it gives us the illusion 
that it was contained in the already available significations , whereas 
by a sort of 
ruse it espoused them only in order to infuse them with a new life" 145 
Merleau-Ponty's early gestural theory of language is not only founded upon his 
more fundamental theory of bodily perception, but also acts as a concrete example 
and confirmation of his phenomenological standpoint. If there is a finidamental 
thesis to be taken from Phenomenoloýý of Perception it is that through the 
intimate dialogue of the body and world, there is a primordial meaning that is 
given in our experience and throughout our existence. Such a meaning manifests 
itself in the synergic field of the senses, for instance our spatiality and sexuality, 
but perhaps the most concrete example of it is in our capacity to communicate - 
our use of the linguistic gesture. The body, our openness onto perception, is 
immersed m the depth of language - it lives in a world of speech sounds and 
markings. However, although we have seen m this section that the linguistic 
gesture is a type of 'natural meaning', such immanent meanings are always set 
against the backdrop of a certain cultural group and are capable of not only 
changing over fime, but certain expressions having quite different meanings in 
W Mcricau-Ponty. M. 1964 (a), p. 92. 
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alternative cultural formations. It is not simply the case that the linguistic gesture 
and our style of language is grounded in our open and ambiguous experience of 
the world, but expression in the form of the gesture is a concrete example of this 
very ambiguity, that is the human capacity: "to deviate from their pre-ordamed 
direction, througb a sort of leakage and through a genius for ambiguity which may 
serve to define man. " (p. 189). With this in mind, I will move onto Merleau- 
Ponty's WrIting after Phenomenoloýý... where, with the help of both Husserl and 
Saussure, he pays specific attention to the notions of sedimentation and 
institution. This will hopefully give a better insight into exactly how language, 
albeit ambiguous, has a relatively stable and coherent style, and along with his 
numerous investigations into aphasia, I hope to be able to describe how the 
dyslexic does have a coherent relationship With language, albeit in a peculiarly 
frustrating yet creative style. 
Foundation, mediation, sedimentation 
In the preceding section I have tried to introduce Merleau-Ponty's initial 
consideration of language as found within Phenomenologv... and have tried to 
stress the importance of understanding expression, a form of linguistic gesture, as 
the material necessity for significative meaning. Once this is established, one must 
treat the somewhat abstract notions of 'thought' and 'language' as interdependent 
atid co-originary. I have also tried to stress the importance of the linguistic 
expression being the mark of allerity - it is always an opening onto the mter- 
170 
subjective plane of communication, for although there is clearly an original and 
creative power of speech in the form of the speaking word, this is only possible 
against the background of already acquired public language, i. e. the spoken word. 
The way in which the speaking word and the spoken word combine is evident in a 
certain style. Just as somebody will have a certain style with respect to walking 
down the street or decorating a room which is in excess of objectificafion, so there 
is a certain style to the way in which an author writes, a close friend speaks to me, 
or even the grammatical style of another language. The reason why I have 
reiterated this, is because what is at stake for this section of the chapter is to try 
and articulate as clearly as possible the way in which a certain style develops. It is 
my aim in this Chapter to try and delimit the style of dyslexia, the way in which 
the dyslexic does have a typical sryle in relation to language, rather than a simply 
deficient style. In order to do this I want to look more closely at the 
complementary notions of sedimentation and institution m the development of a 
style, sedimentation being a theme that I have already high1ighted in previous 
chapters With reference to problems associated with dyslexia, and to begin this I 
will introduce what Martin Dillon has tenned the 'Fundierung Model of 
Language' 146 
To a certain extent the model that Dillon has derived from Merleau-Ponty, mostly 
from Phenomenoloýý... and middle period texts, is a more systematic treatment of 
the relationship between the speaking word and the spoken word, although the 
niodel underlies "not only Merleau-Ponty's treatment of language but his accounts 
of time. reason and fact reflection and the prereflective, thought and perception 
4' Soe: Dillon, M. 1988, p. 194-208. 
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etc. ., ý 
14' As such, the model opens onto some of the themes that Merleau-Ponty 
will pay greater attention to during his period Erom Phenomenology... up to the 
time of The Visible and the Invisible, the form of which take up a greater 
emphasis on inter-subjectivity and communication. The principle of the 
foundation model is the oscillation between the founding term and that which is 
founded, where: "Signification arouses speech as the world arouses my body- by a 
mute presence which awakens my intentions without deploying itself before 
thern. " 
148 
Maintaining the thesis of the primacy of perception, it is our openness to the mute 
meamngs of the world through perception that initiates the movement of the 
Fundierung model, and is conceived of as the founding term. This is the ground 
upon which expression, in the forin of the linguistic gesture, is able to give rise to 
a public 'instituted' language, and thus 'speech' (language/thought) is that which 
has beenfounded. This is only the first movement of thefundierung model, and is 
more akin the notion of the speaking word, in that it (partially) accounts for our 
creation and acquisition of language. As Merleau-Ponty himself puts it: "speech 
puts up a new sense, if it is authentic speech, just as gesture endows the object for 
the first time with human significance, if it is an initiating gesture. " (p. 194) The 
second movement in the model brings previous expeiience of instituted language 
into consideration, and is perhaps more pertinent to our investigation into how a 
specific style is able to develop, a development which is facilitated through the 
role of sedimentation. This second movement is the returning of instituted 
language to the world, as Dillon puts it: "to structure itý organize itý and enrich it 
147 Dillon, M. 1988, p. 194. 
'-a Merle au-Ponty, M. 1964 (a), p. 89. 
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with deposits of meaning and possibility. " 149 Thus, through the model we are 
made aware that although perception initiates the process and allows expression to 
articulate the mute logic we fmd m the world into coherent public meanings, this 
founding moment is reliant upon previous 'acts' of expression which have been 
retumed to the world - i. e. the perceptual world is always already orgamsed and 
saturated with pre-established meanings. 
Although the above model opens up a number of important philosophical 
problems concerning the interplay and phontisation. between an open and closed 
systenf of language (what Dillon terms 'extra-referentiality' and 'intra- 
referentiality', respectively), such problems are outside the scope of this thesis, 
and are dealt with in depth by Dillon 150 . However, one initial conclusion to be 
taken from the above which is pertinent to our investigation is that there is a 
certain reciprocity in the function of the body in this process, for not only is the 
body the medium in which expression finds its birthing in the lived arena of 
speech, but it is also the site in which language (and hence thought) are 
sedimented, and go on to feed back into the mute meanings of the perceptual 
world. Dillon is quick to highlight the asymmetry of this reciprocal model 
151 
, 
for 
although the founding term is to be located in the world, and the instituted sign is 
derived from this term, one is only aware of the significance and meaning of the 
perceptual event via our previous experience of public language. Two quotes from 
Merleau-Ponty help to clarify this asymmetrical reciprocity, the first from 
D lion, M. 1988, p. 194. 
Indeed the defence of Merleau-Ponty's primacy of perception in the light of what Diflon. terms 
'linguistic imminance and post-hameneutic skepticism' (i. e. no form of linguistic expression 
cx1sting prior to institutionalised language) is perhaps the main problematic which Dillon is 
working with in his book (Dillon, M. 1988). 
15' Dillon, M. 1988, p. 195. 
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PhenomenoloU... and the second from his revised essay included In Signs, 
'Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence': 
"Neither the word nor the meaning of the word is, in fact constituted by 
consciousness. Let us make this clear. The word is certainly never reducible to 
one of its embodiments ... The word has never been inspected, analysed, known 
and constituted, but caught and taken up by a power given to me along with the 
first experience I have of my body and its perceptual and practical fields ... Here 
we have a meeting of the human and the non-human and, as it were, a piece of the 
world's behaviour, a certain version of its style, and the generality of its meaning 
as well as that of the vocable is not the generality of the concept, but the world as 
typical. " (P. 402-3) 
"Before there can be such ready-made significations, language must first make 
significations exist as guideposts by establishing them at the intersection of 
linguistic gestures as that which, by common consent, the gestures reveal. Our 
analysis of thought gives us the impression that before it finds the words which 
express it, it is already a sort of ideal text that our sentences attempt to translate. 
But the author himself has no text to which he can compare his writing, and no 
language pnor to language. " 
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'52 Merleau-Ponty, M. 1964 (a), p. 42-3. This essay was publishod in 1960 as the first piece to 
appear in the collection Signs. It is a good indicator of Merleau-Ponty's detailed reflections on the 
diacnitical nature of a closed system of language as proposed by structuralist thinkers (particularly 
Saussurc), and concentrates on the parrallels betNveen the expressive character of language and 
especial 1ý- painting which are both grounded upon a primordial expression of the world. Although 
it rnaý, not bc entirely representative of Merleau-Ponty's considerations on language that appeared 
in Ae Osible and the Invisible. it is in fact a rc-NNTItIng of an essay entitled 'The Indirect 
Language' which Nvas probably written in early 1952, and eventualy appeared as part of The Prose 
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The above quotes highlight a number of key points. The first and most explicit 
argwnent being made, is that expressions and their meanings are not constituted, 
that is, they are not objects which are the result of a deliberate act of 
comciousness. This premise is critical for Merleau-Ponty m his attempt to move 
away from an intellectualist account of language towards an interpretation which 
privileges the lived or existential meaning of language, whilst such an argument 
also emphasises his intent to undercut a subject-object dichotomy. I will come 
back to this explicit theme below, for what Merleau-Ponty opposes to the notion 
of constitution is the wider, more sociafly and historicafly based theme of 
'institution'. As suggested in the quote, what is at stake here is the pre-conceptual 
grasping of a style of language which, as we have seen in the previous chapters 
consideration of space, is akin to the way in which the lived-body is open to the 
sense and direction of the world through its operative intentionality (dynamic 
synchronicity). Once again we see that in the 'meeting of the human and the non- 
human' what is at stake is presence, not only the co-presence of the body and 
world, but also the co-presence of others. 
The second quote also engages with the theme of presence by drawing attention to 
indirect character of language, that is, the manner in which meaning exists 'at the 
intersection of linguistic gestures'. Merleau-Ponty tells us that at this intersection 
I significations exist as guideposts' as there is 'no language before language'. This 
should not be understood as a regression on Merleau-Ponty's behalf which 
privileges meaning prior to and over expression, but rather an attempt to draw 
attention to the way m which meaning is produced indirectly by a space or 
of'rhe World. For an excellent discussion of the genesis of the essays that appear in this volume see O'Neill's introduction to The Prose of the World (Merleau-Ponty, M. 1974. ). 
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6 spread' which differentiates one word from another: "a detenninale gap to be 
fdled by words - the excess of what I intend to say over what is being said or has 
already been said" 153. What Merleau-Ponty has only gestured towards during his 
earlier investigation into language is the manner in which a type of operative 
intentionality is at work within language and commUMcation, something which he 
later comes to refer to as a 'significative intention'. 
Out of the silence that is our perceptual openness to the world comes a type of 
intentional rupture which aims to fill the gap that exists between words in an 
attempt to discover what one is trying to say. However, such an intention must be 
regarded as pre-conceptual and carries with it Merleau-Ponty's hallmark of 
ambiguity, as it: "exhausts itself to the extent that it is fulfilled. For its aim to be 
realised, it must not be completely realised, and for something to be said, it must 
not be said absolutely. " 154 The significative intention to occupy the differential 
spread between words is a complete refutation of a one to one correspondence 
between a sign and what it is signifijing, for to make significations exist 'speech' 
needs the interaction of signs, the meanings of which only come through their 
ever shiffing combinations and substitutions - the 'coherent deformation' of 
previously acquired language: 
"For speech takes ffight from where it rolls in the wave of speechless 
communication. It tears out or tears apart meanings in the undivided whole of the 
1" Mcrlcu-Ponty 1964, pý89. 
"'4Merleu-Ponty, M. 1974, p. 36- - 'Science and the Experience of Expression'. 
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nameable, as our gestures do in that of the perceptible. To make language a means 
or a code for thought is to break it. " 
155 
Even though we may be in a better position to understand the necessity of an 
intimate relafionship between the 'blind' significantive intenfion and already 
acquired words, it is still not entirely clear how speech is established and 
reconfigured at the differential spread between words - in what way is language 
broken and deformed? There are a number of texts in which, taking a lead firom 
Goldstein and the linguist von Humboldt, Merleau-Ponty offers a 
conceptualisation of the interface between a significative intention and 
56 
significafion in the form of an innere Sprachform (internal form) of language' . 
The issue at stake here is one of transcendence, the way in which speech is able to 
repeat already established meanings and yet at the same time create and yield 
more than has already been invested in it. Thus, In these texts, Merleau-Ponty is 
primarily reacting to the priority Saussure has given to our entrapment within 
linguistic immanence. Through the innere Sprachform, the words that are most 
suitable for fulfilling the significative intention offer themselves up as a type of 
4 recommendation', that is, a connotive, pre-conceptual approximation of words 
which are able to organise themselves without becoming acts of representation 157: 
Iss Mcricau-Ponty, M, 1964 (a), p. 17. Although during the late 1940's and early 50's Merleau- 
Pontý- is interested in the problems of intersubjectivity and language left by Husserl and those 
initiated bN, structuralist thinkers such as Saussure, Heidegger would also seem to have real impact 
on the relationship between silence and language, albeit mentioned in only the briefest of manners 
in 'On the Phenomenology of Language', p. 97. (See: Heidegger, M. 1962, '1ý 34, especially H. 161 - 2). 
For a discussion of the innere Sprachform (internal form) of language see: the r6sum6 of his 
lecture course, 'The Problem of Speech' (Merleau-Ponty, M. 1970. ); the section concerning 'The 
Pathology of Language' (p. 63-77) in lectures contained 'in Consciousness and the Acquisition of 
Language (Merleau-Ponty, M. 1973. ) This theme, is also gestured at in his essay 'Science and the 
E-%pcncnce of Expression' in The Prose of the World (Merleau-Pontv, M. 1974. ) 1s7 In an insightful paper by Paul Jacobson the author is keen to highilight the role played by the 
innercSprachjbrm in filling the 'connotive space' (differential spread) between words. See: 
Jacobson, P. 1979. 
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"The juncture of pure thought and of language occurs, then, in the innere 
Sprachfonn, which is differentiated according to the manner In which we speak or 
write, according to the manner in which we address ourselves to others. A layer of 
sigrufications interposes itself between language (the totality of words) and 
thought. These significations presuppose a certain relationship with the language. 
It is this kind of non-explicit thought in language that constitutes style. "158 
We have already come across Merleau-Ponty's initial consideration of this 
phenomenon through his notion of an existential meaning or emotional essence of 
language. In these later texts, the idea of a meditating innere Sprachform draws 
the readers attention away from the representative power of language towards an 
understanding of language as a communicative activity which exists for both the 
speaker and listener as a certain style or typicality. Again we see the underlying 
theme of co-presence, for although expression is in part a self-improvisation, it is 
simultaneously an improvisation which borrows from our past experience of 
language, from others and from the world: "The innere Sprachform is a mental 
landscape common to all the members of a linguistic community. It is that which 
makes it possible for some people to coexist with others through a cultural 
milieu" 1 59 Followig Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of certain pathologies of 
language, I will return to the notion of an innere Sprachform of language m the 
next section as it provides an effective framework in which to arficulate not only 
the dislocations of language experienced by dyslexics, but moreover, the way in 
Mcricau- Ponty, M. 1973, p. 76. 
Mericau-Ponty. M. 1973, p. 77. 
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which dyslexic subjects have a specific style of meaningful improVisafion and 
creafivity. 
In the final part of this section I want to provide an in-depth discussion of what 
has thus far been missmg from the above account namely, the sedimented aspect 
of language. As I hope to show, the way in which Merleau-Ponty conceives of 
sedimentation is more than a simple store of public language, but an active 
honzon of possible significations. Furthermore, the notion of an active horizon of 
sedimented meanings opens onto wider forms of social institutions (Stiftungen) 
which are grounded in the process of history. We have already come across the 
notion of sedimentation in Chapter's Three and Four, and I have demonstrated 
how sedimentation plays a crucial role in the synthesis of the lived body and thus 
operative intentionality, the perception of space, and, as gestured above, our 
capacity to acquire language and create new formulations of language. I have also 
inade the point that Merleau-Ponty rarely addresses this phenomenon explicitly, 
especially in Phenomenology... However, there are two texts in which Merleau- 
Ponty is quite specific about sedimentation: 'On the Phenomenology of 
Language' and the resum6 of his lecture course 'Institution m Personal and Public 
History'. 160 
"0 See: Mericau-Ponty, M. 1964 (a). p. 84-97; and, Merleau-Ponty, M. 1970. p. 107-113. Some 
reference is made to sedimentation m the essays contained in 7he Prose of the World, especially 
'Science and the Expenence of Expression' (Merleau-Ponty, M. 1974, especially, p. 384 3). It is 
puzzling that although key movements in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy from Phenomenology... up 
to The Visible and the Invisible are influenced by the reciprocal notions of sedimentation and 
institution Merleau-Ponty, and indeed some commentators, are relatively untroubled over the exact 
status and mode of operation of these notions. It is not as though this theme loses or gams any 
pnority in the later texts, for in one of his final %vorking notes from The Visible and the Invisible 
entitled 'History, Transcendental geology, Histoncal time, historical space - Philosophy' (June 1, 
1960) he states the problem of finding: "the simultaneous Urstiftung of time and space which 
makes there be a historical landscape and a quasi-geographical mscription iii history. Fundamental 
problem: the sedimentation and the reactivation" (p. 259) Indeed, the problem of sedimentation and 
reactivafion in relation to tcniporality will be central to my firial chapter (Merleau-Ponty, M. 
1968). 
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In my study of habits and skill acquisition in Chapter Three we have already 
found a precursor to the background of already acquired public language which is 
'broken' into new fonnulations of linguistic expression. Merleau-Ponty states: "I 
perceive with my body or my senses, since my body and my senses are precisely 
that familiarity With the world born of habit, that implicit or sedimentary body of 
knowledge. " (p. 238) Tlus, m one of Merleau-Ponty's more specific references to 
sedimentation in Phenomenology-, we see that, like the self-effacing nature of 
skills, the body's sedimentation of habits into a type of imphcit knowledge is 
something that thwarts a determinate conceptualisation. and can only be grasped in 
its generality or style, a phenomenon which is mirrored by the expression of 
meanings against the background of instituted/sedimented language. Because of 
this self-effacing character of expression, any serious interrogation of language 
necessitates a loosening of our pre-reflective intentional web in order to unearth 
sedimented structures of meaning. The sedimentafion of previous expressions 
remains covered over to consciousness, not only because they become part of our 
own background of institutionalised language, but moreover, because expressions 
are the acquisition of a cultural tradition and are therefore the sedimentation of all 
presents in our own. Furthermore, the fact that sedimented language does not 
coincide with itself is not only down to sedimented language being the horizon of 
all previous presents, but also because the transcendent meanings of sedimented 
language go out ahead of themselves, as one commentator puts it, they have a 
"factor of beyon&ess". 
161 
161 See Mallin, S. 1979, p. 184. 
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Cultural constructions differ from natural objects in that they carry a depth With 
them in the fonn of a cultural background and history: "They are never there in 
the same way. Each morning, after night has intervened, we must make contact 
with them again. They remain impalpable.. 55162 This theme is taken up in earnest 
by Merleau-Ponty in the r6sum6 to his 1955 lecture course 'Institution m Personal 
and Public History' where he advocates the notion of institution over constitution 
in our understanding of consciousness: 
"Thus what we understand by the concept of institution are those events in 
experience which endow it with durable dimensions, in relation to which a whole 
series of other experiences will acquire meaning, will form an intelligible series or 
a history - or again those events which sediment in me a meaning, not just as 
surVivals or residues, but as the invitation to a sequel, the necessity of afuture" 163 
(my emphasis) 
As we have already seen in the wide ranging scope of the Fundiering model, 
sedimentation is a type of general power which is not only at work in the body's 
development of meaningful structures in the world, but in the development of 
language, of history, and ultimately of a form of transcendence which Merleau- 
Ponty refers to as 'truth'. "Truth is another name for sedimentation, which is itself 
the presence of all presents in our own. "164 Although Merleau-Ponty's 
(re)lnterpretation of 'situated truth' is outside the specific interests of this Chapter, 
the idea of sedimentation being akin to, or productive of, truth is of mterest to this 
specific enquiry as it opens up the more locallsed notion of sedimented 
Mer Icau- Ponty, M. 1974, p. 124 
Mcrleau-Pont'y, M. 1970, p. 108-9. 
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expressions onto an historical and thus temporal plane. By doing so, Merleau- 
Ponty emphasises truth as the recognition of approp? Iate expressions which 
subsist within a field of becoming 165 , as opposed to a static, timeless conception of 
objective truth such as the algorithm: "Our present expressive operations, instead 
of driving the preceding ones away - simply succeeding and annulling them- 
salvage, preserve, and (insofar as they contain some truth) take them up again" 166 
This is the reason why I have emphasised the end of the above quote, for it is this 
power of sedimentation, the power to instigate a sequel and future to my 
experience, which seems to be most affected in the dyslexic's style of expression. 
Althougb I will deal with this assertion in the final section of this ChapteT, it is 
worth noting here that as my phenomenological descriptions of dyslexia are 
developed, the emphasis on presence understood as a past and futural co-existence 
seems to be growing with each theme I consider. 
In my interpretation of the Fundiening model above, it may be remembered that 
the model is marked by a certain asymmetry. With the above study of 
sedimentation we may be in a better position to understand why such a paradox 
exists. In the creation of new expressions the significative intention is actualised 
against a backdrop of sedimented meanings which in turn transcends this 
particular gestalt of sedimented meaning. Now although on one level there is a 
transcendence, on a concurrent level this new meaning is itself solidified and thus 
becomes part of a re-styled gestalt of sedimented meaning, i. e. a movement of 
transcendence and a recuperation. As Dillon puts it: "It is the sedimented 
language of acquired usage that ... creates the 
illusion of a transparent 
'64Merlc. au- Ponty, M. 1964(a). p. 96. 
"" Merleau-Ponty, M. 1970, p. 108. 
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signification: in shorý sedimentation allows a transcendence of the signifier 
toward the signified. "'6' Thus sedimented language, and indeed the wider idea of 
cultural Mstitution (Stiftungen), is not only the ground of our acquired 'style' of 
language, but bestows us with the possibility of creating new expressions. As one 
commentator notes, sedimented meanings contained within either language or 
cultural institutions, "act as a pivot to organize other ideas or experiences" 
168 
, and 
thus sedimented language is very much an open structure which, in its self- 
effacement, invites further search and interrogafion or as Merleau-Ponty puts ltý 
4can indefinite elaboration"'69. it is in this way that although "Truth is another 
name for sedimentation",, the truth Merleau-Ponty is describing is one which is 
grounded in history and temporality, and rather than being a logical or 
determinate truth, it is in fact closer to a certain style which is shared amongst a 
community. The working of the past against the present conceived of as 
sedimentation: 
"produces a table of diverse, complex probabilities, always bound to local 
circumstances, weighted with a coefficient of facticity, and such that we can never 
say of one that it is more true than another, although we can say that one is more 
false, more artificial, and less open to a future in turn less rich. " 170 
Wbat we can take from this study of sedimentation and the wider notion of 
institution is that as we have already seen in the case of spatiality, our ability to 
tise already acquired language and create new formulations of language depends 
'66 Mcrlcau-Ponty, M. 1964 (a), p. 95. 
167 Dillon, M. 1988, p. 204. 
,n Jacobson, P. 1979, p. 165. 
"0 Merleau-Ponty, M. 1970, p. 109. 
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upon a certain co-existence of the past in the present which also is an invitation to 
future interrogation. In this way, the power of sedimentation underscores a 
historical underpinning to our acquisition of language, whilst this co-presence of 
all previous presents is also grounded in our ability to communicate with the 
other. Rather than a mere container of previously acquired language, the gestalt of 
sedimented language is very much an active structure around which a certain style 
of language and its accompanying 'truths' are organised. Because Merleau-Ponty 
conceives of language as an ambiguous style which resists determinate 
conceptualisation, he has given back to language a certain depth, a characteristic 
which not only highlights the becommg of language, but the inevitability of 
meanings escaping our complete grasp. It is through this very characteristic of 
language, an invisibility within its visible style, that we come to say more than we 
intend in conversation or m self-dialogue, and fim-thermore, how communication 
and the acquisition of language is possible. In the final section of this Chapter I 
will describe how Merleau-Ponty, in both his early and middle period work, 
proVides a good springboard with which to mterpret the style of dyslexia through 
his discussion of aphasia and related language problems. What I intend to show is 
that by applying some of my previous phenomenological descriptions of dyslexia 
to the context of expression, specifically the notions of style, significative 
intention and sedimentation, not only will I be able to provide a richer 
interpretation the dyslexic's style in relation to language, but this style wiH be 
conceived of as a meaningful style which focuses on just how people with 
developmental dyslexia go about maintaimng such a meaningful relationship With 
language. 
' 70 Mcdcau-Ponty, M. 1970, p. 112. 
184 
The Style of Dyslexic Expression 
Merleau-Ponty on language Disorders 
Although Merleau-Ponty's focus on language disorders is primarily utilised as a 
means of giving an empirical support to his own philosophy of language, he does 
nevertheless offer a phenomenological interpretation of a variety of disorders, and 
it is his application of certain phenomenological themes I have detailed above, 
especiafly that of sedimentation, that I am now interested in. There are three main 
texts in which, building upon previous clinical work, Merleau-Ponty gives his 
interpretation of a number of language disorders: 'The 'Central Sector' of 
Behaviour and the Problem of Localizations' from Part 11 of The Structure of 
Behaviour; 'The Body as Expression, and Speech' in Phenomenology... ; and, 
perhaps more importantly for this Chapter, the first two chapters from 
Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language, specifically the chapter entitled: 
'The Pathology of Language'. 17 1 The main form of language disorder studied by 
Merleau-Ponty in the above texts is the general condition of 'aphasia' and its 
subsequent sub-disorders (motor aphasia, alexia, paraphasia), the definition of 
which he opposes to the disability of 'anarthria', the loss of power to articulate 
speech, interpreting 'true aphasia' as: 
"' See (respectively): Merleau-Ponty, M. 1963; Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962; and, Merleau-Ponty, M. 
1973, The reader is also advised to look closely at both the 'Forward' by Edie, J and the 
'Translators Preface' by Silverman, H for background information concerning the lectures 
contained in Consciousness and the Acquisition ofLanguage. It should be noted that, as with 
Xlericau-Ponty's uses of abnormal psychology presented in earlier chapters, his phenomenological 
interpretation of language disorders is built upon clinical work already conducted by 
psychologists, physiologists and those working Within the field of linguistics, in particularly 
Goldstein (and Gelb), Griinbaum, and in Consciousness and the Acquisition ofLanguage, von 
Humboldt. 
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"inseparable from disturbances affecting intelligence - and over and above 
automatic language, which is in effect a third person motor phenomenon, an 
intentional language which is alone involved in the majority of cases of aphasia. 
The individuality of the 'verbal image' was, indeed, dissociated: what the patient 
has lost, and what the normal person possesses, is not a certain stock of words, but 
a certain way of using them. The saine word which remams at the disposal of the 
patient in the context of automatic languages escapes him in that of language 
unrelated to a purpose. --" (p. 175) 
This quote needs to be taken as something of a preliminary definition of aphasia, 
although the arguments he makes here are quite clear: aphasia is something 
different from disorders affecting the motor capability of speaking, and should be 
considered as a difference in the intentionality of expression. Moreover, aphasia 
should not be understood as a specific deficit, but as a difference involved with 
the praxis of language, its attitude and style. The reason why I suggest that the 
above quote is only a provisional definition is that, in taking his usual middle 
course between empiricism and intellectualism, Merleau-Ponty is keen to stress 
that theories of language acquisition and interpretafions of language disorders 
cannot be understood simply as an 'operation of intelligence' or 'motor 
phenomenon', rather: "it is wholly motility and wholly intelligence. What 
establishes its inherence in the body is the fact that linguistic deficiencies cannot 
be reduced to a unity... " (p. 194). The general claim being made here is that 
although the specific features of what is affected in language disorders may differ 
- i. e. that which is affected may be the body of the word, the material instrument 
of material expression, the structure of the whole experience, or (perhaps closest 
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to dyslexia) the immediate meaning of the word -the verbal concept (p. 194-5) - 
these differences in linguistic experience cannot be reducible to motility or 
intelligence alone. In both my account of Merleau-Ponty's early theory of 
expression via the linguistic gesture, and his later fonnulation of the Fundierung 
model, what is at stake is an interpretation of lingwstic meaning which is akin to a 
typicality or style, a meaning which is given in the transcendence of 
communication. Thus, in the various cases of language disorders noted by 
Merleau-Ponty, what is different (I would hesitate to say lost) is the relationship 
between the person m question and the existential meaning of language which is 
shared amongst a community: 
"But the patient does not make the same use as the normal subject of these 
[linguistic] materials ... It cannot be held that language in his case has become 
automatic; there is no sign of a decline of general intelligence, and it is still the 
case that words are organized through their meaning. But the meaning is, as it 
were, ossified ... We can perceive, in contrast with this, the essence of normal 
language: the intention to speak can reside only in an open existence. " (p. 196) 
Interpretations intent on reducing language disorders to motor or intellectual 
deficits fail to account for the lived experience of language, the existential or 
emotional essence that is indicative of our experience of communication, and 
therefore they miss the more fundamental grounding of language in the body's co- 
existence with the sedimented meanings that are derived from the world and 
others. As with the previous examples Merleau-Ponty has taken from abnormal 
psychology, the interpretation of language disorders also highlights a disruption of 
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operative intentionality. Here the dynamic synchronicity between body and world 
which usually engenders our experience with a certain style of meaning is 
disrupted, and although that which is ultimately disrupted is the general (perhaps 
fundainental) power of transcendence, such a disruption is manifest in being 
unable to apprehend and/or communicate the existential meaning of language. 
Hence, in cases of linguistic disorders, there is a continuation of what we have 
already seen in motor and perceptual difficulties encountered in previous chapters 
through a loosening of the body's pre-reflective openness to world, i. e. the 
intentional arc which usually remains in contact with the primordial world of 
practical, linguistic, ethical, political and aesthetic meaning. Hence, it is the 
disruption of the body's meaningful spontaneity (the 'I can'), already understood 
in Chapter Four as the directional/meaningful term sens, which is also affected for 
aphasics in the form of the spontaneous capacity of the body to wrestle new 
meanings from already acquired language. 
Merleau-Ponty is at pains to show that such a problem cannot be understood as 
simply resulting from a deficiency in the 'categorial act', as such an act: "builds 
itself up Within a certain 'attitude' (Einstellung). It is on this attitude, moreover, 
that speech is based, so there can be no question of making language rest upon 
pure thought" (p. 192). This point is highly important for my arguments 
concerning the meaningful relationship dyslexics have with language as it calls 
into question some of the approaches adopted by experimental psychology which 
place priority on a purely categorial. disturbance, for example a phonolgical delay 
or deficit 172 , and points towards a more originary ground of linguistic mearung 
172 See Chapter One of this thesis. 
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and communication which allows for a more positive definition of certain 
disorders'. Through Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological interpretation we 
understand that what is impaired for those suffering from aphasia (and as I wiH 
argue, those suffering from dyslexia) is the stability of a body-world dialogue in a 
linguistic situation, whilst the concrete symptoms of such an impairment (e. g. the 
difficulty of using words in an abstract context) should be regarded as differences 
in the attitude and style which has built up concuffently with language usage. 
What the reader can infer from Merleau-Ponty is that in cases of developmental 
disorders (with which I would include the aphasias looked at by Merleau-Ponty 
and my own topic of dyslexia) the difference between the normal and the 
abnormal is one of a difference in style and not a deficit or lack of intelligence. To 
back up this claim, and to introduce the notion of a positive approach to dyslexia 
by way of 'compensatory strategies', I quote what I regard as a key piece of text 
from 'The Pathology of Language' in Consciousness and the Acquisition of 
Language: 
"What is of interest In Goldstein's research is that it reveals the role of a 
replacement function which, for the outside observer, masks the problem... There 
are sub . ects who no longer posses the notion of number and who, nevertheless, by 9 
a function of replacement, can give the appearance of counting ... This discovery 
invites the psychiatnst to a much deeper examination, while before it was, above 
all, a question of detennining the fimction that the patient was capable of 
performing and those that he could no longer perform. Now, it is a question of 
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investigating, even in cases where the patient succeeds, by what palk or in what 
senve, he succeeds. " 
173 
This approach adopted from Goldstein is one of the most explicit references made 
by Merleau-Ponty to an interpretation of abnormalities (lingwstic or not) which 
accounts for the manner in which the subject in question does have a relationship 
with the world and its mute meanings, albeit it a different style or different 'path' 
taken to such a 'success'. This last point is critical for my interpretation of 
dyslexia, for irrespective of what may be the underlying cause of dyslexia, the 
underlying experience of dyslexia is one which is meaning(ul, that is, whether the 
dyslexic's current task is successful or not, in either of these cases such an 
expenence will be meaningful for them. This is a point which Merleau-Ponty is 
only too aware of, and in argumg against pathological behaviour being understood 
as 'absolute othemess' he states: "Pathological behaviour also has a meanmg. 
Sickness is self-regulating. There is an establishment of an eqwlibnum which is 
other than the normal level, but here a totally incomprehensible phenomenon is 
not in question" 
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In order to make my basic argwnent conceming dyslexic meaning a little more 
explicit I think that some conceptual clarification is needed. Although I have 
made a similar point in previous Chapters (Chapter Two especially), it is 
important to grasp that when I refer to dyslexic experience as meaningful I am 
111akang a distinction between meaningful understood as: 1) a 'third person' 
conception of meanmgful which indicates whether a situation (e. g. the correct 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1973, p. 7 1. 
Mcricau-Pontly, M. 19731, p. 64. 
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spelling of a word) can be deemed meaningful by others, i. e. a conception of 
meaningful which thus depends on its accuracy in relation to inter-subjective 
4 rules' of behaviour; and, 2) a first person, phenomenological concepfion of 
meaningfW which interprets A experience, reflexive and pre-reflective, as 
meaningful ("Because we are in the world, we are condemned to meaning", 
p. xix), even when an experience may contradict the previously mentioned inter- 
subjective rules of behaviour, e. g. the way in which a dyslexic believes a word 
should be spelled and finds such a speffing meaningful, albeit 'inaccurate' to 
others. 
The distinction I am tying to draw out here is that between a reflexive notion of 
meaningftd which adheres to a standard of accuracy, and a pre-reflective notion of 
meaningfW which adheres to a certain style or attitude. Although these two 
interpretations of meaningful cannot be taken in complete isolation as they have 
something of a reciprocal relationship (accuracy and attitude, as with reflexive 
and pre-reflective are inter-dependant), there is nevertheless a distinction to be 
made, a distinction which is illustrated well by pathological behaviour such as that 
exhibited in dyslexia. If one applies an interpretation of 'meaningful' to dyslexia 
that is synonymous with 'accuracy, although the dyslexic may have some success 
in reading and writing activities, much of their linguistic behaviour wiH be 
construed as meanmgless, i. e. incomprehensible. However, if we are to take a 
phenonienological attitude towards dyslexic behaviour, although the dyslexic may 
indeed have great trouble com rehending words and sentences in a text to the p 
extent where a text presents itself as incomprehensible, the text is in no way 
meanuigless for the dyslexic by virtue of the text presenting itself in a certain style 
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- incomprehensibility, disorientation and frustration Irk a linguistic situation are all 
meamngful attitudes and styles of the dyslexic's being-in-the-world. Thus a 
further conceptual distinction can be made: in adopting the phenomenological 
attitude, we see that there is a profound difference between a situation being 
interpreted as incomprehensible and being interpreted as meaningless. This point 
is absolutely critical for a positive phenomenology of dyslexia, for even though 
written language may be experienced as profoundly fi-ustrating and unpredictable 
for the dyslexic, such frustration and awareness of unpredictability is itself 
constitutive of a meaningful relationship between the dyslexic and written 
language. Moreover, once we have established that the dyslexic's relationship 
with a text is meaningful, certainly on an experiential level, this provides a ground 
for investigating the way in which the dyslexic is able to find success in tasks 
which involve written language, that is, the capability of transcending a situation 
which is initially experienced as incomprehensible (albeit meaningful) towards an 
expenence of comprehensibility; i. e. an investigation concerned with: "by what 
path, or in what sense, he succeeds". Before I move onto a more positive 
phenomenological Interpretation of the dyslexic's style of expression, I now want 
to try and use Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of language to describe the 
manner in which the dyslexic does have a problematic relationship with the 
written word. 
The dyslexic's relationship with meaning 
Let me first recap what we have learned in previous Chapters concermng the 
breakdown of reading and wnting tasks for dyslexics. In Chapter Three's study of 
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dyslexia and the lived-body I made my basic claim that will run throughout this 
thesis, that is: dyslexia can be interpreted as impaired ability for dyslexics to 
sediment or habituate a type of body schema that is suitable for reading and 
writing skills. This assertion opened up two main interpretations. The first is that 
certain attributes of our body schema, that is our pre-reflective horizon of bodily 
habits and postures, are simply not suitable for the acquisition of skills suited to 
the utilisation of the written word, an assertion which could be explained in 
physiological terms (a deficit in motor skills, or low-level performance of the 
sensory system, especially eye movement and aural ability), in cognitive terms (a 
deficit in phonological ability) or in neurological terms (for example, Stein's 
hypothesis of an impairment in the magnocellular pathway). A second and more 
phenomenological interpretation of problernatic sedimentation can be given in the 
study of skill acquisition, i. e. there is a problematic interplay between the body 
schema and the body image required for the acquisition and refinement of habits 
that are suitable for reading and writing. The problem faced by the dyslexic is that 
the interplay between reflection (the body image) and concrete actiVity (the pre- 
reflective body schema) is fragmented, and hence only an unsteady or superficial 
body schema will develop. Whereas for a non-dyslexic the lived-body's capacity 
to sediment the existential meaning of words will become second nature, the 
temble problem faced by a dyslexic person is a continual faltering of existential 
meaning, and a concurrent lack of conviction when a mean-ing has been decided 
upon. 
When the above conclusions are applied to the experience of spatial perception, 
the type of dys-location experienced by the dyslexic is indicative of a faltering or 
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stuttering of dynamic synchronicity; that is, the body-world dyad cannot establish 
a smooth and pragmatic dialogue. This faltering arises because dyslexic space is 
more normative/impartial than pathological/personal, and thus such a space 
hesitates in offering itself up for further (and thus futurao interrogation. It is not 
simply isolated words themselves that fail to offer themselves freely, but their 
position, the context of words, their spelling and grammar, and the background of 
the page. The dyslexic's expefience of space is meaningfid, but inasmuch as its 
style (its 'mode of passing') is far from smooth, this singles out the dyslexic from 
the rest of his/her linguistic community. The question now is how such a 
difference in style presents itself in the acquisition and use of language? 
The theme of sedimentation once again seems to hold the key to the above 
question, and will deepen the above descriptions of dyslexic experience. In the 
previous section, and in Merleau-Ponty's study of language disorders, we found 
that language is experienced as an attitude and style rather than a deterniinate 
system of equivalencies between the word and its meaning - language is indirect. 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of language contains a number of key claims 
that are relevant to my discussion of dyslexia. Firstly, language is grounded upon 
the body's openness to the world, i. e. perception, and thus explanations which 
understand dyslexia as prunarily a cognitive-language disorder, in particularly the 
phonological hypothesis, seem to neglect the manner in which phonemes and 
words are acquired. My point here is that, against cognitive theories and 
philosophical theones of linguistic amanence, the operative intentionality of our 
body is paramount in wrestling mute meanings from the world, whilst the body 
also plays a reciprocal role in returning these 'embodied' meanings to the world m 
194 
the form of instituted language. Thus, in cases such as dyslexia where there is a 
pathological disruption of language, language cannot be treated as a closed system 
of learned representations acquired by intellectual activity, as this neglects the 
role of the body (and thus perception) In the acquisition and practical use of 
language, i. e. communication. Furthermore, as I shall argue in Chapter Six, an 
interpretation of language as the storage of lingwstic representations also 
presupposes a highly rigid (non ek-static) notion of memory. Merleau-Ponty's 
notion of a linguistic gesture puts a quite different emphasis on the way in which 
we understand a disrupfion of language, for just as thought cannot be divorced 
fi7om the body, so language cannot be divorced from perception, and therefore the 
dyslexic's disruption of language must be interpreted as a wider more general 
phenomenon. What this phenomenological approach points towards is a different 
conception of language which is understood as a style rather than a representation, 
and moreover, an understanding of dyslexia as a general problem of operative 
intentionality which affects the way in which dyslexics grasp the style of others 
and create their own peculiar style. 
A second main point to come from the preceding sections is that our experience of 
language is one in which meaning is always open to further elaboration, and is 
therefore cliaracterised by an ambiguity and typicality rather than exactness: "The 
word has never been inspected, analysed, known and constituted, but caught and 
taken up by a power given to me along with the first experience I have of my 
body and its perceptual and practical fields... " (p. 402-3). Merleau-Ponty explains 
our experience of language as a style in terms of the interaction and substitution of 
s'L,,, ns, thereby emphasising the differential spread between words and phonemes 
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constitutive of meaning, rather than a representative role of a signifier which is the 
necessary counterpart of a specific meaning. In experiential terms, what takes 
place when one acquires a new meaning is not the apprehension and storage of a 
representative image, as much of the cognitive literature would have it (whether 
this be oral or visual), but an acquisition of meaning which sees the fulfilment 
(and hence exhaustion) of a significative intention in the fonn of a style, an 
existential meaning which resides between words and phonemes. What this 
account of 'style' offers to an experiential-based investigation of dyslexia, and 
which traditional approaches fail to take into account, is not only a different 
manner of understanding the acquisifion and use of language, but the pre- 
reflective role played by the body in the fonn of a significative intention and 
sedimented meaning. Thus, the pending question is: in what manner is the general 
power of operative intentionality (which includes the notions of a significative 
intention and sedimentation) modified for dyslexics? 
I start with a general claim taken from Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of aphasia; 
that the dyslexic's experience of language is one which has a tendency towards 
meaning becoming congealed, that is, the existential meaning of I"TItten language 
is often dimmed or lacking. Now as I have argued elsewhere 175 , in drawing a 
concepmal parallel between Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of disorders such as 
aphasia and my own phenomenological interpretation of dyslexia, I am not simply 
reducing dyslexia to the type of disturbances outlined by Merleau-Ponty, but 
nierely using Merleau-Ponty's observations as an exemplar with which to make a 
general claim about the congealment of existential mean-ing. Indeed, even in the 
M Sce: Philpott. M. 1998. 'Response to Commentators'. 
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physiological and psychological literature on dyslexia there are studies suggesting 
a similarity in symptoms between dyslexia and other acquired and developmental 
disorders. 176 Running in tandem with the above claim is the assertion, already 
specified above in relation to the conclusions of Chapter Three, that through a 
phenomenological investigation we find that dyslexia is marked by a loosening of 
the intentional arc in the context of a lingwistic situation, i. e. a de-synchronising of 
the dynamic synchronicity between world/word and body. 
In light of the first two sections of this chapter, the way I interpret these general 
claims centres around a disruption of the asymmetric interplay between the 
sedimentation of linguistic meanings and role of a significative intention. If we 
give credence to the idea of communication being an indirect activity, then it Will 
not suffice to argue that in cases of dyslexia there is simply a faltering or loss of a 
significative intention in linguistic situations. Although it might be intuitive to 
focus on how there is a failure of the 'instrment' which actualises suitable 
meanings, the realisation of a significative intention is only made possible against 
the background of previously sedimented meatungs, and thus a wider 
interpretation is called for. In our attempt to understand the meanings of words 
and sentences (i. e. the style of the text), or in our attempt to communicate (i. e. 
create) through the written word, the body's capacity to go out ahead of itself in 
the forin of a significative intention is understood as a pre-reflective attempt to 
find a suitable expression which will fill the differential spread within language. It 
is therefore evident that the congealment of existential mean-ing I have associated 
with dyslexia is a problem which, although havmg a detrimental effect upon the 
'76See: 
Richardson, A. & Stein, J. 1993a. - and, Richardson, A. & Stein, J. 1993b. 
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capacity for significative intentions to actualise suitable meanings, is in fact 
something which should be aligned more with the sedimentation and reactivation 
of previously acquired meanings. This in turn opens up a number of 
interpretations, all of which are in some way a response to the question of how we 
are to understand a disruption of sedimented meaning for the dyslexic. 
My first hypothesis focuses on the acquisition and integration of new meanings. 
We have seen that the acquisition of meanings is based upon the coherent 
deformation of the current gestalt of previously sedimented meanings. I suggest 
that in cases of dyslexia (although this would not rule out a similarity with other 
language disorders), the dyslexic is able to transcend his/her current gestalt of 
sedimented meanings such that a new expression and its existential meaning is 
learned. However, the subsequent integration of this acquisition into a fresh 
gestalt that is capable of offering itself as a horizon for future creative usage is 
problematic for dyslexics. My argument would be that, as with the problems of 
sedimentation noted in Chapters Three and Four, what is perhaps most notable in 
cases of dyslexia is a susceptibility towards an incohesive sedimentation of 
existential meaning, thus resulting in an unstable horizon against which language 
can be utilised. It is important to note that in dyslexia there must be some 
fortnation of a reliable horizon with which to acquire and make use of language, 
for if it were not the case there would be no relationship to written language at all. 
Nevertheless, because the horizon upon which communication depends seems to 
be less cohesive for dyslexics, this marks a difference between that manner in 
which they seem to be less successfid in utilising the written word; e. g. the 
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capacity to read words, often quite basic in structure, that have previously been 
acquired. 
It is important to understand that the above argument concerning dyslexics having 
a horizon of sedimented meanings which lacks cohesiveness is not conceived as a 
problem of recalfing words that have been stored as 'representations' in a part of a 
cognitive system. Instead, by taking a phenomenological approach to the above 
we find that by failing to fully integrate new meanings into a stable gestalt the 
horizon upon which the dyslexic's linguistic world depends will always be 
susceptible to rising to the foreground, rather than acting as a constant 
background upon which meanings can arise through the differential spread of 
language. Consequently there is a problem with integrating newly acquired 
expressions into a sedimented gestalt which is stable 177 and thus setf-effacing. 
What the dyslexic is liable towards is an unreliable background (i. e. not altogether 
missing) of sedimented meanings which are integral in the acquisition of new 
meanings and a general creafive use of language. In more experienfial terms, the 
manner in which an unreliable background can be understood is through a 
temporary collapse of difference - i. e. a foreclosing of the differential spread of 
language which flattens out the depth of language. An unreliable background 
which is prone to rising to the fore is unable to present a differential spread of 
language to the significative intentions of the lived body, the result of which is the 
depnvation of style which is common to a linguistic community. Indeed, if one is 
to look at the symptoms of dyslexia, a concrete example of this phenomenon is 
the way in which letters, words and lines of text fail to offer themselves to the 
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reader as static, discrete and, thus, coherent 178 , the dyslexic experiencing them as 
blurred, moving or sometimes reversed. What the dyslexic is up against is a world 
in which language often refuses to break, to defonn, to differenhaie from itself, 
and this is manifest in the way that expressions and their meanings fail to offer 
themselves freely for usage, i. e. there is a congealment of existential meaw . ng i. n 
dyslexia. 
Considering that the above account has interpreted dyslexia as a general problem 
of operative intentionality that is manifest in linguistic situations rather than a 
specific 'language disorder', it may come as little surprise to recognise a parallel 
between the above account and the phenomenon of dys-location in Chapter Four. 
As Merleau-Ponty reminds us: "What then does language express, if it does not 
express thoughts? It presents or rather is the sub . ect's taking up of a position in j 
the world of his meanings. " (p. 193) Because operative intentionality subtends the 
intimate relationship between body and world which is constitutive of meaning 
and typicality, if there is a slackening of the body's mtentional arc in dyslexia, this 
cannot be interpreted merely as a breakdown of linguistic expression, but is 
directly tied to the way in which dyslexics orientate themselves within, and 
perceive, space. In Chapter Four I have described the dyslexic as having a greater 
relationship with normative rather than pathological space, and I believe that this 
very same structural phenomenon can be seen in the dyslexic's relationship to 
language. In the previous Chapter I concluded that the dyslexic's relationship With 
The notion of stable would have to be understood here as a normative concept, i. e. stable would 
have to be measured against the behavioural expectations of a similar linguistic community, e. g. 
reading age or spetling age. "" As I have documented in Chapter One, the blurring and movement of letters/words/lines of 
words on a page is one of the main features of dýslexia, although such a disability is generally not 
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space, most notably in linguistic situations, was marked by a deprivation of lived 
distance or 'play' (Spedraum) which binds the body to things which 'exist' and 
count for it. Such a deprivation occurs because of a disequilibriwm between clear 
and dark space which for dyslexics comes out in favour of clear space (" [an] 
impartial space in which all objects are equally important" p. 287). This is 
experienced by the dyslexic as letters, words and lines of text offering themselves 
in a vague, indiscriminate style rather than a manner which embodies a specific 
meaning. Now in the context of language, I believe that the dyslexic's relationship 
with nonnative/clear space has a direct counterpart in the way in which an 
unstable horizon of sedimented language can be interpreted as a foreclosing of the 
differential spread between phonemes and words. What seems to be different for 
dyslexics In both the contexts of space and communication is a disruption of 
operative intentionality which comes as a result of the dyslexic's insufficient 
commitment to a more personal/pathological relationship with language and 
space. If we interpret this in terms of the differential spread in language, it seems 
that the dyslexic is persistently thwarted by an experience of language which 
tends towards undifferentiation, and it is this foreclosure which, on Merleau- 
Ponty's terms, lies at the heart of dyslexics having difficulties with grasping the 
intersubjective style of language with conviction (on behalf of the dyslexic) and 
accuracy (on behalf of the third person). 
Without wanting to resort to new vocabulary for the sake of it, I think the best 
way of summarising the above interpretations of the dyslexic's relationship with 
language, and as a precursor to a positive phenomenology of dyslexia, is to draw 
regardod as a motor-visual problem in origin. For a explicit discussion of this symptom., see: 
Garzia, R 1993, especially p. 423-7. 
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attention to the expression Merleau-Ponty uses in 'The Pathology of Language' 179 
by saying that, more than simply having a different manner of being in the world, 
the dyslexic has a different innere Sprachform of language (see previous section 
for a discussion of the innere Sprachform). Perhaps most significant for my 
interpretation of dyslexia, Merleau-Ponty states: 
44 the innere Sprachform ... is the reflection in language of the world view 
appropriate to a given culture. Each language has its own way of expressing 
different relationships, like space and time ... The innere Sprachform is the totality 
of processes and expressions that are produced when we are at the point of 
expressing out thought or of understanding the thought of other people. The 
juncture of pure thought and of language occurs, then, in the innere Sprachform, 
which is differentiated according to the manner in which we speak or write, 
according to the manner in which we address ourselves to others. "180 
When comparing the above quote to my preceding interpretations of the 
dyslexic's relationship with operative intentionality, sedimentation and style, it 
would be understandable to claim that the dyslexic has a consistently different 
innere Sprachform to the rest of a linguistic community by virtue of the different 
relationship they have with the written word. I have already tried to give a rich 
interpretation of how the dyslexic experiences the disruption of a hngWstic 
situation, but what the above quote also draws attention to is the way in which a 
difference in the innere Sprachfbrm can also hold consequence for the way m 
which fundamental themes such as space and time are experienced. Thus, the 
1 79 See- Nierleau-Pontv, M. 1973. 
]so Marleau-Ponty, M. 1973, p. 75-6. 
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parallels I have drawn between the breakdown of operative intentionality m the 
contexts of space and language are in fact more than just parallels. What we can 
understand through the notion of the dyslexic havimg a different innere 
Sprachform is that this will have some effect (depending on how severe the 
dyslexia is) on the way in which they relate to space and time. Furthermore, 
although up until now I have interpreted the different facets of the breakdown in 
dyslexia as co-originaiy, I will tentatively suggest that by following the above 
quote it may be justified to suggest that not only do dyslexics express and 
experience time and space differently from others, but such phenomena are 
grounded in the different innere Sprachform of language possessed by dyslexics. 
Although I wish to deal explicitly with the relationship between dyslexia, time 
and language in the final chapter of the thesis, a provisional remark is that a 
foreclosure of the differential spread in language has a direct consequence for the 
manner in which the existential meaning of words is present for dyslexics. 
However, what remains in the conclusion of this chapter is the realisation that 
although having a different innere Sprachform of language, the dyslexic is able to 
communicate through the written word, and thus I finally turn to the manner in 
which the dyslexic does have a style of language. 
The compensatory style of dyslexia 
Although I have interpreted the breakdown of language for dyslexics as a 
foreclosure of the differential spread of language, such a phenomenon should not 
be understood as a static entity which manifests itself as a mere breakdown. 
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indeed, just as I have argued in Chapter Four that the phenomenon of dyslocation. 
has a direct correlate m the form of relocation, so a foreclosure of the differential 
spread of language which results in a congealment of existential meaning also has 
a more positive correlate. I have already tried to stress at the beginning of this 
section that, although the dyslexic may have a relationship with language which is 
marked by incoherence, there is nevertheless a meaningiul relationship, i. e. the 
breakdown of a linguistic situation is meaningful for the dyslexic in that it will be 
confusing and frustrating. On a general level, the dyslexic's experience of written 
language is one which thwarts a certain ease of acquisition and usage, although a 
relationship is still maintained. Moreover, on the specific level of how dyslexics 
experience a breakdown of language, the disruption of a goal-orientated activity 
such as reading is not only met with confusion, but the need to overcome such a 
disruption, a fonn of puzzle solving which both Jakobson and Merleau-Ponty 
refer to as an act of reequilibrium. 
I have already touched on the notion of equilibriurn and reequilibrium in a number 
of places in the thesis: the ever shifting equilibrium of the lived body In its 
synthesis of body schema and body image; the equilibrium between the lived- 
body and the world that structures our operative intentionality; the ever 
fluctuating tension that is constitutive of the 'maximum grip' of our perceiving 
body over an object in the phenomenal field; and, in the case of dyslexic space, 
the notion of breakdown of equilibrium (dyslocation) and the attempt at a 
reequi i *1 bnium (re-location). Thus, in cases of both 'normal' and 'pathological' 
behaviour, our being-in-the-world is subtended by a combination of subtle, and 
sometimes not so subtle (i. e. pathological, traurnafic, ecstatic behavlour) shifts in 
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and out of a provisional equilibrium which is shaped by the specificity of our 
goals in a current situation. Merleau-Ponty is quite explicit about such notions 
when applying them to the themes of phoneme acquisition and the pathology of 
language in Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language 181 , and in a more 
general vem in The Structure of Behaviour where, in his discussion of vital 
structures, he states: 
"... the preferred behaviour is the one which permits the easiest and most adapted 
action: for example, the most exact spatial designations, the finest sensory 
discriminations. Thus each organism, in the presence of a given milieu, has its 
optimal conditions of activity and its proper manner of realizing equilibrium; and 
the internal determinants of this equilibrium are not given by a plurality of 
vectors, but by a general attitude toward the world" 182 
Thus, the notion of equilibrium is being used as an ever fluctuating, provisional 
'indicator' of optimal behaviour, which is in turn dependent upon the current 
situation - the milieu. The need to maintain a suitable equilibrium is therefore of 
the uppermost importance whether this concerns pathological or 'normal' 
behaviour. However, what is different in cases such as dyslexia is the extent to 
which, not only will there be a greater occurrence of conspicuous reequilibrium, 
but this activity wiH become habituated, i. e. it will become part of their very style 
of being-in-the-world. Merleau-Ponty draws attention to this phenomenon of 
pathological behaviour usmg Jakobson's example of the aphasiac who, whilst 
,8' See: Merleati-Ponty, M. 1973, p. 25. The notion of reequilibnwn also has a parallel Nvith the role 
of a replacement function mentioned earlier in Merleau-Ponty's text in relation to GoldsteMi (see: 
p. 7 1). 
"2 See' Merleau-Ponty. M. 1963, p. 148. 
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experiencing a regular disintegration of his phonemic system, often accompanies 
this with a provisional reequilibrium in the form of a compensatory strategy; in 
this case the inability to distinguish between long and short vowels is 
compensated for by placing the tonic accent on the penultimate syllable 183 
Indeed, this capacity of reequilibrium is what Merleau-Ponty also refers to as a 
replacement function, a concept which I have already touched upon at the start of 
this section and which prompts the quote: "Now, it is a question of investigating, 
even in cases where the pafient succeeds, by what path, or in what sense, he 
succeeds. "'m 
It is precisely this point that has to be heeded if a genuine phenomenology of 
dyslexia is to emerge, for although I have accounted for the way In which there is 
a breakdown of language in the rhetoric of phenomenology, what has to be 
uncovered is the layer upon layer of compensatory strategies and replacement 
function used by dyslexics with a view to maintaining an equilibrium widlin 
linguistic situations. It is important to note that when I refer to compensatory 
strategies employed by dyslexics, I am making a qualitative distinction between 
the strategies habituated by the dyslexic at an early age in order to proceed with 
any relationship with the written word, and specific interventionist strategies that 
may be used to help diaposed dyslexics, but which come from an extemal 
source. Although compensatory strategies and interventionist strategies may well 
overlap in their aims and approach, what would be of real use to a 
phenomenological investigation are the habits that are specifically characteristic 
of dyslexia. Because such strategies are precisely not made use of at the level of 
Iml Mcrlcau-Pontv, M. 1973, p. 25. '"Mcricau-Ponty', M. 1973, p. 71. 
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explicit consciousness, and become integrated into operative intentionality of the 
lived body, one has to start conceiving of such strategies as the style of dyslexia. 
it is with considerable surprise that in my review of the literature on dyslexia there 
seems to be only a small amount of attention paid to the compensatory strategies 
employed by dyslexics, and this I believe is a reflection of the way in which 
dyslexia is still regarded as a disorder which is marked by deficit. Furthermore, 
this is also a major stumbling block in terms of providing a rich account of the 
style of dyslexia, for it is imperative that some type of empirical material, whether 
it be quantitative or qualitative, is available for a phenomenological interpretation. 
Indeed, it may be that qualitative research in the form of a phenomenological 
investigation into first person reports of exactly how dyslexics do maintain a 
relationship with language could go some way to redressing this gap in the 
literature. However, although there seems to be little work done in this area, 
leading figures such as Margaret Snowling do seem committed to the possibility 
that dyslexics are assisted by compensatory strategies. As she remarks: "it is 
likely that some dyslexics, maybe the majority, learn to read using compensatory 
strategies". 185 Of the reports that do exist, these can be divided into three types. 
Firstly, there are what I will call the 'positive' accounts of dyslexia, which try to 
focus on the way in which dyslexics are more gifted in certain skifls, for example, 
Ron Davis' account of the hidden talents of dyslexics86. What Davis stresses is 
that, like the negative aspect of dyslexia, the positive attributes are developmental, 
Secý Snowling, M. 1987, p. 127-8. Indeed, the fmal chapter of Snowllng's book is a good 
introduction to die possibihn, of compensator), strategies in dysleXics. 18C, See: DaN is, R- 1994, p. 94-110, and for a more theoretical account on the specifc talent of 
Clý'slekics as artists, sccý Aaron, P. & Guillemard, J. 1993. 
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i. e. they have to grow and be created by the dyslexic, whilst the specific examples 
he offers of positive aspects of dyslexics are: 1) a primary thought process of non- 
verbal picture thinking. 2) A capacity for intuitive thinking which results from 
picture thinking. 3) Profound curiosity and creativity which is often interpreted as 
idleness or daydreaming. 
A second type of report which touches on the topic of compensatory strategies is 
the biographical account. For example, the detailed account given by both a boy 
who suffers from dyslexia and his mother which highlights the way in which a 
child with severe dyslexia has been allowed to display his creative skills by 
concentrating on his abilities rather than using conventional methods of remedial 
treatment for his weaknesses 187 . The account details how instead of completely 
overcoming his reading and writing problems, Alexander Faludy (who eventually 
started an Arts degree course at the Open University at the age of 12) 
circumvented his problems so that it became accepted that his primary input was 
through his ears, and his output was, via his mouth, on to tape. Although such 
reports prove interesting, they are somewhat anecdotal as evidence of the type of 
habitual strategies that can be developed by dyslexics in order to read, write and 
spell, and it is perhaps the third type of account, a more clinically based 
experimental account, which provides the most information regarding the 
compensatory strategies of dyslexics. 
In the first group of studies looked atý the authors set out to mvestigate whether 
dyslexics are able to process words m an autornatised way, i. e. a pre-reflective 
Sec. Faludy, T. & Faluch, A. 1996. -, and, Hampshire, S. 19 81 
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style of reading which enables words to be read in a fast, elementary, and 
effortless manner. This is a summary of what was concluded from the experiment: 
"Our evidence is first that dyslexics, despite equal levels of continuous reading 
performance, have lower discrete reading performance that reading age controls, 
This indicates, on the one hand, that dyslexics have a deficit in the lower order, 
automatic processes tapped by isolated word reading. On the other hand, it 
suggests that they use different ways to come to the same reading level as reading 
controls ... The possibility 
is raised that dyslexics use strategies to compensate for 
their decoding deficit when task demands allow for such strategies ... Whatever the 
nature of the compensation process(es), the studies reported here imply that 
compensation is related to effortful, time-consuming processing. " 188 
The authors basic hypothesis is that dyslexics have to look at the orthographic 
structure of words over and over again in an attempt to utilise language, a strategy 
which can be interpreted as a way of compensating for a phonological deficit 
which degrades the dyslexic capacity for an automaticity of reading. They also go 
onto describe the characteristics of such strategies at the specific levels of 
continuous reading and isolated word reading. In continuous reading, strategies 
are employed such as compensating high accuracy with low speed and vice versa, 
amending known reading errors, and overlapping different stages In reading by 
simultaneously processing words that are appearing next in a sentence. In isolated 
word reading the authors are not so explicit, pointing towards evidence of 
compensatory strategies being used by dyslexics in tests which are not conducted 
"' Yap, R. & van de LcU, A. 1994, p. 102-3. 
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under the pressure of time, the nature of such strategies being a deliberate use of 
orthographic processing over phonological processing. 189 Snowling has also 
conducted research on the influence of orthographic priming, and although only 
some of her conclusions seem to concur with the above study, there is a general 
agreement on the likelihood of such a compensatory strategy in the form of 
'lexical analogies' (i. e. a visual process of lexical activation which invokes the 
similarity between a new word and a previously seen word). 
The second group of studies concentrate on what has only been gestured at In the 
above - the deliberate use of context made by dyslexics In learning to read and to 
spell. Snowling is again a leading figure in this area of research, and the results of 
one of her most recent experiments make strong clairns in favour of the dyslexic 
relying upon context as a compensatory strategy. The experiment consisted of 
testing children at three levels; dyslexics, poor comprehenders, and normal 
readers. Children were presented with a printed word, either in isolation or 
following a contexý and the accuracy and speed of responses were measured. 
Although all the children fared better in the presence of context; the experiment 
had a specific finding for dyslexics: 
"The findings of this experiment underline the fact that there is more to reading 
than decoding. To focus on the dyslexic children: In the face of deficits In 
decoding, they benefited from context more than younger, normal readers 
matched for reading age. Importantly, the benefit that accrued were not just 
because the availability of context allowed them to guess ... Rather, the availability 
180 Sec. Yap, R. & van de Lcij, A. 1994, p. 100-4; and corroborative evidence for these arguments 
is also offered in: Fawcett, A. & Nicolson. R- 1994. 
210 
of semantic and syntactical information from the sentence frame allowed the 
children to modify their incomplete or inaccurate pronunciation of target words to 
bring them in line with context. This 'self-teaching' device provides one plausible 
explanation for how many dyslexic children eventually attain reasonable levels of 
word-reading accuracy, despite persisting difficulties with phonological 
processing and non-word reading. "'90 
The conclusion presented here and in other work by Snowlig and associates is 
quite explicit: although dyslexics may improve their use of the usual letter-sound 
correspondences with age, the majority of dyslexics learn to read and speU 
through alternative, compensatory strategies which are predominantly Visual in 
nature, and may continue to use such strategies throughout their lives. Thus, the 
compensatory strategies employed by dyslexics in the form of specific 
replacement functions (e. g. using analogy as a substitute for basic decoding skiHs) 
are a pragmatic way of maintaining a certain equilibrium in situations which 
require remarkably complex skills such as reading and spelling. 
Although there is far less experimental work done on the topic of compensation as 
opposed to the deficits of dyslexics, it is this theme which I believe holds the key 
to the style of dyslexia. Unfortunately for this project, the lack of material 
concerned with the specýfic nature of replacement functions used by dyslexics, 
and a problem of whether widespread assertions can be made as to whether all 
dyslexics are marked by similar ftwctions, means that I am only in a position to 
Snowling, M. & Nation, K. 1997, p. 162. For other experunental evidence that supports the 
specific use of context by dyslemcs in learning to read and spell, see also: Frith, U. & Snowling, 
M. 1983, - and, Pring, L. & Snowlmg, M. 1986. 
211 
make the most general of claims. Indeed, it is in trying to give a 
phenomenological characterisation of exactly how dyslexic children resort to the 
tself-teaching' devices mentioned in the last quote, that qualitative research work 
drawing on data firom interviews should be the next step in providing an account 
of the dyslexic style of language. Not only should this be seen as a continuation of 
a philosophical project, but I believe this is a crucial bridge between the raw 
experiential data gained from first-hand interviews conducted with dyslexic 
children, and the way in which, through a phenomenological characterisation, this 
data can then be used in future qualitative and quantitative research. 
in moving from the empirical to the philosophical, I now want to make two 
concluding remarks. In this chapter I have argued that following Merleau-Ponty's 
insights into language, dyslexia can be understood at a general level as a 
congealment of existenial meaning, whilst at a specific level, it can be understood 
as a disruption of operative intentionality In the form of an incohesive 
se6nentation of acquired linguistic meanings. Furthermore, I have characterised 
the idea of incohensive sedimentation as a foreclosure of the differential spread of 
language, a phenomenon which thwarts the possibi1ity of transcendence which is a 
requisite of grasping the style of language shared by an inter-subjective 
community. However, I have also shown that in t*g to learn how to read and 
spell, the dyslexic becomes aware of such problems when tasks such as reading, 
creative writing and spellmg present themselves as unusually confusing and 
frustrating. In order to readdress the disruption of such a goal-orientated activity 
(what I have referred to as reequihbnum), the dyslexic employs certain 
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compensatory strategies which become habituated by the body, and are in fact 
constitutive of the dyslexics style of language. 
In terms of the phenomenological framework I have presented, the compensatory 
strategies employed by dyslexics can be understood as an attempt to maintain a 
pragmatic standard of operative intentionality which is less likely to be disrupted 
in situations which involve the use of written language. Thus, what is happening 
when compensatory strategies become habituated by dyslexics is a qualitative 
shift in the way in which operative intentionality is regulated. Such regulation is 
provided by an equilibrium which is conducive to the goals of a certain situation, 
and which is "given by a general attitude towards the world. "'91, and thus the 
dyslexic actually learns how to enter into linguistic situations which will not 
require the explicit effort of major reequilibrium. I therefore conclude that, 
although dyslexics seem to suffer from a general foreclosure of the differenfial 
spread of language, it is not as though such a foreclosure remams permanent. 
Indeed, through a combination of compensatory strategies and regular methods of 
learning how to use written language (i. e. the decoding rules which apply to 
grapheme and phoneme combinations), dyslexics develop a differential spread of 
language which is pecuhar to the style in which they are able to acquire the 
existential meaning of language. Although dyslexics will still be susceptible to 
frequent lapses into a foreclosure of the differential spread of language, and thus 
operative intentionality In general, In general the dyslexic is able to have a 
relationship with the written word. 
Nlerleau-Ponlhý, M. 1963, p. 14& 
213 
This brings me to the final point of this Chapter, an argument which puts the 
emphasis back on the capability rather titan disability of dyslexics. Although I 
have described the manner in which there is a problem for dyslexics in grasping 
the existential meaning of language shared by a community, the manner in which 
dyslexics are able to overcome such problems through compensatory strategies 
puts a quite different emphasis on the way in which dyslexia is experienced. What 
the phenomenological investigation of this chapter has revealed is that instead of 
dyslexia being marked by a complete breakdown of language, i. e. somediing akin 
to absolute incomprehensibility, what the dyslexic actually experiences in 
supposed 'breakdowns o language'should infacl be interpreted as 'breakdowns )f 
in compensatory strategies'. Thus, the style of dyslexia is a very particular 
acquisition of skills which are utilised more than others when usmg written 
language. Although these skills are employed in order to maintain a level of 
operative intentionality which allows the dyslexic to share and make use of the 
existential meanings of a community, the way in which meanings are acquired 
and sedimented by dyslexics will be slightly different from others. Because of this 
d. ', ý- itierence, the likelihood of consistently being able to grasp the specific style of 
written language, i. e. the instituted language of 'others', is that much lower. 
In conclusion to this chapter, I argue that although dyslexics, do suffer from some 
fonn of deficit (whether this be perceptual, cognitive or neurological in origin), 
they are able to provisionally overcome such problems by devising skills which 
will enable them to work with written language, and it is only when this specific 
style of language becomes incompatible with certain aspects of the style of a 
community in general (e. g. the appearance of irregularly spelled words), that 
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compensatory skills are diminished and dyslexic traits are unveiled. What I now 
wish to give an account of in the final chapter of this thesis, is the manner in 
which the existential meaning of language can be understood as being grounded in 
the phenomenon of lived-time, and through this I want to highlight the manner in 
which dyslexics have a different experience of temporality. 
2 15 
Chapter Six 
Temporality 
in the previous chapter I offered a phenomenological interpretatiori of, not only 
the problems faced by dyslexics in the acquisition and use of language, but the 
manner in which they are able to sustain a relationship with language through the 
development of compensatory skills and strategies. Through my use of Merleau- 
Ponty's phenomenology of language I have provided a different way of 
interpreting dyslexia, that is, an experiential account which illuminates the way(s) 
in which dyslexics have a meaningful, intentional relationship With language, i. e. 
a specific style. Although such an approach is in no way a attack upon previous 
explanations of dyslexia, there is an implicit criticism of the matmer in which they 
have failed to account for fimdamental structures that are vital to the acquisition 
and use of language. 
The primary difference between the phenomenological approach I have taken and 
the models of language used by previous disciplines (notably cognitive 
psychology), is that I am conceiving of language as an indirect phenomenon 
where meaning should be understood as a certain style rather than the determinate 
counterpart of a specific symbol. There are three main areas which are not usually 
considered in this connection, the culmination of which will have a bearing on this 
chapter. Firstly, language is not only grounded upon perception but feeds back 
into our perception of the world, and thus dyslexia cannot be understood as 
merely a phonological deficit. Secondly, because of the intimate relationship 
216 
between perception and language, the body is vital to the acquisition and creative 
usage of language. Thus, not only is the notion of language being a specifically 
intellectual activity challenged by Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological account, 
but furthermore, the idea of phonological and orthographic meanings being 
understood as a store of representations is cafled into question. Finafly, the notion 
of a linguistic gesture moves our understanding of language away from the 
recollection of represented meanings, and towards an indirect experience of 
language which emphasises a differential spread of linguistic meaning in our 
endless interaction and substitution of signs. We shall come back to these points 
as this chapter unfolds, but as I suggested in the preceding chapter, not only does 
my interpretation offer a critique of the models of language used in the existing 
literature on dyslexia, but there is also an implicit critique of the way In which 
memory and time are understood, a criticism which can be especially levelled at 
the cognitive approach. 
Problems of memory and the challenge of time-consciousness 
The topic of memory, or more specifically a disruption of certain forms of 
memory, features heavily in explanations of dyslexia. As noted above, the general 
theory of memory used in cognitive explanations relies upon the 'storage' of a 
meaning conceptualised as a representation. For example: "Once a structured 
representation has been created, it is then linked to existing knowledge in long- 
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terrn memory, thereby expanding and adding to that knowledge. " 192 Much 
evidence has been gathered by experunental psychology to suggest that dyslexics 
experience difficulties on short-term memory tasks, in particularly tasks which 
require verbal short-tenn memory'93 , and that this 
is one facet of a broader 
linguistic impairment at the phonological level. The general argument offered is 
that, although dyslexics are able to make use of a 'phonological code' which acts 
as a form of stored representation, when it comes to short term memory tasks - for 
example reading unfamiliar words or retaining word identity and order when 
constructing sentences - dyslexics make far less efficient usage of these codes, 
Indeed, the apparent fact that dyslexics perform badly in tasks which require 
verbal short-term memory is something which has focussed attention on the 
manner in which dyslexics have to resort to some form of compensation strategy, 
as discussed in the previous chapter. As Snowfing highlights, instead of relying 
mostly on a form of phonological coding, dyslexics resort to the visual or 
orthographic features of words as a basis for recal-I 194 . However, although I am in 
no way trying to contradict these findings, what seems to be lacking in any of the 
accounts given concerning deficits of the memory and capacity for recafl in 
dyslexics is the very notion of 'memory' and hence temporality itself - the 
concept is simply discussed as a 'given'. Thus, in an attempt to understand what 
the presuppositions of 'memory' consist of, I now turn to the manner in which 
such presuppositions can be critiqued and surpassed by a phenomenological 
understanding of temporality. 
102 Ellis, A. 1993, p. 50. 19.1 See: Bradv, S. 1986; Brady, S. 1991, and, Torgesen, J. 1988. 
"4 See: Chapter Five of this thesis -'The Style of Dyslexic Expression', and Snowling 1987, p. 24- 
-5, and Rack, 1985, p. 325-40. 
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In the texts I have looked at from the existing literature on dyslexia, those which 
have come from the field of contemporary psychology have treated memory as 
though it were the cognitive equivalent of a physical reality. Hence, such a notion 
of memory is built upon neurological processes which store experiences 
(representations) in the bram for later retrieval and usage, and as such, the activity 
of remembering is akin to the activation of memory traces of the past, albeit 
within the concrete here and now. This notion of memory is commonly referred to 
as the 'Storage Hypothesis"95, and falls prey to many of the criticisms we have 
already seen Merleau-Ponty level at schools of intellectualism, including a notion 
of time which is linear and spatial. Before I turn to the manner in which such a 
hypothesis presupposes an abstract conception of temporality, I will briefly 
outline three main criticisms that can be directed at the logic of the storage 
model 
196 
. 
Firstly, there is a problem of infmite regression, a difficulty which is contingent 
upon the storage model assuming that the recognition of an object results from a 
match between current perception and pre-existing memory traces in the brain. 
The nub of the problem results from the 'match' between the current field of 
perception and previous memory traces, as this requires a type of comparison 
function which would have to employ another trope of memory which in turn 
would still need another memory, ad infinitum. A second and related problem is 
that of solipsism. Because the storage hypothesis is dependant upon the perception 
of objects being in the fonn of a representation, there is never any direct or 
immanent apprehension of what is sign, ficant within the perceptual field, i. e. 
See: Block, R. 1990. 'Editors Introduction', and for a critical study, Rosenfield, 1.1988. 
See: Gallagher, S. 1998. 'Inti-oduction', and more specificaIly. Arcaya, J. 1989. 
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perception is always conceived of at the level of categorial reflection. Thus, such a 
presupposition forecloses the possibility of being able to transcend ones own 
subjective beliefs, which not only endangers the possibility of intersubjectivity 
and communication, but also the likehhood of making any valid or truthful 
judgement that could be distinguished from a subjective presumption. The final, 
and perhaps most important, objection to the storage hypothesis is its 
impossibility of actually being in contact with 'the past'. The model assumes that 
memory is the storage of representations within the brain, and thus when certain 
perceptual stimuli are present, this electrochemical change produces the 
experience of pastness. In this way, the notion of experiencing the past is only 
possible in temis of a repetition, i. e. the past can be repeated when certain brain 
traces are re-stimulated. What the model fails to take into account, and what the 
phenomenological position will keenly undermine (especially Merleau-Ponty), is 
that our experience of the past should not be simply conceived of as 'repetition', 
and furthermore, in order to experience the past (whether this is conceived of as 
pure repetition or not) one must already be in continuous contact with memory in 
the first place, i. e. a immanent sense of pastness. 
In effect, the storage hypothesis proposes that the past as a form of memory trace 
has to be pulled out of the brain, as though it occupied a place in physical space in 
the fonn of a separate entity to our perceptual experience. Thus, in the context of 
temporality, the storage hypothesis conceives of time as a linear and spatial 
phenomenon, that is, a chain of discrete moments moving from past to present, 
and into the future in a serial order. In contrast with such a serial and linear model 
of time, the treatment of temporality by the phenomenological tradition has, in 
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general, taken an imminent view of time which, as we have already seen 
implicitly in previous chapters, treats time as an evolving structure which has a 
certain depth or spread, a depth which is the co-existence of the past, present, and 
future. Although I will once again concentrate predominantly on the writing of 
Merleau-Ponty in this chapter, it is wid-dn the context of temporality that Merleau- 
Ponty explicitly continues much of Husserl's initial work 197 . Thus, I will first give 
a brief synopsis of the way in which Husserl turns his attention towards 
temporality, a study which understands time-consciousness as the most 
fundamental form of consciousness. 
To present Husserl's account(s) of time consciousness at any length, and 
furthermore to do them any justice, is far beyond the scope and purpose of this 
chapter, and therefore I will try and restrict my account to only some of Husserl's 
key themes and concepts which seem directly relevant to Merleau-Ponty's 
account of temporality, in particularly the notion of retention and how it differs 
from recollection 198 . Before I move onto Husserl's specific account of time- 
consciousness, it will serve well to review what Husserl had in mind when 
referring to an intentional relationship. Because Husserl wishes to set aside any 
questions concerning the metaphysical reality of a phenomenon under 
investigation, what Husserlian phenomenology discovers in the idea of 
intentionality is that all consciousness is consciousness of something, that is, 
"" On this specific topic, see: Spicker, S. 1973. For a discussion of the way m which Merleau- 
Ponty sees himself as developing certain Husserlian themes, the reader should look at Merleau- 
Ponty's cssay 'The Philosopher and His Shadow' m: Merleau-Ponty, M. 1964 (a). '" Although much of Husserl's writing can be mterpreted as an investigation into time- 
consciousness, his most explicit accounts of the phenomenology of tune exist in the collection On 
7he Phenomenology Of Die Consciousness OfInternal Time (1893-1917) (Husserl, E. 1991 . 
), 
Ndillst he also makes frequent reference to time m the first volume of Ideas (Husserl, E. 1982. ), 
and Cartesian Meditations (Husserl, E. 1977. ). For useful commentanes on Husserl and 
temporality, see: Gallagher, S. 1998, and, Miller, 1.1984. 
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every manner of perceiving, representing, judging, wifling, anticipating etc... is 
directed toward something which is perceived, represented judged etc... There is 
a distinction being made here between what is referred to as a 'real relationship', 
for example, the force of the waves against the rocks, and an 'intentional 
relationship', for example, being conscious of a blossoming tree in the distance 
which appears as a baH of cherry red'99. Thus, in my apprehension of the tree 
there is a relationship which is independent of the actual existence of a 'cherry red 
ball', and as such my fived-experience of the tree is one which consists of a 
relationship between an intentional act of consciousness and an intentional 
correlate of consciousness: 
"Each cogilo, each conscious process, we may also say, 'means' something or 
other and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular 
cogitalum. Each does this, moreover, In its own fashion. The house-perception 
means a house - more precisely, as this individual house - and means it in the 
fashion peculiar to perception. -)-)200 
Although this may seem quite different from the type of operative intentionality 
we have encountered in the texts of Merleau-Ponty, i. e. a form of intentionality 
which is primarily pre-conscious, for Husserl, the intentional object is part of our 
immanent experience, and thus it cannot be a mental phenomenon which is 
represented by an image in consciousneSS201 . Husserl 
defines this intentional basis 
of consciousness as a relationship between the noetic act and its noematic content, 
1 99 Secý Husserl, E. 1982, §36. 
200 Seeý Husserl, E. 1977, p. 33. `01 For Mcrleau-Ponty's observations regarding intentionality, which includes substantial remarks 
concerning Husserl and this topic, see the 'Preface' to Phenomenology ofPerception. 
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inasmuch as these two elements must be thought of as two sides of an inclusive 
intentional project. Such a project consists of the noetic acts of consciousness, i. e. 
the varying modes or manner in which an object is posited, such as imagining, 
doubting, and secondly, the corresponding fonns of noematic giveness, which 
bestow a certain intentional, or more precisely, meaningful content to that wbich 
is being intended, i. e. that which is imagined or doubted as SUCh202 . Although 
Husserl's intentional schema provides many questions and unresolved problems, 
namely the relative correlation and/or independence of the noematic content to the 
noefic aceo', the distinction will prove vital in understanding his notion of time- 
consciousness and the fundamental status he attaches to this form of 
consciousness. 
Husserl's investigation into time-consciousness can be understood of having a 
twofold, albeit reciprocal, conceM204. On the one hand, Husserl is interested in the 
question regarding the possibility of comprehending a temporal object as such, 
and the manner in which a temporal object appears to consciousness. On the other 
hand he is also interested in following an inquiry into the nature of an 'absolute 
subjectivity', a trope of consciousness which constitutes all temporal appearance, 
whilst at the same time is self-temporalising in the form of a constituted flow of 
consciousness. Because these two lines of enquiry are interrelated I will inevitably 
touch on some of the themes that are relevant to the constituting role of an 
absolute consciousness, but it is the former of these fines of enquiry that I wifl be 
2'12 See Husscri, E. 1982, §88,90,98. 
203 For a far more detailed introduction into the development of the basic strucWres of 
intentional itv and the relative problems that it poses as a topic, see; Bernet, R-, Kern, I. & 
Marbach, E. 1993, Ch. 3. 
'04 See: Bemet, R. et al. 1993, Ch. 3. - arid, Gallagher, S. 1998, Ch. 3 and ChA 
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most interested in presenting below, as the questions that are raised remam more 
pertinant to the aims of this chapter. 
To be able to perceive a temporal object such as a musical tone, the object it must 
be able to endure, that is, it must be able to retain its unity whilst extending over 
tiMe. The question of how to reconcile the unity and thus identity of an intentional 
object over a stretch of time is thus pivotal to the first branch of Husserl's 
investigation mentioned above. Vital to the understanding of both Husserl's and 
Merleau-Ponty's accounts of temporality is the distinction they both draw, albeit 
with different emphasis, between the re-presentation of previous intentional acts 
in the form of recollection (secondary memory), and the automatic holding back 
of the just-past experience in the form of retention (pnmary memory), a 
disfinction which has its basis in the actual presence of retention: 
"We characterized primary memory or retention as a comet's tail that attaches 
itself to the perception of the moment ... (For example] After the melody 
has died 
away, we no longer have it perceived as present but we do stil-I have it in 
consciousness. It is not a present melody but one just past. Its being past is not 
inerely something meant but a given fact given itself and therefore 'Perceived'. 
In opposition to this, the temporal presentation in recollection is a remembered, 
re-presented past but not an actually present past, not a perceived past, not a past 
pnmarily given and intuited. 99205 
'" Husserl, E. 199 1, § 14 [p. 361. 
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By introducing this qualitative distinction between retention and recollection 
Husserl is radically reworking the way in which our conscious awareness of a 
temporal object is conceived as something which is present. He does this by 
characterising the three reciprocal modes of intentionality - primordial impression 
(present), retention (past) and protention (future) - modes which should not be 
understood as deliberate and discrete acts of consciousness such as recollection, 
but which together allow for the apprehension of a temporal object within an 
originary temporal field. Husserl gives a diagrammatic representation of these 
three modes of temporality in a munber of evolving forms, most notably in his 
1905 lecture course,, whilst Merleau-Ponty also makes use of such a diagram in 
Phenomenology... albeit in a more critical manner206 . The primordial impression 
(also refeffed to as primordial sensation) conforms to the immediately given 'now 
moment' of the temporal object. Furthermore, such impressions of a temporal 
object can exist simultaneously. For example, I can experience the primordial 
impressions of a pen's extension, colour, distance in a manifold which is 
, 207 constitutive of the now-mode of the temporal object -a 'being-aE-at-once 
Such a manifold is made possible because of the temporal mode which 
corresponds to the just-past - retention. Each retention functions to preserve the 
just past moment in view of consciousness, whilst the further into the past which 
each earlier points slips, the more dimly they are retained. Hence, as we have seen 
iii distinction to recollection, retentioning of the just-past moment is a direct 
inhiilion of the past, and as such should be understood as a strictly intentional as 
opposed to real perfonnance. As GOagher keenly points out, what the retenfional 
performance allows for is a holding back of the just-past in the form of a semantic 
See: liusserl, E. 1991, §10 [p. 28], No. 33 1 [p. 230], and No. 53 [p. 365]. Also see: Merleau- 
Ponty, NI. 1962, p. 417. 
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referene". Thus, retention allows consciousness to carry within itself an 
immanent meaning of the past, i. e. an intentional and meaningful relationship 
which is independent of the natural reality of the temporal object. It is in this way 
that when listening to music we are not simply conscious of the individual tones 
that together form a melody, but one hears the whole melody itself as it flows: 
"And if we hear a bit of melody, we do not hear merely single tones, even less 
moments of sIngle tones or mathematical tone-nows, matching the now-points that 
could be abstracted in thought. We rather grasp enduring tones - specifically, 
tones combin-ing into a tone-fonnation ... And in the unitary regard continuously 
directed towards itý we grasp the unity of the total perceptual appearance of this 
ione-formalion as something absolutely given itself. And if the whole tone-phase 
is finished, retention still apprehends the just-having been of the total phase that 
has there elapsed. The evidence here concerns the just-having-been by means of 
which a relation of the object to the flowing now is co-given"'09 
I will come back to the role of retention below, but first I will detail the ftitural 
mode of the lived-present - protention. Although both Merleau-Ponty, and 
especially Heidegger2'0, will put a far greater emphasis on the temporal mode 
which corresponds to expectation, Husserl still accounts for such a phenomenon 
albeit in a manner which treats protention as a less significant countetpart to 
retention, Thus, Husserl conceives of such a mode as intending the immediately 
iipproaching, although such an anticipation of the nearly present is only done on 
Husserl., E. 1991, No. 54, (p. 376]. 
108 Gallagher, S. 1998, p. 48. -, k)Q . Husserl, E. 199 1, No. 5 1, [p. 344]. 
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the basis of retentional consciousness. Because protention, is the futural mode of 
the lived-present, i. e. the trope of the present which is indeterminate, it is a form 
of intentionality which, unlike retention, is never fulfilled. Thus protention takes 
the fonn of an immanent projection of the past onto the nearly present which is 
being anticipated, and the fulfilment or unfulfilment of such protentions is given 
in the primordial impression. Although there is clearly a relationship between 
retention and protention, such a relationship is asymmetrical in favour of the 
Hfilled intending of the past - retention. As such, the three phases of the lived- 
present contribute to an enduring 'now' which has an intentional (i. e. unreaO 
temporal 'fiinge' - "a living horizon of the no-longer (the just past) and the not- 
yet (the now approaching) in various gradations. r-211 
In that there is a temporal fiinge surrounding the lived-present, there is inevitably 
a 'now' which is just passed and a 'now' which is expected. Thus, by the very 
nature of the temporal field of the lived-present it is apparent that the 'current' 
phase of a temporal object which is considered to be 'now' is continuously 
passing over into the just-now, and therefore the protention, primordial 
impression, and retention that characterise the 'now' are all modified into a new 
mode of intentionality. In passing ftorn one 'now' phase into the nexi, the 
primordial impression is modified into a retention of this primordial impression, 
whilst the existing retention is modified into a retention of a retention, and so on. 
Thus, the lived-present is constantly changing, floWigI 'in flux', as Husserl puts 
it, there is a continuous 4adumbration' of the 'now 212 . However, 
if the 'now' is 
2'0 See Hcidegger's notion of 'Bcing-towards-death' and 'anticipatory resoluteness' in Being and 
7, ime. (Heidegger, M. 1962, Div. 11, Sect. I and 2, esp. 153. and 60). ý" Bemet, R. et al. 1993, p. 103. 212 Husserl, E. 199 1, § 19, [p. 471. 
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continually in flux, to the extent that protention, primordial impression and 
retention are continuously being modified, how is it that we are able to maintain 
the unity and identity of a temporal object, and finihermore, why is it not the case 
that an object should simply appear only to be simultaneously disappear, or be 
apprehended as a completely different object? 
If we go back to the role of retention, and the distinction Husserl draws between 
retention and recollection, we can go some way towards answering the above 
questions. When a new 'now' phase of a perceived temporal object inevitably 
supersedes the current 'now', there is a modification of the temporal modes such 
that there is a modification upon modification of retention, wherein each 
modification of an original primordial impression becomes less and less distinct. 
Although the lived-present is characterised by being in flux, retention stretches 
back over the whole duration of a temporal object in a specific act of 
consciousness (perception, imagination etc.. ): "The flowing consists in the passing 
of each phase of the original field (thus of a linear continuum) over into a 
retentional modification of the same, only just past, phase. And so it continues. , 213 
However, whilst the retention of a perceived ob ect stretches back fin-ther than the j 
just past phase to include all previous retention's, there is another characteristic of 
retention which allows the previous Oust-past) phase of the temporal object to be 
held back in all its temporal modes, and it is this characteristic of retention which 
allows for our experience of the lived present as a cerWn unity: 
213 Husserl. E. 199 1, Appendix VIE [p. 116]. 
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"This unity becomes constituted originally through the fact of the flow itself ; that 
is to say, it is the flow's proper essence not only simply to exist but to be a unity 
of experience and to be given in internal consciousness, In which a ray of 
attention can extend towards it. 55214 
Thus retention can be seen to have two functions, what Husserl refers to as a 
double intentionality of retention, whereby retention not only allows for the 
duration of a temporal phase, but its very unity. He characterises these two forms 
of retentional intentionality as logitudinal (or horizontal) intentionality, i. e. the 
flow which consists of the modification upon modification of an original 
primordial impression and subsequent previous retention's, and transverse 
intentionality, i, e. the holding back of the temporal modes of the previous now as 
a certain unity and thus identity: "There is one, unique flow of consciousness In 
which both the unity of the tone in immanent time and the unity of the flow of 
consciousness itself becomes constituted at once"215 . It is important not to 
conflate transversal intentionality with the representational character of 
recollection. Recollection is a specific act of consciousness which reproduces in 
total (i. e. isolates) the previous protentions, primal impressions and retentions 
which not only belong to a specific now, but those which belong to the whole 
perception of temporal objece 16; for example, the re-presentation of a melody as 
opposed to the direct intuition of a melody: 
"The latter modification has the character of a continuous adumbration; just as the 
now is continuously shaded off into the past and the further past, so too the 
214 Husserl, E. 1991, Appendix VIII [p. 117]. 
"' Husserl, E. 199 1, §39, [p. 90-83 1, and, Appendix VIII [p. 116-1191. 
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intuitive time-consciousness is continuously shaded off. On the other hand, we 
never refer to a continuous transition of perception into phantasy, of impression 
mto reproduction. The latter is a difference between discrete tbings. "" 7 
There are a number of points to be made in conclusion to this brief outline of 
Husserl's Investigation of time-consciousness. In the above we have seen that 
Husserl draws an important distinction between the character of retention 
(primary memory) and recollection (secondary memory). Against the storage 
hypothesis of memory which we have encountered at the beginning of this 
section, Husserl has shown that although the recollection of certain memorial 
representations exist as a specific form of consciousness, the act of recoflection is 
based upon a lived-present which is intended in the temporal field made up of the 
continuous flow of protention, primordial impression and retention. What 
recollection points towards is therefore a certain objective time which exists as a 
discrete and abstracted 'now' point as opposed to a directly intuited time of the 
present. Thus, in accounts of dyslexia which charactense reading and writing 
difficulties as a problem related to short-term memory, even in light of Husserl's 
investigations, the notion of 'storing' specific temporal objects as representations 
(a phonological code) may be valid. However, what the double role of 
intentionality does suggest is that problems surrounding the recol-lection of such 
phonological codes may reside with the intentional (and hence meaningrul rather 
than reaO layer of the intuited lived-present, an argument I will flesh out with the 
help of Merleau-Ponty's thought on temporality 
216 Bcmet. R- et al. 199-3, p. 105. 
Husscri, E. 199 1, § 19, [p. 46-471 
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The presence of 'ek-static' tem 
Although Merleau-Ponty utilises and modifies a certain amount of Husserl's 
account of time-consciousness in the penultimate chapter of Phenomenology... - 
'Temporality, ), most notably the themes of protention and retention, he is clearly 
unhappy with some of the philosophical consequences of the Husserhan account, 
and it could be argued that such criticisms (implicit in the 'Temporality' chapter, 
but explicit in The Visible and the Invisible) are a result of Merleau-Ponty's own 
corporeal-based phenomenology, and Heidegger's own interpretation of 
temporalitY2 18. As one commentator puts it: "Merleau-Ponty considers Husserl's 
analysis as 'correct, ' but it is not therefore 'true'. Husserl only lays the 
groundwork for an analysis of true time"219 . In giving an exposition. of the main 
themes in the 'Temporality' chapter, I will explain how Merleau-Ponty modifies 
the Husserlian themes of protention, retention and presence, and in so doing Witl 
concentrate on two main concerns he has with Husserl's account of time- 
consciousness, that is, the implicit seriality of time and reliance upon a passive 
synthesis of now-points, and furthermore, the wider problems associated with 
transcendental subjectivity which undermine Husserl's general approach to 
temporality. 
Perhaps most pertinent to the concerns of this thesis is the way in which 
temporality has a ftindamental. bearing on the theme of operative intentionality, 
I will come back to Heidegger's notion of 'ek-static' temporality later in the section. Within the 
bounds of the 'Temporality' chapter, Merleau-Ponty is clearly drawing on two of He, degger's 
texts, Being and Time (Heidegger, M. 1962), and Kant and the Problem ofMetaphysics 
(Heidegger, M. 1990). For a discussion of the Nvay in which Merleau-Ponty draws on Heidegger's 
account of temporality, and the manner in which these two interpretations agree and disagree, seeý 
Camele. A. 1975, 
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i. e. the originary dynamic synchronicity between body and world which endows 
our situations with meaning. In a key passage from the 'Temporality' chapter 
Merleau-Ponty sets out what is 'correct' about Husserl's analysis, and 
ftuthermore, the way M which it falls short of bemg 'true': 
"In Husserl's language, beneath the 'intentionality of the act', which is the thetic 
consciousness of an object ... we must recognise an 'operative' intentionality 
(fungierende Intenionalitat) which makes the former possible ... In order to have a 
past or a future we do not have to bring together, by means of an inteflectual act a 
series of abschattungen, for they posses a natural and primordial unity, and what 
is announced through them is the past or the future itself Such is the paradox of 
what Might be termed, with Husserl, the 'passive synthesis' of time - and of a 
term which is clearly not a solution, but a pointer to the problem. " (p. 418-9) 
Because of Merleau. -Ponty's commitment to an embodied perspective as opposed 
to the 'cosmic overview' of a transcendental consciousness,, the need for an act of 
consciousness which would synthesise and thus unify time, even if it were to be 
conceived of as 'passive', is not needed if time is understood as a spread, a notion 
which we have already encountered in the context of language as a self- 
differentiating phenomenon. What Merleau-Ponty will further argue is that, by 
way of an original 'transition-synthesis' which belongs to time (as opposed to 
consciousness), time cannot be thought of as having a detenninate identity 
constituted by consciousness, but of having a specific style which is in relation to 
the world. I will come back to these themes below, but in order to gain a better 
219 Spick-er. S. 1973, p. 246. 
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understanding of Merleau-Ponty's position, we need to see how the above serves 
as a critique of Husserl's unplicit seriality of time. 
Although Husserl, indeed the phenomenological tradition in general, may be 
unfamiliar with such vocabulary, there is in Husserl's investigation of time- 
consciousness a conception of time which is representative of what McTaggart 
refers to as the experience of an A-series and B-series of time 220 . The A-series is 
conceived of as involving the constant change or flow of time, whereby an event 
starts in the remote future, moves into the present and becomes more and more 
removed when slipping into the past. Opposed to an experience of time as pure 
change, the B-series is conceived of as time being ordered in a static fashion, i. e. 
there is a permanent ordering to events, such that in an isolated week Monday 
inevitably comes before Thursday. When applying these definitions to Husserl, 
we can see that his philosophy of time undoubtedly fits the A-series in that the 
flux of time-consciousness is defined by a change from protention to primordial 
impression to retention. However, to a certain extent Husserl's account also lends 
itself to a notion of seriality which fits the B-series of permanent order. This is 
certainly GaRagher's position 221 , as he points out that the process of retention, 
most notably the operafion of transversal intentionality, also maintains a certain 
temporal ordering among the phases of the flux, whereby each phase slips ftu-ther 
into a past which can never become present again except in the form of re- 
presentation. Although Husserl's account of time is characterised by flux, the 
tiature of this flux is quite orderly as a specific just-past retention is inescapably 
2") See MeTaggart's seminal article, 'The unreality of time' (MctaggartJ. 1908. ). For an 
introduction to the problems accounted provok-ed by the notion of A and B-series, seeý Turetzky, 
P. 199& 
2, ' Gallagher, S. 1998, p. 87-8. 
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more recent than a retention of a retention, and thus time presents itself as 
unwavering, predictable and unambiguous. For Merleau-Ponty, the notion of a B- 
series is inconsequential to a corporeal-based account of primordial temporality, 
but although he detects a problem of identity of Husserl's account he is not so 
quick to lay accusations of seriality. In a working note from The Visible and the 
Invisible Merleau-Ponty challenges the assertion that temporality is necessarily an 
ordered seriality, as certain past experiences (he still refers to them as retentions) 
and the phenomenon of forgetting are two concrete examples which contradict 
such a smooth, detenninate theory of predictabihty. He wntes: 
"there are retentions that are not forgotten, even remote ones. There are fragments 
rperceived' Just now, that disappear ... Husserl's diagram is dependent on the 
convention that one can represent the series of nows by points on a line. To be 
sure, Husserl at this point adds the whole recasting of the retentions... and it is In 
this that he does not conceive of time as serial and as a succession of punctual 
events. But even complicated in this fashion, the representation of the 
phenomenon of flow is faulty. Not inasmuch as it is spatial. For in fact space does 
not comprise points, lines, any more than time does. Understand that the Gestalt is 
already transcendence: it makes me understand that a line is a vector, that a point 
is a center of forces -- There are neither absolute lines nor points nor colors In the 
things. 
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As is the case with much of The Visible and the Invisible (including the Working 
Notes), Merleau-Ponty's style of writing is far more critical than assertive, and 
2-,., Mcrelau-Pontv, M. 1968, p. 195. 
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within the above working note he only gestures towards the way in which 
temporality could be thought beyond (or perhaps beneath) seriality, an experience 
of time as a differentiating spread - "a separation (icart), a relief ."- which 
should be considered as the fundamental ground of perceptual meaning223 . It is 
clear that Husserl has moved on from a simplistic seriality associated with the folk 
psychology of measured or 'clock time', yet the flux of time he refers to is 
characterised by Merleau-Ponty as "a heaping up of the past and a tremor of the 
future ... a multiplicity of 
linked phenomena" which is represented as "an 
instantaneous cross-section of time... " (p. 419), and constituted by the 
synthesising activity of a transcendental consciousness. What Merleau-Ponty is 
objecting to in the main quote above, and what is implicit in the 'Temporality' 
chapter, is that the 'now' cannot be thought of something in-itself. The present is 
not ordered in the manner of Husserl's diagram, for we do not always experience 
time as an anticipated seriality, rather our experience of time is far less predictable 
f r224 and more creative than Husserl gives credit 0 
Opposed to notions of temporality which treat time as an objective in-itself or a 
subjective for-itself, Merleau-Ponty envisages a network of corporeal 
intentionalities which are connected with our experiential field ofpresence -a 
reciprocal presence to the world and to the self. Thus, Merleau-Ponty's notion of 
presence, and of time in general, is contingent upon our taking up of a situation, a 
bodily perspective that interacts with the world in the creation of meanings: "Time 
exists for me only because I am situated in it that is, because I become aware of 
2n Merleau-Ponty, M. 1968, p. 197. 
224 For a comprehensive discussion of the way in which both Merleau-Ponty and modem science 
offer a variety of examples which contradict the apparent senality of Husserl's account, see: 
Gallagher, S. 1998, Ch. 6. 
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myself as already committed to if' (p. 423). I have mentioned above that time, as 
with language, is characterised by Merleau-Ponty as a 'spread', Le. a smg1e, 
stretchable and self- differentiating phenomenon, and it is because of this 
characteristic that presence should be understood as an opening onto otherness, or 
as we have encountered in previous chapters, presence understood as implicating 
a co-presence (e. g. the co-presence of objects in the phenomenal field, or the co- 
presence of spatiality and temporality). Thus, in response to Husserl's reliance 
upon a passive synthesis which acts as an identification of individual instants, 
Merleau-Ponty states. 
"There is, then, not a multiplicity of linked phenomena, but one single 
phenomenon of running-off. Time is the one single movement appropriate to itself 
in all its parts, as a gesture includes all the muscular contractions necessary for its 
execution ... It is nothing but a general 
flight out of the Itself, the one law 
governing these centrifugal movements, or again, as Heidegger says, an ek-stase. " 
(p. 419) 
There is no need for time to have a unifying synthesis engendered by a 
transcendental subjectivity, for as Merleau-Ponty imphes in the above quote, and 
as we have seen in other examples of operative intentionality from previous 
chapters, we have a pre-reflective grip over the dialogue between the world and 
our body. In the fundamental context of time this pre-reflective awareness can be 
understood as the field of presence outrunning itself in the direction of a future 
and a past. - "the ftesh present is the passage of a future to present, and of former 
present to past" (p. 419). Instead of the present being a determinate, closed 
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phenomenon, the ever 'fresh present' is a general, and therefore ambiguous 
structure which allows us to transcend the immediate, punctual 'now' which, 
44 amounts to saying that each present reasserts the presence of the whole past 
which it supplants, and anticipates that of all is to come... Aere is one single time 
which is self-confirmatory" (p. 420-1). There is not one present, then another 
present, nor a present with its 'temporal fiinge', then another with its temporal 
fringe needing synthesis, but a spread "between a past which structures and sets 
, I- the essential conditions of this present and a future of perpetual demands for new 
and present articulations of the pasf 1-225 . Thus, the notion of presence should be 
understood as an indivisible project which can be viewed from the perspectives of 
the past, present and future, and although the field of presence is utterly dependant 
upon these temporal dimensions, the past: "therefore, is not past, nor the future 
future... A past and a future spring forth when I reach out towards them. " (p. 42 1). 
Although presence in virtue of its stretchability is therefore a dynamic unity, our 
experience of time is in no way a coincidence of the future or past with the 
present, rather, there is an overlapping, or as we have already seen, a co-presence 
of dimensions. This should come as no surprise in light of former chapters, for 
just as we are restricted to a perspectival relationship within an ambiguous 
phenomenal field, we are also restricted to a specific field of presence, albeit that 
the field of presence is endowed with a certain ambiguity and depth owing to its 
temporal horizons. But although the field of presence is itself a dynamic unity, 
how exactly do the past, present and future relates to presence as a network of 
intenionalities? Furthermore, what exactly is the relationship between time, the 
world, and the body? 
Mallin, S, 1979, p. 95. 
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The manner in which Merleau-Ponty conceives of a relationship between the past 
and the present, and the future and the present is especiaUy IMPortant for my own 
arguments as it directly informs and deepens some of my conclusions in the 
previous chapter on language, most notably in respect of the theme of 
sedimentation. As such, the template for much of Merleau-Ponty's thoughts on 
this subject will be familiar, most notably the creative ftdfdment of previous 
intentions within our current projects, a kind of coherent deformation of the 
current gestalt of the temporal spread. The crux of Merleau-Ponty's argument is 
the idea of presence outrunning itself as a perpetual distancing and differentiating 
between itself and a previous or future field of presence, whilst simultaneously 
maintaining a certain continuity and openness to the past and the future as a 
unified structure: 
"There is no need for a synthesis externally binding together the fempora into one 
single time, because each one of the tempora was already inclusive, beyond itself, 
of the whole open series of other lempora, being in internal corrununication with 
them, and because the 'cohesion of a life' is given with its ek-stase. The passage 
of one present to the next is not a thing which I conceive, nor do I see it as an 
onlooker, I effect it; I am already at the impending present as my gesture is 
already at its goal. "' (p. 421) 
The field of presence has a lived depth and thickness in virtue of it stretching 
towards the horizons of the past and future, i. e. an opening onto otherness, and 
therefore a fresh present cannot be grasped in its entirety - it is ambiguous. 
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However, as we have seen with the operative intentionality of the body, if there is 
an 'aim' or ftmdarnental 'project' to our practical situations, this can be 
characterised as the pre-reflective 'maximum grip' we strive to mamtain over 
situations, i. e. the way in which we comport ourselves towards a situational 
gestalt. Thus, when looking at a 'specific' field of presence it is not as though 
there is a specific point 'in time' which it represents. Rather, as the above quote 
confirins, it is a presence which is constantly under transition, which in practical 
terms is a striving to keep a maximum grip over our situation in the face of an 
anticipated present (the horizon of the future) and the expectations of a former 
present (the horizon of the past). From the perspective of a fresh 'present' in 
relation to a former present, there is a certain motivation or 'indivisible thrust' 
(p. 423) of time, and hence a fluid connection between two fields of presence 
which comes about through a taking up of past intentions within the present. in 
this way there is a certain refocusing of the past within a fresh present, as only 
certain intentions are selected from the ambiguity of the previous present, whilst 
certain others are left unfulfilled and remain in the background, and we have 
already seen this process in the form of the acquisition and creation of new 
linguistic meanings. However, because there is a certain refocusing and fulfilment 
of specific intentions, there is also a constant reconfiguration of my intentional 
gestalt, and thus there is a certain distancing, separation and differentiation of one 
present from another: "primordial temporality is not a juxtaposition of external 
events, since it is the power which holds them together while keeping apart" 
(p. 422). 
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We can also view this phenomenon of a temporal spread from a more futural 
perspective, for although there is a fulfilling of certain previous intentions within 
the present, there is in this very performance an opening onto new and 
inexhaustible horizons of possibility, and hence a demand to fulfil certain 
intentions which are appropriate to our current situation. This means that one can 
only understand the 'present' as a provisional notion, for as soon as a fresh 
present comes into being it is always starting to transform mto, another fresh 
present under the expectations of past and future horizons. Agam we have already 
come across a similar phenomenon in the guise of sedimentation. Just as new 
linguistic structures are enveloped into our sedimented gestalt of language and 
therefore go onto affect the way in which we use language, so the fresh present is 
immediately relegated to the status of a past, albeit a past which still affects the 
future. 
hi light of the comments made in the first section concerning the concept of a 
storage hypothesis and the idea of recollection understood as a deliberate re- 
presentation, the important point to make here is that, irrespective of whether one 
is focussing on the theme of time or language, the notions of 'past' and 
'sedimentation' cannot be understood as Inert repositories of our lived experience 
- both the past and sedimented language is always at work in shapmg our 
meaningful relationship with the world. Indeed, the spread of time that is 
constitutive of our field of presence, in its capacity to differentiate from itself 
whilst remaining in contact with "the whole past which it supplants, and 
anticipates that of all 'Is to come" (p. 420), can be seen as having a direct parallel 
with the way in which we have understood the genesis of a certain style of 
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meaning in the context of language. This is something Merleau-Ponty is qwte 
aware of, for it is temporality understood as presence which is ftmdamental to our 
meaningful relationship with the world, that is, our style of being-in-the-world: 
"There is a temporal style of the world, and time remains the same because the 
past is a former future and a recent present, the present an impending past and 
recent future, the future a present and even a past to come; because, that is, each 
dimension of time is treated or aimed at as something other than itself and 
because, finally, there is at the core of time a gaze, or, as Heidegger puts it, an 
Augen-blick, someone through whom the word as can have a meaning. We are 
not saying that time is for someone ... We are saying that time is someone" 
(p. 422) 
There are two primary inter-related themes that Merleau-Ponty is specifijing in the 
above quote, firstly, the notion of finie and subjecfivity being reversible 
phenomena, and secondly, the creation of meaning and our capacity for 
communication which is subtended by temporality. Of these themes I Will 
concentrate mainly on the former in this section, whilst I will elaborate on the 
latter in the final section of the chapter in relation to language and dyslexia. The 
basic point to be gained from the above quote regarding the reversibility of 
subjectivity and temporality is that for time to exist there must be a bodily 
relationship with the world, a provisional perspective grounded in ambiguity 
which nevertheless allows for the taking up of a certain situation. Thus it is 
neither the case that time is an external and eternal phenomenon which can exist 
outside of a bodily perspective, nor that the body is necessarily constitufive of 
241 
time. As Merleau-Ponty puts it: "I am not the creator of time any more than of my 
heart-beats ... yet once I am born, time flows through me, whatever I do" (p. 427). 
We have seen that the field of presence is a unified phenomenon, albeit one which 
is self-differentiating and thus in a state of perpetual becoming, i. e. it is a general 
phenomenon which opens onto the world and the inexhaustible horizons of the 
past and future. Now in that Merleau-Ponty equates time (presence) With 
subjectivity (existence), and vice-versa, there is a certain reversibility in the way 
that the body-subject is capable of becoming aware of itself, for as with time, the 
body-subject is also conceived of as a certain spread or indivisible thrust, i. e. a 
unified multiplicity of specific events, actions and experiences which are part of a 
general and unfinished project. Thus, just as for temporality there is a co-presence 
of ever 'fresh' presents which can never coincide with each other, it is also the 
case that we can never befilly aware of ourselves as a bodily subjectivity, i. e. we 
can never exhaust the depth of the fived-body (neither just body schema nor body 
image) in its continuous stretching from birth to death. What Merleau-Ponty 
suggests is that both time and subjectivity M their reciprocal relationship Witb 
each other are characterised by their 'auto-positing': 
"Time is 'the affecting of self by self; what exerts the effect is time as a thrust 
and a passing towards a ftiture: what is affected is time as an unfolded series of 
presents: the affecting agent and affected recipient are one, because the dirust of 
time is nothing but the transition from one present to another. This ek-Stase, this 
projection of an indivisible power into an outcome which is already present to it, 
is subjectivity" (p. 426) 
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Merleau-Ponty's point is that because he has done away with a conception of 
subjectivity which is dependant upon the transparency of a transcendental ego, i. e. 
a subject which cannot maintain a concrete relationship with the world, the body- 
subject is not simply a constituting and thus affecting agent, but it is also that 
which is affected. As with temporality, the lived-body is in a constant state of flux 
which we have already characterised as ambiguity, yet there is a real awareness of 
itself in the form of a general and pre-reflective style. As Langer puts it, 
subjectivity in Merleau-Ponty's sense: "is self-affecting, rather than unchanging 
-)1,226 self-identity. In its attempt to grasp a current project and thus maintain a 
certain grip over a situation, the body-subject is involved in some fonn of self- 
expression, and this necessity to articulate is understood as a gesture, e. g. bodily 
or linguistic. Nevertheless, what the body-subject cannot attain is an exhaustive 
articulation of its involvement in a situation, as such a form of totalised positing 
would always be at the mercy of the temporal horizons of the past and future. 
Thus, Merleau-Ponty claims, any articulation of a current project is done so at a 
distance - as with the structure of temporality, subjectivity cannot coincide with 
itself for if it were to do so the body-world dialogue generative of meaning would 
collapse: "to retain is to hold, but at a distance" (p. 423). It is in this way that the 
body-subject gains awareness of itself in the movement of presence, i. e. the 
perpetual movement away from 'the present' towards an impending fresh present. 
As with the phenomenon of a temporal field of presence, it is also the case that the 
body-subject is always ahead of itself, yet to be fully determined, and thus 
Merleau-Ponty states: "the explosion or dehiscence of the present towards a future 
is the archetype of the relationship of seýf to seýf, and it traces out an interionty or 
226 Langer, M. 1989, p. 129. 
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ipseity. " (p. 426). What we fmd in the themes of temporality and subjectivity are 
two reciprocal structures which articulate the manner in which Being is inherently 
an opening onto otherness, and our lived experience is truly grounded in an 
ambiguous relationship between the body and the world. 
Within the above study of presence one can see an account which stretches ftu-ther 
than simply an investigation into our experience of time. In stating that the subject 
is temporality we start to see how subjectivity, in the form of a body-subject, is 
capable of remaining one with itself, albeit ever changing, from birth until death. 
The body-subject, in its pre-reflective relationship with the world, is ultimately a 
perpetual project of self-articulation, and such an articulation is very much the 
type of expressive existence we have encountered in the previous chapter on 
language. Furthermore, the cohesiveness of the body-subject and thus the 
cohesiveness of expression itself (i. e. language) takes place through time - 
subjectivity and its continuous project of self-articulation is, as Merleau-Ponty 
suggests above, a temporal phenomenon. What I will attempt to articulate in the 
. r- - final section of the chapter is the way in which language is ultimately grounded in 
temporality, whi-Ist language can also be seen to affect temporality. This 
discussion will then go onto inform my final conclusions concerning the style of 
dyslexia. 
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The temporalit 0 v of expression and dvslexia 
Although the final section of this chapter will deal with the way in which 
Merleau-Ponty's understanding of temporality as 'presence' can be related to 
dyslexic experience, and furthermore how such an understanding highlights some 
of the conceptual limitations of the existing literature, what I am most interested 
in is how the above presentation of temporality can enrich my conclusions 
regarding the peculiar expressive style of dyslexia. To begin to do this I must first 
show how the reciprocal relationship between temporality and subjectivity also 
underscores the manner in which the expression of the lived-body is open to 
others, and thus temporahty can be further understood as not only the ground of 
meanmg, but intersubjectivity and instituted language. Again it is the notion of 
presence which holds the key to the opening of the lived-body onto 
intersubjectivity and communication. Returning to the final section of Merleau- 
Ponty's essay On the Phenomenoloýg of Language which brings together the 
theines of intentionality, expression, intersubjectivity and temporafity, the author 
states: 
"The ultimate philosophical step is to recognize what Kant calls the 
'transcendental affinity' of moments of time and temporalities ... Now 
it is at the 
heart of my present that I find the meaning of those presents which preceded it 
and that I find the means of understanding others' presence at the same world; and 
it is in the actual practise of speaking that I learn to understand. 11227 
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We have seen that temporality is an ek-static structure, and is therefore a dynamic 
unity which outruns itself by opening onto the horizons of our whole past and 
possible futures, and it is this ek-static organisation of time which is also the 
template for our understanding of subjectivity, inter- subjectivity and expression; 
as Mallin puts it: "ekstase is the 'law' of every possible type of subjective act. ""' 
in the previous section I have already touched on the structural affinities between 
the perpetual passing of the fresh present into the past, and the envelopment of 
creative or 'fresh' language into a sedimented form of language. The primary 
affinity of 'past' and 'sedimented' structures is their capacity to endure, and thus 
influence our future projects. This is possible because our actions, expressions and 
experiences in general are not simply stored as inert traces that can be re- 
presented, but are incorporated into the spreads of time and language as horizons 
which constantly feed into the way in which we maintain our pre-reflective hold 
over a situation. Therefore, in our experience of the fresh present, certain 
expectations of our past experience (and not necessarily a 'just past') are able to 
be continued, our situation dictating which intentions are to be fulfifled whilst 
others are left to fade away as insignificant. As Merleau-Ponty shows, this 
continuation of the past is not simply an attribute of temporality, but very much a 
feature of our 'expressive operations', which: 
" instead of driving the preceding ones away - simply succeeding them and 
annulling them - salvage, preserve, and ... take them up again; and the same 
phenomenon is produced in respect to others' expressive operations -), 
229 
. 
Merleau-Pontx, M. 1964 (a), p. 97. 
Mallm, S. 1979, p. 103. 
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Thus 'Presence' understood as a unified and self-differentiating structure is also at 
the heart of language, for it is in the present that we not only 'keep the promises' 
(i. e. interpret and carry forward the 'truth' carried by language) of our sedimented 
past of expressions, but we also keep the promises of others through an 
acquisition of a tradition in our use of instituted language. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter on language, the 'truths' (always understood as provisional) that 
are carried forward and endure in expression are accomplished not by a timeless 
grasp of meaning but through a historical and cultural act of sedimentation, and 
we can understand this phenomenon on a wider, more social level M the form of 
cultural institutions - Stiftungen. Thus, signification -whether it be a bodily 
gesture, the spoken word or the written text - can also be understood as a form of 
presence, an expressive act which, as one commentator puts it: "inhabits all time 
as the soundful and gestural incarnation of a presence which moves within a 
temporality of infinite horizons. 1,7230 
To gain a better understanding of exactly how the ek-static structure of 
temporality is also operational widiin expression, and thus instituted language, I 
briefly tum again to the reversible relationship between temporality and 
subjectivity. Although we have already located the critical role of an operative 
intentionality that engenders our experience as meaningftd in our investigations of 
the lived-body, spatiality and language, it is through Merleau-Ponty's account Of 
temporality understood as an ek-static structure, that the fundamental level of our 
pre-reflective, pre-personal contact with the world is disclosed as a form of being- 
in-the-world which is always already ahead of itself Thus, the fundamental 
, ýQ ' Nlericau-Ponty, M. 1964 (a), p. 95. ,; o Gilian, G. 1970, p. 23. 
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gTound and template of our operative intentionality is a temporality which is 
already temporalising itself - it is self-affecting. Following this assertion, we have 
also seen that our bodily subjectivity can be understood as an ek-static structure 
and is therefore marked by its own non-coincidence and self-positing. Although 
the body subject becomes aware of itself through a self-articulation and is thus 
capable of finding its situation meanmgftd, such a self-positing will always be 
incomplete and thus open to further elaboration. Because the body is a project that 
is always already within the world, i. e. ahead of itself, such a self-articulation will 
always be at the mercy of future possibi1ities, and hence our expression and grasp 
of the self is necessarily incomplete: "The transcendence of the instants of time is 
both the ground of, and the impediment to, the rationality of my personal history" 
(p. 347). Furthennore, because our awareness of self is constantly displaced and 
thus ambiguous, this has a direct consequence for the manner in which we sustain 
a meaningful relationship with the world through our operative intentionality. As 
Merleau-Ponty points out, our meaningful relationship with the world is grounded 
in an ambiguity which aRows for "an active transcendence between the subject 
and the world" (p. 430), and yet because such a transcendence involves a form of 
subjectivity which is necessarily incomplete (i. e. a bodily rather than 
transcendental subjectivity) the meaningfulness of our current situation can only 
be a perspectival one: 
"We have no way of knowing what a picture or a thing is other that by looking at 
theni, and their significance is revealed only if we look at them from a certain 
point of view, from a certain distance and in a certain direction [sens], in short 
only if we place, at the service of the spectacle, our collusion with the 
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world ... 
[T]he meaning of a sentence is its import or intention, which once more 
presupposes a departure and arrival point, an aim and a point of view" (p. 429-30) 
The main point to be taken from the above is not only that meaning is to be 
understood as sens and thus as a certain directionality and perspectivity, but 
moreover, because meaning is always from a specific 'point of view' it must be 
treated as provisional and always open to another interpretation. in every creation 
of meaning that is thematised by the body-subject's self-positing, there is 
inevitably a sense of the tentative and the incomplete, indeed, it is always open to 
an-other perspective because we are open to a field of presence which we 
continually attempt to express and yet can never fully do so. Furthermore, because 
self-awareness is mediated through expression rather than a direct intuition of the 
self, there is an awareness of self which is only gained at a distance, for although 
there is an echo of the primordial relationship between the body and the world M 
our expressions, this is only done against the horizon of otherness. Not only is our 
self-expression the taking up of a past and a set of cultural traditions wit1iin the 
present but ftirthermore, such a form of presence - the re-activation of sedimented 
meanings - is an opening onto the 'inter-world' (p. 357) of the other, an other who 
is capable of entering into such a field of presence and creating his/her own 
meanings such that presence has to be understood as co-presence. What is 
disclosed in this study of presence is that in every instance of self-positing of the 
self, such an expression is made possible through the immanent presence of the 
other, an other who acts as the futural horizon of our self-expression and thus a 
honzon against which sens is directed, intended, anned at. As Merleau-Ponty puts 
it: 
249 
"two temporalities are not mutually exclusive as are two consciousness, because 
each one knows itself only by projecting itself into the present where they can 
interweave ... my living present open[s] on to temporalities outside my living 
experience and acquire a social horizon, with the result that my world is expanded 
to the dimensions of that collective history which my existence takes up and 
carries forward. " (P. 433) 
Temporality is not simply my own temporality, for temporality understood as an 
ek-static structure is inherently an opening onto otherness, and thus to different 
temporalities. What Merleau-Ponty fmds in his investigation of temporality is a 
structuring of our experience which allows for a sense of self, but one which is 
only mediated by expression against the background of the other, a co-existence 
rather than a co-incidence of temporality which sustains a diversity rather than 
seriality of time. What remains in this chapter is to see how a phenomenological 
interpretation of temporality that emphasises the ek-stwic nature of our existence 
has a bearing on my previous conclusions, most notably those reached in the 
previous chapter regarding the congealment of existential meaning, a phenomenon 
which I attributed to a difference in the operative intentionality of dyslexics. 
In brief, the conclusions I have reached thus far have cuhninated in the argument 
that there is a qualitative difference for dyslexics m the way in which operative 
intentionality engenders our world with existential meaning, and this difference is 
manifest most clearly in situations which are dependant upon the written word. 
From a phenomenological-explanatory perspective, we can attribute this dimming 
or stuttering of operative intentionality to a problem of integrating newly acquired 
meanings into the sedimented honzon of our indirect spread of language. The 
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problem is manifest at the level of interplay between a significative intention and 
the background of sedimented meanings, however, it is the 'unstable' 
temperament of the horizon of sedimented meanings which is fundamental to the 
problems faced by dyslexics. The notion of an unstable horizon can be interpreted 
as a persistent rising to the foreground of the dyslexic's sedimented meanings, and 
this results in a foreclosure of the differential spread of language and hence a 
flattening out of difference (e. g. the difference between phonemes, words etc.. ). 
From an intentional-positive perspective, the dyslexic is capable of employing 
certam compensatory strategies and replacement functions in order to mamtain a 
relationship with the written word (e. g. making greater use of context), and hence 
there is a development of a specific style of dyslexic expression. Indeed, it is only 
when such strategies break down (e. g. reading under the pressure of time), that the 
symptoms associated with dyslexia reveal themselves, and therefore it is at this 
point that a dimming of operative intenfionality, and thus problems described 
above, can be located. Now considering that Merleau-Ponty's account of presence 
is concerned with an ek-slatic understanding of temporality In which our 
meaningful expression and experience of the world is always against the horizons 
of the whole past and all possible futures, in what way does such an understanding 
of temporality refine my conclusions regarding incohesive sedimentation and a 
foreclosure of the dyslexic's differential. spread of language? 
In order to see how Merleau-Ponty's account of temporality can help clarify the 
above conclusions it will be helpful to look at an account of Goldstein's 
exposition of aphasia by Garth Gillan, as this pays specific attention to the 
relationship between language and temporality23 1. In his account of certain forms 
2" Sm Goldstein, K. 1948, and for his interpretation of this account, Gil-lan, G. 1970. 
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of aphasia, Goldstein makes a distinction between two 'attitudes' that are taken 
towards our experience of the world and thus the manner In which we find the 
world meaningful, an 'abstract' attitude and a 'concrete' attitude, both of which 
we have already come across in Merleau-Ponty's use of the Schneider case and 
other examples of psychopathology. The abstract attitude can be understood as a 
reflective and imaginative attitude that is able to comprehend experiences in terms 
of their categorial meanings, i. e. the capacity to name something and thus attribute 
a symbolic meaning to it (e. g. the 'pen' is 'red'), whilst the concrete attitude refers 
to the way in which meanings are restricted to the bounds of an immediate and 
thus practical situation, i. e. resorting to the concrete features of an object in order 
to describe it (e. g. describing a pen as a 'letter writer') 
In Goldstein's analysis, some patients suffering firom aphasia are recognised as 
being unable to live outside of their immediate situation, and thus are in some way 
compromised in their use of the abstract attitude. Goldstein observes that the 
aphasic's inability to grasp categorial meanings manifests itself as patients being 
unable to use a symbolic power of language to name an object, regardless of 
whether or not it be within their current sensory field. Subsequent symptoms 
include: learned words not being able to be used outside of the original context M 
which they were acquired; words not being able to be used in a metaphorical 
sense; and, communication ceasing to be spontaneous, i. e. a reaction to a situation 
or a conversation had to be initiated by another person 232 . In addition, the 
aphasic's orientation of space, such as indicating what was to the left of the 
patiený was also disturbed 233 . However, 
in Gillan's re-interpretation of 
Goldstein's observations, instead of referrmg to an abstract attitude and concrete 
2'2 Goldstem, K. 1948, p, 63. 
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attitude, he instead draws the reader's attention to the way in which such attitudes 
represent a variation of behaviour within temporal hoiuons, As he puts it: 
"The contrast between 'abstract' behaviour and language and 'concrete' behaviour 
and language is in actuality that between behaviour and language temporalized 
within infmite horizons and that temporalized within the immediate temporal 
horizons of the present situation ... For objects to be experienced as 'of a kind' 
they must be experienced within the flow of unmanent time of infinite horizons 
and not just the horizons of the past and future outlined by the inunediate, 
concrete situation. )-)234 
Gillan thus argues in his paper that in the examples of aphasic patients outlined by 
Goldstein, symptoms such as the loss of symbolic and metaphoncal language 
which are initially attributed to a loss of the abstract attitude can be ftirther 
understood as a restricted manner of temporalisation. Continuing Goldstein's Ime 
of inquiry, the aphasic's behaviour can be further understood as being limited to a 
punctual, momentary temporality which is surrounded by the horizons of an 
immediate past and future and which correspond to the practical nature of the 
current situation. Thus, in more phenomenological terms at least, what is perhaps 
ftindwnental to the loss of the more symbolic aspects of language for aphasics is 
the manner in which such modes of signification and their concurrent meanings 
are not able to endure over time. What is lost or at least vastly diminished, is the 
aphasic's openness to a background of infinite horizons of the whole past and of 
all possible futures, and the consequence of this is that the presence of a 
meaningful (and thus expressive) experience is restricted to the immediately 
1 Goldstein, K. 194K p. 267-8. '4Gillan, G. 1970, p. 2 1. 
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present rather than being able to stretch over time as part of our ek-static style of 
being-in-the-world. What these cases of aphasia seem to represent is a manner of 
temporalising which is unable to maintain an unbroken progression of the 
subject's progressive fields of presence; the aphasic cannot reopen time and 
"recapture the situation evoked" (p. 85). In light of my previous accounts of 
language and temporality, it would appear that the aphasic is unable to sediment 
the existential meanings of instituted language, meanings which would normally 
remain ever present to us as an immanent past i. e. a persisting background to our 
linguistic world which can be called upon by our operative intentionality. 
Although dyslexia may exhibit some of the symptoms presented in the above 
account of aphasia, dyslexia is clearly not debilitating in the sairne manner as 
aphasia (perhaps quantitatively as well as qualitatively), and to reduce an 
interpretation of dyslexia to a slackening of the abstract attitude akin to the above 
account of aphasia would be mistaken. Although dyslexia is a pathological 
phenomenon, there is no sense in which the dyslexic is permanently stuck in a 
specific manner of behaviour that would correspond to the 'concrete attitude', 
whilst it should also be pointed out that dyslexia is not marked by a loss of 
propositional language, metaphorical language or spontaneity. Following this 
assertion, there would be little point in further characterising dyslexia as a 
disorder which can be understood as a subject whose manner of temporalisation is 
restricted to the immediate present. However, in that both dyslexia and aphasia 
seem to be marked by a general impairment to the sedimentation of meanings, 
there must be some temporal basis to the way in which this phenomenon shows 
itself in cases of dyslexia, and thus, at the ftwdamental. level of temporality there 
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is at least a structural affinity between dyslexia and aphasia which can help to 
refine my previous conclusions. 
Our experience, and hence expression, of the world is given to us through our 
operative intentionality, a pre-reflective capacity of the body which is grounded 
upon an ek-static form of temporality. Thus, it would appear that the problems of 
'foreclosure' which I have associated with an incohesive horizon of sedimented 
meanings, and which I have shown to be characteristic of dyslexia, are in some 
way grounded in a different style of temporalisation. It is clear that since the start 
of this chapter we have moved a long way from a notion of time and memory that 
corresponds to the storage hypothesis of memory, and thus if one is to maintain 
the cognitive argument that dyslexia can be understood as a problem connected to 
the poor performance of short term memory, such an argw-nent can no longer rely 
upon a conception of recollection where meanings are understood as codified 
representations. What Merleau-Ponty's notion of an ek-stalic forrn of presence has 
shown is that, because each fresh field of presence is experienced against the 
infinite horizons of all our previous 'presents' and 0 those to come, we have the 
pre-reflective capacity to re-open time and thus bring to fiffl presence the manner 
in which we have previously found a certain situation meaningful. By re-opening 
time and bringing to presence a former situation, one is bringing to presence the 
lived-body's previous expression of a certain situation, i. e. the inimanent, 
existential meanings which belong to instituted language, and which always 
remain within our grasp as the background to our linguistic world in the fon-n of a 
sedimented gestalt of language. 
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It is this re-opening of time and re-activation of sedimented meanings which I 
believe is central to the phenomenon of dyslexia. Although I have already argued 
that such problems can be understood as a breakdown of operative intentionality, 
such a breakdown can now be further interpreted as a difference of 
temporal i sation, for it is in virtue of the ek-static, stretchable nature of temporality 
that we are able to maintain a smooth and flowing dialogue with the world. 
indeed, this is why I have previously conceptualised such a smooth dialogue as 
'dynamic synchronicity. I propose that what is different about the dyslexic's style 
of temporalisation is a propensity to briefly flatten out the depth of time, a depth 
wbich consists of the horizons of our whole past and all our futures to come, and 
thus such flattening out of time can be understood as dyslexics losing their sense 
of a past and an impending future. 
Although there are some affinities with the interpretation of aphasia offered 
above, I am in no way suggesting that the dyslexic is constantly restricted to the 
past and future horizons of an immediate present as is the case with aphasia, for a 
flattening out of the depth of time experienced by dyslexics is only short-lived, 
and can furthermore by characterised by an unpredictable, erratic occurrence. 
Furthermore, when an awareness of past and future is dissipated in the case of 
dyslexia, such a flattening out of time is of a such an intensity that we can 
understand it as an almost complete deprivation of temporal horizons, and here we 
are faced with the philosophical paradox of a current present existing almost 
entirely as an autonomous entity, i. e. there is no experience and thus expression of 
the present. I therefore argue that the dyslexic's style of ternporalisation is marked 
by an unpredictable and transient collapse of difference, where difference should 
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be understood as the non-coincidence of our fields of presence, and we have 
already seen a concrete example of this phenomenon in the foreclosure of the 
dyslexic's sedimented background of meanings. Indeed, because dyslexia is 
characterised by this fundamental collapse of difference, such a fractured style of 
temporalisation is necessarily intertwined with the manner in which the dyslexic 
subject is self-positing, the manner in which he/she relates to the other, and 
inevitably the way in which dyslexics relate to instituted language, 
It is ninportant to note that I ain not arguing here in favour of a directly causal 
connection between the dyslexic's style of temporalisation and their style of 
expression, for the topic of temporality is merely a more fimdamental way of 
themalising a set of symptoms which are prevalent in the dyslexic's use of written 
language. Merleau-Ponty has shown us that temporality and subjectivity are co- 
originary, and therefore a collapse of difference that is characteristic of the 
dyslexic's style of expression should be given the same priority as a collapse of 
difference wbich is characteristic of the dyslexic's style of temporalisation. 
Although ek-static temporality is the template for our ambiguous, Stylistic 
experience of the world, such that our sense of subjecfivity, openness to the other 
and use of language is grounded in an ek-static style of co-presence, it would be a 
mistake to claim that symptoms of dyslexia can be attributed to a certain style of 
temporalisation. Thus, in my final characterisation of dyslexia I wish to show how 
there is an intertwining of my conclusions ftom previous chapters, and the mitial 
conclusions given above. 
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In Merleau-Ponty's account of temporality we find that our field of presence is 
characterised as a reciprocal relationship between the indivisible dirust of time (or 
stretching over time), and the awareness of a 'fresh' present as different from that 
which has gone before it and that which is yet to come. Our experience of time is 
therefore one which involves a 'transition synthesis', a movement and 
differentiation which belongs to the very possibility of temporalisation itself, and 
is therefore opposed to the passive synthesis of time produced by a transcendental 
consciousness. It is my fmal assertion that the realisation. of a transition synthesis, 
i. e. the very possibility of temporalisation itself, would seem to be disrupted for 
dyslexics, most notably in situations where use of the written word is required, 
and this assertion has a physiological correlate in the form of work currently being 
conducted on the connections between the features of dyslexia and problems of 
sequencing and timing in the brain and nervous system of dyslexicS235. 
My assertion can be further clarified if we examine what occurs In the 
differentiation of one moment from another, that is, the taking up and continuation 
of previous intentions within a fresh present, a movement which inevitably 
changes the way in which we experience and thus express the world - 
differentiation - which nevertheless remains coherent with our previous projects. 
What would seem to be unconventional for dyslexics is not simply their ability to 
take up and continue preceding intentions, but more specifically, an attempt to 
bring to presence an existential meaning (a word, sentence, spelling, use of 
grammar) that has already been acquired and sediniented. Because the dyslexic is 
235 See: Wolff, P., Michel, G. & Ovrut, M. 1990; and, Wolff, P. 1993. Although in its forma 
i 
tive 
stages, itwould be interesting to take this research ftirther in a contemporary phenomenological 
vein, that is, through a new approach being taken to normal and abnormal behaviour by authors 
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a poor performer in sedimenting existential meanings, this has a hugely 
detrimental consequence for their capacity to pre-reflectively bring to presence 
meanings which are suited to a current situation, and therefore the intentions of 
the previous present fall short of being fulfilled. Thus, what is taken up in the 
fresh present is a sense of failure of previous intentions and there is an agitation of 
the anns of a current project - the endeavours of the dyslexic are being thwarted. 
In terms of a temporal theme, there is hence an experience of a new and different 
present, however this is a present which recognises the need to take up a radicaRy 
new direction to its current project in order to fulfil the needs of a current 
situation. instead of asserting that time seems to disappear for the dyslexic, it is 
perhaps more pertinent to suggest that the dyslexic is trapped in the same 
experience, for what is experienced is the frustrating effect of playing out the 
same present experience time and again, i. e. a thwarting of intentions which 
continues until a strategy is adopted to relieve the foreclosure of sedimented 
meanings, or the situation as the concern of a current project is abandoned. To 
give an overview of how these final arguments fit Mto my project as a whole, I 
now turn to a conclusion of what we have learned in all my previous chapters 
regarding the stylistic differences of dyslexia. 
such as Varela working between a phenomenology of time and neuroscientific approach to brain 
, states (See: Varela, F. & Shear. 1 1999; and Petitot, J. et al. 1999. ) 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has attempted to provide the philosophical groundwork for a 
phenomenological investigation into developmental dyslexia, and in doing so I 
have offered an original way of studying dyslexia that neither takes the form of an 
autobiographical report nor a clinical account of the causes of dyslexic problems. 
In the thesis I have used Merleau-Ponty's brand of existential phenomenology to 
describe the lived experience of the problems associated with dyslexia. These 
descriptions have been concerned with the particular style of intentional 
relationship exhibited by dyslexics when involved with situations which require a 
proficient utilisation of the written word, e. g. fluent reading. In order to present an 
authentic phenomenological account, my descriptions have not only been 
concerned with how dyslexics experience the breakdown of language, but also, 
the manner in which dyslexics are able to have a relationship with language, i. e. 
the different ways in which language is meaningftd. Through these descriptions I 
have started to reveal how, instead of dyslexia being explamed by phonological, 
visual and motor deficits, from a phenomenological perspecfive, dyslexics can be 
intetpreted as having a different style of being-in-the-world in relation to mitten 
language. My descriptions are in no way opposed to the claims of previous 
clinical research, as the aims and conclusions of this thesis are not of an 
explanatory nature, and therefore it is hoped that future empirical research may be 
facilitated by my invesfigafion. 
The main findings of this thesis are as follows. fn Chapter One I established that 
the mexpected failure to acquire written language skills in cases of dyslexia could 
260 
be studied in a way that draws attention to the experiential level of such a 
developmental disorder, and fiHthermore, that the focus of such a study would be 
on the different style of intentional relationship dyslexics share with language, as 
opposed to the possible deficits that are understood as causing the problems 
associated with dyslexia. Through Merleau-Ponty's critique of objective schools 
of thought I Introduced the idea of focussing on the lived experience of dyslexics, 
a world of meaningful experience that is created through the mtentional 
relationships between the body-subject and the world. Also in Chapter Two I 
emphasised the difficulties of applying Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological 
4method' to dyslexia as such a descriptive process is, in part, already derived ftom 
the phenomenological interpretation of behavioural abnormalities, i. e. a 
substantial difference in the body-world dialogue of specific situations. I therefore 
drew attention to the importance of not only describing the manner in which 
dyslexics have a substantially different body-world dialogue in linguistic 
situations, but the way in which dyslexics are able to find such situations 
meaningful at all. Chapter Three introduced Merleau-Ponty's notion of the lived 
body, a locus of experience which is engendered with a pre-reflective, operative 
intentionality and the reciprocal levels of body schema and body image. The 
acquisition and habituation of skills by the lived body was then discussed as a 
concrete example of how intentional relationships are developed, and furthermore, 
how such relafionships not only infuse our experience with an certain 
meaningfulness, but how they become self-effacing and are therefore only grasped 
as an indirect style. These findings are then applied to dyslexia and yield the 
following conclusions. 
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My first phenomenological descripfion. of dyslexia understands the features of 
dyslexia as a peculiar difference in the intentional relationships developed by the 
lived body. This assertion can be interpreted in greater detail as follows: firstly, 
the dyslexic's body schema can be understood as unsuitable for acquiring the 
skills needed for proficient levels of literacy, and therefore a poor habituation of 
such skills may occur; secondly, if the body schema is unsuitable, the 
sedimentation of such skills into habitual, intentional relationships which infuse 
the dyslexic's linguistic situations with meaning is compromised, and I conclude 
that the dyslexic is marked by an operative intentionality that tends to become 
disrupted in linguistic situations. I also note that although there is a loosening of 
the dyslexics operative intentionality, there is still some sort of intentional 
relationship at work, and therefore dyslexia is by no means a loss of meaning, 
rather, they can be seen as having a different style of being-in-the-world. These 
foundational conclusions are then applied to the contexts of space, expression and 
time. 
In Chapter Four's study of spatiality, depth and movement, I established through 
Merleau-Ponty's discussion of spatial ofientation that meaning should be 
considered as a form of directionality, whilst his phenomenological description of 
depth revealed that our intentional relationship with the world is marked by a 
spatio-temporal 'co-existence', and hence otherness. When applying the notion of 
lived space to dyslexia, I concluded that the equilibrium between dark space 
(involved, pathological) and clear space (impartial, disinterested) that grants a 
lived distance and 'grip' over our situations is unbalanced in favour of clear space. 
The consequences of this follow that objects in the dyslexic's perceptual field 
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present themselves as having equal importance, and therefore the dyslexic finds it 
hard to become spatially attuned to the requirements of the linguistic situation. In 
the context of movement the problem of spatial attimement is further interpreted 
as a disruption of interrogation, that is, being unable to maintain a smooth 
transition between different perspectives. 
Chapter Five has made the most notable contribution towards describing the 
specific differences in the dyslexic's style of being-in-the-world. Merleau-Ponty's 
pHosophy of expression is grounded in perception and thus language is 
understood as having a gestural meaning. This existential meaning of language is 
therefore experienced as an indirect style rather than representational content, and 
such meanings are created through the differential spread of language, both 
drawing ftom and producing new sediments of existential meaning. My initial 
conclusions concerning the dyslexic's problems of sedimentafion. were applied to 
this context, and as a general claim I interpreted the dyslexic's experience of 
language as a congealment of existential meaning. In fin-thenng this claim, I 
argued that dyslexics are prone to an unsteady sedimentation of existential 
meanings, and that this is experienced by dyslexics as a loosening of their 
intentional relationship in linguistic situations, more specifically, a foreclosure of 
the differential spread of language. However, in becoming aware of such 
problems, the dyslexic tries to develop compensatory strategies in an attempt to 
find a re-equilibrium with the requirements of the situation. Those strategies 
which prove successful are habituated by the dyslexic body and therefore 
contribute towards the style of intentional relationships peculiar to dyslexia. Thus, 
the experience of dyslexia is one of a slackening of intentional relationships that 
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are unique to dyslexia through their habituation of compensatory strategies, and I 
noted that this discovery would be suitable for future empirical research of a 
qualitative nature. 
The final chapter of the thesis gave a more ontological underpinning to my 
conclusions through a study of temporality. After drawing attention to the 
shortcomings of the storage hypothesis of memory, notable its dependency on re- 
presentation, I introduced an alternative approacb to memory and time in the form 
of Husserl's double intentionality of retention -a phenomenological descriptionof 
how a temporal object can endure and remain meaningful over a passage of time. 
Although Merleau-Ponty takes much from Husserl's investigation into time, most 
notably the idea of specific intentionalities (protentions and retentions) modified 
into a network of intentionalities, he is critical of the need for a continuous 
passive synthesis that is accomplished by a transcendental consciousness. What 
Merleau-Ponty proposes is a ek-static form of temporality that is marked by a 
transition-synthesis, that is, a presence which continuously outruns itself due to it 
being surrounded by the infinite horizons of a past and future. The thickness of 
time and co-existence of temporal dimensions is understood as the ontoloVcal 
ground for our intentional relationships with the world, most notably our capacity 
to obtain a distance and awareness of the self through expression. LU applying 
these observations to dyslexia, I was able to elaborate on the faltering of operative 
intentionality by concluding that the dyslexic has a different style of 
temporalisation, a style that is characterised by a susceptibility towards flattening 
out the thickness and implicatory nature of time. As such, this is experienced as a 
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stuttering of the smooth transition between temporal dimensions, and the 
. I- . dyslexic's opening onto language through expression of the self is compromised. 
265 
Bibliouraphy 
Aaron, P. & Guillemard, J. 1993. 'Artists as Dyslexics', in Willows, D. et al. 
Abdulla, S. 1998. 'Left hermsphere of the brain is underactive in dyslexic people', 
in British Medical Journal, 316, p. 1189. 
Alm, J. & Andersson, J. 1995. 'Reading and writing difficulties at prisons in the 
county of Uppsala', in Dyslexia Project of the National Labour Market Board of 
Sweden. 
Arcaya, J. 1989. 'Memory and Temporality: a phenomenological alternative, in 
f1hilosophical Psychology, 2.1, p. 10 1-4. 
Ashworth, P. 1996. 'Presuppose nothing! The suspension of assumptions mi 
phenomenological psychological methodology', in Journal of Phenomenological 
Psychology, 27, p. 1-25. 
Bergson, H. 1991. Matter and Memory. Trans. Paul, N. & Pahner, W. (orig, 
1896). New York: Zone Books. 
Bemet R., Kem, 1. & Marbach, E. 1993. An Introduction to Husserhan 
Phenomenologv. Trans. Verlag, F. (orig. 1989). Evanston: Northwestem 
University Press. 
Biggar, S. & Barr, J. 1996. 'The Emotional World of Specific Learning Difficulties', 
in Reid, G. 1996. 
Block, R. 1990. (ed. ) 'Editors Introduction' - Cognitive Models of Psychologicol 
Time. Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Bolton, D. & Hill, J. 1996. Mind, Meaning and Mental Disorder. oxford: oxford 
University Press. 
266 
Bordo, S. 1998. 'Reading the Slender Body', in Welton, D. 1998. 
Brady, S. & Shankweiler, D. 1991. (eds. ) Phonological Processes in Literacy. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Brady, S. 1986. 'Short-term memory, phonological processing and reading abiliý-ý, 
in Annals ofDyslexia, 36, p. 138-153. 
Brady, S. 199 1, p. 129-52. 'The role of working memory 'in reading disability' in 
Brady, S. & Shankweiler, D. 1991. 
Bullington, J. 1999. The Mysterious Life of the Body: A New Look at 
Psychosomatics. Link6ping (Sweden) Studies in Arts and Science, 190. 
Bunnudez, A., Marcel, A. & Eilan, N. (eds. ). 1996. The Body and the Seýf 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Catnele, A. 1975. 'Time in Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, in Philosophy Today, 
Fall, p. 256-268. 
Casey, E. 199 1. 'The Element of Voluminousness: Depth and Place Re- 
examined', in Dillon, A 1991. 
Casey, E. 1993. Getting Back Into Place. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press. 
Cash, T. and Brown, T. 1987. 'Body image in Anorexia Nervosa and Buliniia 
Nervosa: A Review of the Literature, in Behaviour Modification 11,487-521; 
Cataldi, S. 1993. Emotion, Depth and Flesh. New York: State University of New 
York Press. 
267 
Cheung Chung, A (ed. ) 1997. Psychological Concepts From Philosophical and 
Historical Perspectives. The British Psychological Society - History and Philosophy 
of Psychology Section. 
CritcWey, M. & Critchley, E. 1978. Dyslexia Defined. London: Acford. 
Critchley, M. 1970. The Dyslexic Child. Londow Heinemann Medical Books. 
Davis, R. 1994. The Gift ofDyslexia. Souvenir Press. 
Deleuze, G. 1988. Foucaull. Trans. & Ed. Hand, S. (orig. 1986). London: Athlone 
Press. 
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. 1987. A Thousand Plateaux. Trans. Massumi, B. 
(orig. 1980). London: Athlone Press. 
Denkla, M. 1985. 'Motor co-ordination in dyslexic children: Theoretical and clinical 
implications', in Duffy, F. & Geschwind, N. 1985. 
DenneM D. 198 1. Brainstorms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
DenneM D. 1987. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, NIA: MIT Press. 
Derrida, J. 1978. Writing and Difference. Trans. Bass, A. (orig. 1968). Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Dillon, M. 1988. Merelau-Ponty's Ontology. Bloomington: Indiana UniversitY 
Press. 
Dillon, M. 1991. (ed. ) Merleau-Ponty Vivant. Albany: State University of New 
York Press. 
Dreyfus, H. 1996. 'The Current Relevence of Merleau-Ponty's PhenomenOlOgY Of 
Embodiment', in Haber, H. & Weiss, G. 1996. 
268 
Duffy, F. & Geschwind, N. (eds. ) 1985. Dyslexia: A Neuroscientific Approach to 
Clinical Evaluation. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Ellis, A. 1993. Reading, Writing and Dyslexia. Hove (UK): LEA Publishers. 
EveratL J. (ed. ). 1999. Reading and dyslexia: visual and aftentional processes. 
London: Routledge. 
EveraM J., Bradshaw, M. & Hibbard, P. 1999. 'Visual processing and dyslexia', 
in Perception, 28(2), p. 243-254. 
Everatt, J., McNamara, S., Groeger, J. & Bradshaw, A 1999. 'Motor aspects of 
dyslexia', in Everatt, J. 1999. 
Faludy, T. & Faludy, A. 1996. A Little Edge of Darkness: A Boy's Triumph Over 
Dyslexia. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. 
Fawcett, A& Nicolson, R. (eds. ) 1994. Dyslexia in Children. London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Fawcett, A. & Nicolson, R. 1994(b). 'Speed of processing, motor skiH, automaficity 
and dyslexia', in Fawcett, A. & Nicolson, R. 1994. 
Foucault, M. 1977. Discipline and Punish. Trans. Sheridan, A. (orig, 1975). 
London: Pengum Books. 
Freeman, H. & Berrios, G. 1996.150 Years of British psychiatry: Vol. H 
London: Athlone. 
Frith, U. & Snowling, M. 1983. "Reading for meaning arid reading for sound in 
autistic and dyslexic children', in British Journal of Developmental psycholoKv, 
1, P. 329-42, 
269 
Frith, U. 198 1. 'Experimental approaches to developmental dyslexia', in 
Psychological Research, 43, p. 97-109. 
Frith, U. 1985. 'Beneath the Surface of Developmental DyslexIa", In Patterson. K. 
ei aL 1985. 
Frith, U. 1997. 'Brain, Mind and Behaviour in Dyslexia', in Hulme, C. & Sm, ling, 
M. 1997. 
Gallagher, S& Cole, J. 1995. 'Body image and body schema in a deafferented 
subject', m The Journal ofMind and Behaviour, 16, p. 369-90. 
Gallagher, S. & Cole, J. 1998. 'Body Image and Body Schema' in Welton, D. 
1998. 
Gallagher, S. 1996. 'Body Schema and Intentionality', in Burrn6dez, A. et al, 
1996. 
Gallagher, S. 1998. The Inordinance of Time. Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press. 
Garzia, R. 1993. 'Optometric Factors in Reading Disability', in Willows, D. ef al., 
1993. 
Gibson, J. 1986. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Hillsdale. NT 
LEA Publishers (reprint). 
Gillan, G. 1970. 'The Temporality of Language and the Symbolic', in Philosoplýv 
andRheloric, 3,13-39. 
Goldstein, K. 1948. Language and Language Disturbances. New York-ý Grune and 
Stratton. 
2 70 
Groner, R. & Wright S. (eds. ) 1993. Studies in Vjýýual Information Proce. s. sing, 
Holland: Elsevier, 
Haber, H. & Weiss, G, (eds. ) 1996. Perspectives on Embodiment. Loiidon, 
Routledge. 
Hampshire, S. 198 1. Susan's Story. London: Sidgewick and Jackson. 
Hanley, J., Hastie, K. & Kay, J. 1991. 'Developmental surface dyslexia and 
dysgraphia: An orthographic processing impairment', in Quarterýv Annul of 
Experimental PsycholQgy, 43A, p. 285-3 10. 
Heidegger, A 1962. Being and Time. Trans. Mcquarne, J& Robinson, F. (ong, 
1927). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Heidegger, M. 1990. Kant and the Problem ofMetaphysics. Trans. Taft, R. (orig. 
1929). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Hinshelwood, J. 1904. 'A case of congenital word-bldness, in British Medical 
Journal, 2, p. 1303-7. 
HuIrne, C& Snowfing, M (eds. ). 1994. Reading Development and Iývsle, via, Londow. 
Whuff Pubhshers. 
Huhne, C& Snowling, M. (eds. ) 1997. Dyslexia: Biology, Cognition and 
Intervention. London: Whurr Publishers. 
Hulme, C. & Snowling, M. 1992. 'Deficits in output phonology: An explanation of 
reading failureT, in Cognitive Neuropsycholog, 9, p. 47-72. 
19,1). The 
Husserl, E. 1977, Cartesian Meditations, Trans. Calms, 
D. Ong. 
Hague: Niihoff. 
271 
Husserl, E. 1982. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenolok4- and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. - General Introducowi to Pure 
Phenomenology. Trans. Kersten, F. (ofig. 1913). The Hague: Martin Nijhoff 
Husserl, E. 1989. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenolo*,, and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy, vol. 2: Studies in the PhenomenoloK', tf 
Constitution. Trans. Rojcewicz, R. & Schuwer, A. (ong. 1952). Boston. - Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Husserl, E. 1991. Collected Works. Vol. 4: On The Phenonienologv (? /- "Ie 
Consciousness Of Internal Time (1893-1917). Trans. Brough, J. (ong. 1966). 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Jacobson, P. 1979. 'Language, Thought and Truth', in Research in 
Phenomenology, Vol. IX, p. 144-167. 
Johnston, R. 1983. 'Developmental deep dyslexia', in Corlex, 19, p. 113-139. 
Johnston, R. 1996. 'Reading Disorders - Do Poor Readers Have Phonological 
ProblemsT, in, Reid, G. 1996. 
Kendell, R. 1975. 'The Concept of Disease and its implications for Psychiatry', in 
British Journal ofPsychialry, 127, p, 125-34. 
Kockelmans, J& Kisiel, T (eds. ). 1970. Phenomenologý and the Natural 
Sciences. Evanston: Northwestern UniversitY Press. 
Kockehnans, J, 1995. 'On the Function of Psychology in Nlerleau-Ponty', Farly 
Works', in Review of Existential PsycholoKY and Ps. vchjatrý-. 
Vol . xv i 11, p 
19- 
142. 
Kockelmans, J. 1970. 'Merleau-Ponty on Space Perception and Space'. in 
Kockelmans, J. & Kisiel, T. 1970. 
272 
Kwant, R. 1963, The Phenomenological Philosophy ofAlerleati-Pon, -ý-. Pi sbur In , h: Duquesne University Press. 
Laing, R. 1967. The Politics ofExperience. London- Penguin Books. 
Langer, M. 1989. Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception'. Londoný 
Macmillan Press. 
Leder, D. 1990. The Absent Body, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Lewis, J. and Frick, R- 1999. 'Row blindness in Gestalt grouping and 
developmental dyslexia', in Neuropsychologia, Vol. 37(3), p. 385-393. 
Lovegrove, W. 1994. 'Visual deficits in dyslexia: Evidence and implications', in 
Fawcett, A& Nicolson, R. 1994. 
Madison, G. 198 1. The Phenomenoloýy of Merleau-Ponw. Trans. Madison, (Y. 
Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 
Malfin, S. 1979. Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
McLoughlin, D., Fitzgibbon, G. & Young, V. 1994. Adult Dyslexia: Avscýslnenf, 
Counselling and Training. London: Whuff. 
Mctaggarý J. 1908. 'The unreality of time', in Mind, 17 (Revised edifion. No. 68), 
p. 457-74. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945. Ph9nomMologie de la perception. Paris. Gallimard. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962. Phenomenoloýy of Perception. Trans. Smith, C (ong. 
1945). London: Roudedge and Keegan Paul. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1963. Thc SIructure of Behaviour Trans. Fisher. \ (OT19- 
1942). Boston: Beacon Press. 
1 
Merleau-Ponty, 1964 (a). Signs. Trans. McCleary, R. (orig. 1960). Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1964 (b). The Primacy of Perception. Ed. Edie, J. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1968. The Visible and the Invisible. Ed. Lefort, C-, Trans. 
Lingis, A. (orig. 1964). Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1970. In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essoys. Tratis. 
O'Neil, J. (orig. 1968). Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1973. Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language. Trans. 
Silverman, H. (orig. 1964). Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1974. The Prose of the World. Ed. Lefort, C. Trans; O'Neill, J. 
(ong. 1969). London: Heinemann Educational Books. 
Miles, T. & Miles, E. 1990. Dyslexia- A hundredyears on. Milton Keynes (UK): 
Open University Press. 
Miles, T. 1983. Bangor Dyslexia Test. Cambridge: Learning Development Aids. 
Miles, T. 1993. Dyslexia: The Pattern ofDifficulties. London: Whurr. 
Miles, T. 1994. 'A Proposed Taxonomy and Some Consequences', in Fawcett, A& 
Nicolson, R. 1994. 
Miller, 1.1984. Husserl, Intentionality, and Temporal Awareness. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
Minkowski, E. 1970. Lived Time. Trans. Metzel, N. (ong. Ig-,. -, ). rvanston: 
Northwestern Press. 
274 
Newton, M. & Thompson, M. 1982. Aston Index (Revised). Cambndge: Leaming, 
Development Aids. 
O'Neill, J. 1970. Perception, Expression and History. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press. 
Olson, R., Kliegel, R., Davidson, B. & Davis, S. 1984. 'Development of phonetic 
memory in disabled and normal readers', in Journal of Experimental Child 
PsycholoAy, 3 7, P. 187-206. 
Olson, R., Wise, B., Conners, F., Rack, J. & Fulker, D. 1989. 'Specific deficits in 
reading and component language skills: genetic and environmental influences', in 
Journal ofLearning Disabilities, 22. 
Orton, S. 1937. Reading, Writing and Speech Problents in Children. New York- 
Norton. 
Patterson, K., Marshall, J., & Coltheart, A (eds. ). 1985. Surfacc Di-sle-via. 
London: Routledge and Keegan Paul. 
Paulesa, E., Frith, U., Snowling, M., Gallagher, A., Morton, J. Franckowiak, R. & 
Fnth, C. 1996. 'Is developmental dyslexia a cross-connection syndrome? Evidence 
from PET scanning', in Brain, 119, p. 143 -5 7. 
Petitot, J., Varela, F. Pachoud, B. & Roy, I (eds. ) 1999. Naturahzing 
Phenomenolqy. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Philpotý M. 1998. 'A Phenomenology of Dyslexia', in Philosophy, P, ývcluwýv and 
Psychology. Vol. 5.1, p. 1- 19. 
Philpott, M. 1999. 'The How and Why of Phenomenology: Commentary on 
Svenaeus', in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 6.2. p. 87-93. 
"75 
Pring, L. & Snowhng, M. 1986. 'Developmental changes in word recognition: an 
information processing account', En Quarterly Journal of Experimenial 
Psycholoýy, 38A, 395-418. 
Pumfrey, P. & Reason, R. 1991. Specific Learning Difficulties (Lý-slexia). London- 
Routledge. 
Rack, J. 1985. 'Orthographic and phonetic encoding in normal and dyslexic readers', 
British Journal ofPsychologv, 76, p. 325-40, 
Rack, J. 1994. 'Dyslexia: The Phonological Deficit Hypothesis', in Fawcett- A. & 
Nicolson, R. 1994. 
Rack, J., Snowling, A& Olson, R. 1992. 'The nonword reading deficit in dyslexia: 
a review I, in Reading Research Quarterly, 27, p. 29-53. 
Reid, G. & Hinton, J. 1996. 'Supporting the System - Dyslexia and Teacher Stress', 
in Reid, G. 1996. 
Reid, G. (ed. ) 1996. Dimensions of Dyslexia, Vol. 2 -- bleracy, Language atid 
Learning. Moray House Publicafions. 
Richardson, A. & Stem, J. 1993a. 'Personality characteristics of adult dyslexics', 
m Groner, R. & Wnght S. 1993. 
Richardson, A. & Stein, J. 1993b 'Dyslexia, Schizotypy, and Visual Direction 
Sense', in Tallal, P. et al. 1993. 
Rosenfield, 1.1988. The Invention ofMemory. New York: Basic Books. 
Singleton, C. 1988. 'The early diagnosis of developmental &yslexia', Support jor 
Learning, 3.2, p. 108-2 1. 
" 76 
Slaghuis, W. & Ryan, J. 1999. 'Spatio-temporal cont-ast sensifivity, coherent 
motion and visible persistence in developmental dyslexia', in Vision Re, ýearch, 
39(3), p. 651-668. 
Snowling, M, Goulandris, N. & Stackhouse, J, 1994. 'Phonological constraints on 
leami. ng to read', in Hulme, C& Snowling, M. 1994. 
Snowling, M. & Nation, K. 1997. 'Language, Phonology and Learning to Read', in 
Hulme, C. and Snowhng, M. 1997. 
Snowling, M. 1987. Dyslexia -A Cognitive Developmental Perspecuve. Oxfbrd: 
Blackwell 
Snowling, A 1995. 'Phonological processing and developmental dyslexia", iii 
Journal ofResearch in Reading, 18, p. 132-138. 
Snowling, M., Nation, K., Moxham, P., Gallagher, A. & Frith, U. 1997. 
'Phonological processing skills of dyslexic students in higher education: A 
preliminary report. ', in Journal ofResearch in Reading, 20, p. 31-41. 
Spache, G. (ed. ). 1969. Reading Disability and Perception. Newark: International 
Reading Association. 
Spicker, S. 1973. 'Inner Tune and Lived-Through Time: Husserl and Merleau- 
Ponty', In Journal of the British Societyfor Phenomenology, 4.3, p. 235-247. 
Stanovich, K. 1988, 'Explaining the difference between the dyslexic and the garden- 
variety poor reader: The phonological-core variable-difference model', in Journal of 
Learning Disabilities, 2 1, p. 590-612. 
Stanovich, K. 1994. 'Annotation: does dyslexia existT, Journal of Child 
Pývchology and Pvychialry, 35, (4), p. 579-595. 
277 
Stanovich, K., Siegel, L. & Gottardo, A. 1997. 'Progress in the Search for Dyslexia 
Subtypes', in Hulme, C& Snowling, M. 1997. 
Stein, J& Walsh, V. 1997. 'To see but not to read, the magnocellular theory of 
dyslexia', in Trends in Neurosciences, 20, p. 147-152. 
Stein, J. (ed. ) 199 1. Vision and Visual Dyslexia. London: Macmillan 
Stein, J. 1993. 'Visuospatial Perception in Disabled Readers', in Willows, D. et al. 
1993. 
Stein, J. 1994, 'A Visual Defect in Dyslexics? ', in Fawcettý A. & Nicolson, R. 1994. 
Stein, J., Riddell, P. & Fowler, M. 1988. 'Disordered vergence eye movement 
control in dyslexic children' British Journal of Opthalmology, 72, p. 162-166. 
Steinbock, A. 1997. 'Merleau-Ponty's concept of depth' in Philosophy Toc4v, 3 1, 
Winter, p. 33 6-3 5 1. 
Stephenson, L. & Fairgrieve, E. 1996. 'Dyslexia and the links with motor problems', 
in Reid, G. 1996. 
Straus, E. 1963. The Primary World of Senses. Trans. Needleman, J. (orig. 1935). 
Glencoe, N. Y: The Free Press of Glencoe. 
Strauss, A. & Kepharý N. 1955. Psychopathology and Education of the Brain- 
Injured Child. New York: Gnme and Stratton. 
Szasz, T. 1960. 'The Myth of Mental Illness', in American Psychologist, 15, 
113-18. 
Tallal, P., Galaburda, A., Lfinas, R. & von Euler, C. (eds. ) 1993. Temporal 
Iýfbrmafion Processing in the Nervous System: Special Refert, nce to I ývvlexia and 
O'sphasia. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 
682. 
278 
Theweleit, K. 1998. 'Male Bodies and the 'White Terror", in lKelton, D, 1998. 
Toombs, S. 1992. The Meaning ofIllness. Dordrecht: KluweTAcademic. 
Torgesen, J. 1988. 'Studies of children with learning disabilities %,, rho perform 
poorly on memory span tasks', in Journal of Learning Disabilities, 2 1, p. 605-612. 
Turetzky, P. 1998. Time. London: Routledge. 
Tye, A 1993. 'Blindsight and the Mystery of Consciousness' in Philosopki, and 
Cognitive Science (Supplement to Philosophy Journal) Cambridge: Royal Institute of 
Philosophy. 
Varela, F. & Shear, J. (eds. ) 1999. The View From Within. UK: Imprint Academic. 
Vellutino, F. & Scanlon, D. 1987. 'Phonological coding, phonological awareness, 
and reading ability: Evidence from a longitudinal and experimental study', in Merrill 
Palmer Quarterly, 33, p. 321-364. 
Vellutino, F. 1979. Dyslexia: Theory and Research. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Waites, L. 1980. 'Sense of Direction, The Arrow and the Alphabet'. in Bullefin of 
The Orton Society, Vol. 30, p. 277-283. 
Watson, P. 1997. 'Definitions of Specific Learning Difficulties, Dyslexia, and the 
Related Notions, Do They Have To Be Such a Dog's Dinner? ', in Cheung Chung, 
M. 1997. 
Welton, D. (ed. ). 1998. Body and Flesh. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Widdershoven, G. 1998. 'Conunentary on: 'A Phenomenolon, ' of DYS]exa", III 
Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychologv, Vol 5: 1, p. 29-3 1. 
'79 
Willows, D., Kruk, R. & Corcos, E. (eds. ) 1993, Visual Processes in Reading and 
Reading Disabilities. Hove (UK): LEA Publishers. 
Wolff, P. 1993. 'Impaired Temporal Resolution in Developmental Dyslexia'. in 
Tallal, P. ef al. 1993. 
Wolff, P., Michel, G. & Ovrut, M. 1990. 'Rate and Timing Precision of Votor 
16ý 3 Coordination in Developmental Dyslexia, Developmental Psychology, - -1. 
p. 349-359. 
Yap, R. & van de Leii, A. 1994. 'Automatic deficits in word reading', in Fawcett, 
A, & Nicolson, R. 1994. 
Zaner, R. 197 1. The Problem ofEmbodiment. The Hague: Martinus Nýjhoff, 
Word count (inc. footnotes): 79,084 
